Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

2003

The means of ignorance: genuine dialogue and a rhetoric of virtue
Daniel Anthony Grano
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Grano, Daniel Anthony, "The means of ignorance: genuine dialogue and a rhetoric of virtue" (2003). LSU
Doctoral Dissertations. 3079.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/3079

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.

THE MEANS OF IGNORANCE:
GENUINE DIALOGUE AND A RHETORIC OF VIRTUE

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Communication Studies

by
Daniel A. Grano
B.A., University of Memphis, 1995
M.M.C., Louisiana State University, 1997
August 2003

DEDICATION
This is for Dee, who sustained me with love, support, patience, and turkey sandwiches.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A special thanks goes to my mother and father, Lucille and Anthony Grano, for
teaching me the values reflected in this study, and what it means to work hard on things
that matter. I am also grateful for a blessed relationship with my brother, Ken.
My deepest gratitude goes to Dr. Andrew King, whose encouragement and guidance
throughout writing this has allowed me to say what I wanted to say; over the past several
years, what he has taught me about being a scholar is second only to what he has taught
me about being a person. I must also thank Dr. Kenneth Zagacki, another deeply
influential voice in my scholarly development, whose impact on this dissertation is
apparent to several of its readers. The rest of my committee’s contributions mean a lot to
me on a personal and professional level: through a continuing dialogue on a broad range
of ideas, Dr. Ruth Laurion Bowman has been a source of creativity, courage, and
interpretive bliss; Dr. Laura Sells has influenced my teaching, given me the means to
challenge my own ideas, and showed me that Foucault and the rest of the posties aren’t
so impenetrable after all; finally, Dr. Ellis Sandoz’s teaching and comments have
strengthened my foundational ideas and my faith in the most worthwhile pursuits.
The importance of my “supplemental” education cannot be overlooked. Here I must
thank all of my friends and colleagues in the Department of Communication Studies who
helped me along the way, especially Shaun Treat, Jon Croghan, and Christi Moss.
Through countless conversations with me on everything from rhetoric to Zen to trout,
Shaun and Jon have been central in my ascent to Ph.D. level ignorance. Christi has done
a great job of keeping me in line, and at times, of keeping me afloat. Finally, I am
grateful to Dr. Mark Williams, for all the e-mails, advice, and friendship.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION .......................................................................................................... ... ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................... .. iii
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................... .. vi
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. ... 1
Problem................................................................................................................. ... 1
Response: Socratic Ignorance ................................................................................ ... 5
Genuine Dialogue as Enacted Virtue ..................................................................... . 10
Enacted Virtue as Craft ......................................................................................... . 16
Ignorance as a Mediated Solution .......................................................................... . 18
Dialogic Community ............................................................................................. . 21
Preview of Chapters .............................................................................................. . 23
CHAPTER 2. IGNORANCE AND A RHETORICAL ETHICS OF VIRTUE...... . 25
Overview of Communication Ethics on Local and Transcendent Mediation........... . 26
Contemporary Moral Philosophy and Ignorance .................................................... . 32
CHAPTER 3. THE ETHICS OF CONTINGENCY AND IGNORANCE ............. . 41
Introduction to Contingency and Ignorance ........................................................... . 41
Uncertain Time in Narrative Theories of Moral Rhetoric....................................... . 44
Immanent Versus Transcendent Narrative:
An Evaluative Basis for Contingency .................................................................... . 50
CHAPTER 4. IMMANENT CONTINGENCY AND THE
RESTRICTION OF DIALOGUE ..................................................... . 62
Rorty’s Liberal Utopia and a New Moral Vocabulary ............................................ . 63
Moral Discourse in Rorty’s Public Sphere ............................................................. . 72
CHAPTER 5. CONTINGENCY AS UNCERTAINTY: VIRTUE AND
ARGUMENTS FROM DEFINITION .............................................. . 77
Introduction to Arguments From Definition........................................................... . 78
Socrates’ Argument From Definition..................................................................... . 80
The Priority of Definitional Knowledge Debate:
Resolving the “Socratic Fallacy” ........................................................................... . 86
Aristotle’s Practice of Virtue Definition ................................................................ . 92
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 100
CHAPTER 6. THE MEANS OF IGNORANCE: SOCRATES’
DISAVOWAL OF KNOWLEDGE .................................................. 102
Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge ....................................................................... 105
The Sincerity of the Disavowal.............................................................................. 109

iv

Socrates’ Claims to Know ..................................................................................... 123
The Elenchos and Moral Uncertainty..................................................................... 127
Conclusion: Ignorance and Genuine Dialogue ....................................................... 131
CHAPTER 7. IGNORANCE AS A DEFICIT OF KNOWLEDGE AND
THE DEPARTURE FROM DIALOGUE......................................... 134
Nicholas of Cusa’s “Learned Ignorance” ............................................................... 137
John Rawls and Justice Behind the “Veil of Ignorance”......................................... 142
Modesty and Ignorance: The Problem of Relational
Sincerity and Self-Knowledge ............................................................................... 152
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 156
CHAPTER 8. PIETY, IGNORANCE, AND THE ENACTMENT OF VIRTUE:
THE EXAMPLE OF PLATO’S EUTHYPHRO AND APOLOGY ... 159
Defining Socratic Piety.......................................................................................... 161
Piety as Enacted in the Apology............................................................................. 168
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ........................................ 173
Future Research and the Issue of Praxis ................................................................ 174
Catholic Social Teaching .................................................................................. 176
Medical Ignorance in Pedagogy and Practice .................................................... 180
Contingent, Ignorant Conclusions.......................................................................... 183
Implications .......................................................................................................... 188
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................... 194
VITA.......................................................................................................................... 201

v

ABSTRACT
Aimed at core problems of contemporary moral rhetoric - pluralistic argument,
incommensurable disagreement on ordering terms, and a theoretical move away from
essence to relativism - this study is an attempt to restore rhetoric as an art capable of
investigating and positing terms of order and being. This restoration relies upon viewing
rhetoric as a practice of epistemic mediation between the experiential and language-based
knowledge of the local, and the perfected knowledge of the Absolute. I propose
characteristically Socratic notions of contingency and ignorance as the bases for this
mediated approach. As a recognition of what is unknown and uncertain in relation to the
Absolute, contingency and ignorance promote rhetoric as “genuine dialogue,” an otherrecognizing, inclusive, and open-ended practice carried out in the local but aimed at the
Perfect. Genuine dialogue allows agents to relationally enact virtue, collapsing virtue and
rhetoric together as a craft or techne. The study is structured as an argument against
immanent notions of contingency (in historical and political utopianism and
progressivism), and a-discursive notions of ignorance, which are demonstrated to violate
basic values of dialogue. Concluding remarks focus on the praxis of contingent, ignorant
dialogue as enacted in actual policy settings, as well as focusing on future directions and
applications.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Problem
Concerning the “ancient question of the right use of rhetoric,” Ralph T. Eubanks
(1968) writes that the hope of an ideal rhetoric, “undimmed for 2500 years,” can only be
made relevant for the present human condition by making a “new wisdom” operate in
human affairs (187). Contemporary rhetoric, however, has tracked an ontological and
epistemic downturn, declining from a substantive order of Being “through reason,
pragmatic intellect, usefulness, production forces…to biological drives”1 making the
bases for a new moral wisdom difficult to locate. Where this slide has landed
contemporary moral rhetoric - in base pragmatics, pluralistic confusion, argumentative
disablement, or a theoretical over-emphasis on difference - is a matter of where theorists
wish to focus their anxieties. Frentz (1985) argues that with “the rise of science and the
advent of positivism, rhetoric and morality have become disjoined, leaving both adrift,
depreciated, and vulnerable to redefinition in terms of the presuppositions of
contemporary philosophies” (1). Farrell (1986) complains that rhetoric has become a
disabled moral art: it “no longer mimes an ordered world, even if it ever did. And with
the shattering of mirrors has come a mad scramble for interpretive authority…
Appearances and ‘orders’ are all we have” (15). Most importantly, we have lost the sort

1

Voegelin, Eric “Necessary Moral Bases for Communication in a Democracy,” in
Problems of Communication in a Pluralistic Society. Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 1956.
66-67. Quoted in Eubanks, Ralph T. “Nihilism and the Problem of a Worthy Rhetoric.”
Southern Speech Journal 33 (1968) : 199. Here, Voegelin is describing a decline of order
in Western civilization, which he relates to a decline in American communication.
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of wisdom that can make the formation of a “Just society” and the search for a “common
Good” possible through speech in human community. This study proposes that a “new”
wisdom for moral practice may be found in ignorance.
Recently, rhetorical theorists aggravated by argument in a relativized and pluralistic
world have been attempting to recover virtue-terms as expressions of communal order.
For several of them Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue has been influential in framing
attempts at restoring an ethics of virtue to public argument (see Herrick, 1992; Farrell,
1991; Johannesen, 1991; Frentz, 1985; Fisher, 1984). MacIntyre (1984) summarizes our
problem as “emotivism,” “the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more
specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of
attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character” (12). The
emotivist attitude leads to the belief that “moral judgments, being expressions of attitude
or feeling, are neither true nor false; and agreement in moral judgment is not to be
secured by any rational method,” but instead by “producing certain non-rational effects
on the emotions or attitudes of those who disagree with one” (12). This lack of grounding
for moral discourse produces the attitude that the “utterance of any universal principle is
in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will” (20-21).
The context of emotivist rhetorical practice is liberal individualism, which pictures
community as an “arena in which individuals each pursue their own self-chosen
conception of the good life…” (195). No one public moral utterance can be said to be
better than any other, and the ability to effectively and even usefully talk about morality
is lost. MacIntyre offers the “disquieting suggestion” that we have utterly lost the ability
to discuss morality and to secure moral agreement (2). Public utterances of concepts such
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as “virtue,” “justice,” “piety,” “duty,” and “ought,” are deprived of the historical contexts
that once gave them meaning, and we have no consistent means of talking about them (2,
10). The result is that modern moral disputes have an “interminable character,” that there
“seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture” as evidenced
by debates over what makes a “just war,” or how to negotiate rights of bodily possession
versus murder in abortion debates (6-7).
A major cost of the loss of argumentative and interpretive foundations is a pragmatic
turn in moral rhetoric away from discussions of “virtue,” “justice,” and “piety,” and
toward winning. Herrick (1992) notes that rhetoric, removed in our pluralistic society
from an agreed upon standard for ethical practice, has become directed not at seeking
“consensus,” “community,” or “humanness,” but rather “victory, ideological hegemony,
or…’having the last word’” (133-134). Research on etiquette manuals (WhittenbergerKeith, 1992) has revealed that this merely pragmatic focus on ethical rhetoric has resulted
in a historical reduction of the concept of virtue once based in internal foundations (such
as individual character), to something residing in appearances, and finally, “to a
persuasive tool outside the individual” (34). In this final contemporary (described as
“postmodern”) state, virtue becomes “management,” a tool “not really concerned with
values at all,” but rather “concerned with one’s ability to use the manners system and the
rules of etiquette to ‘get what one wants’ despite constraints” (37). Another pragmatic
outcome has been the rise of public “experts” who expound a brand of “truth” that merely
“prevails at the moment” (Fisher 1984, 12).
Complicating the contemporary search for foundations in moral argument, rhetoric,
being “potentially persuasive and adversarial discourse” is situated in a problematic way
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for the communication ethicist (Herrick, 135). Herrick argues that “the disparate nature of
concrete values in modern urban societies,” mandate that “in the contemporary context, a
rhetorical ethic must have utility for argumentation among persons disagreeing about the
very bases of morality itself, and thus about the bases of policy, justice, and virtue” (135).
Abstract and Absolute values lose their footing and dissolve under the pressure of public,
local, and personal desires. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) point out that even
when abstract values such as “the True, the Good, the Beautiful, and the Absolute” seem
to acquire universal agreement this is only due to their generality. As soon as their
content is specified “we meet only the adherence of particular audiences” (76). The
removal of interpretive foundations for an ethic of rhetoric causes the theorist or
practitioner that goes looking for ordering terms - justice, piety, equality, the Good - to
run “directly into the problem of contemporary urban society’s divergent moral
perspectives…” (Herrick, 135).
Celeste Michelle Condit (1987) has argued that individual desires are not as
problematic for moral rhetoric as MacIntyre, Frentz, and Farrell assume. Condit claims
that competing rhetors persuade audiences and create “public consensus” that does not
require total approval by every individual (but rather “minimal satisfaction”), and that
this allows for the production of public moral consensus from individual desires (81).
Condit claims that general resistance to the idea that morality can be humanly grounded
is based on a “fallacy of composition and division,” that falsely assumes “that a
‘collective will,’ because its components are individual desires, can be no more than a
bundle of individual desires, and similarly, that a collective will cannot transcend the
interests of the collectivity.” Rather, Condit writes “It is precisely the practice of public
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rhetoric that converts individual desires into something more – something carrying moral
import, which can anchor the will of the community” (82) Condit is optimistic that the
‘public’ does not endorse enactment of social policies for apparently selfish interests,”
and that “only when a policy can be presented as bearing greater goods will it be
endorsed” (82). I share Condit’s optimism that public moral argument can produce a
sense of greater good, but I disagree that individual desires do not problematize that
process. My argument will point out that individual desires, disconnected from practices
aimed at terms of order and being, often become articulated through base pragmatics and
progressivist programs, both of which endanger dialogue.
Contemporary ethical rhetoric can justify its departure from idealist approaches on
the grounds that their foundations have been crippled by an increased sensitivity to
historical and experiential context. These recognitions of epistemic limitation and
contingency plague moral argument at large, and especially universalist proposals. My
study turns this justification around by taking the limits of human moral epistemology
(moral ignorance) and contingency as the bases for recovering rhetoric as an art capable
of articulating and examining terms of being. By returning to classical (Socratic and
Aristotelian) theories of practice, I will propose a rhetorical ethics of virtue based in
idealist notions of contingency and ignorance.
Response: Socratic Ignorance
Socratic ignorance is the key ethic in a larger dialogue practice that seeks moral terms
like piety, justice, or courage as Ideas or essences, in an attempt to make them consistent
bases for moral judgment across contexts. A thorough consideration of Socratic
ignorance reveals that the problems of epistemology that plague moral investigations and
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moral reason (as discussed in the next chapter) can actually form an ethics for moral
discourse. My investigation of Socratic ignorance will describe this ethic and outline its
possibilities as an idealist solution for problems of moral argument in contemporary
rhetoric. As an existing discourse that makes unknowing both a situated and ideal ethic,
Socratic ignorance illustrates several potential contributions to these problems.2

2

It is appropriate to raise the matter of the “Socratic question” in order to describe the
labeling of the ideas that are of interest to me as “Socratic.” Kennedy (1999) defines what
is commonly called the “Socratic question” as the problem of the extent to which Plato’s
dialogues are vehicles for the actual views of Socrates, and the extent to which they are
vehicles for Plato’s own philosophical thought. According to Kennedy the most common
view today is that the historical Socrates stressed the need to examine assumptions and
form definitions, and that although many Platonic doctrines such as “Forms,”
recollection, and imitation were perhaps inspired by Socrates’ interests, Plato felt free to
develop his own ideas, retaining Socrates as a dramatic figure (54). Kennedy, George A.
Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition From Ancient to Modern
Times. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1999.
Vlastos (1991) works through this “historical Socrates” distinction in more detail, and
offers that from a historical standpoint one would be more concerned with whether or not
the ideas articulated through Socrates’ mouth were accurately Socrates’ own ideas; that
is, were they expressed somewhat verbatim by the historical Socrates? From a
philosophical standpoint, historical accuracy matters less than what the articulated ideas
mean, and to which degree they are Socratic in a more general sense (by this I mean to
which degree they are influenced by Socrates’ basic ideas) (45). Vlastos, Gregory.
Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1991.
Consistent with Kennedy, Vlastos (1991) claims that Plato, in his earlier writings,
remains convinced of the truth of Socrates’ methods and teachings, but at no point in his
quest does Plato become “shackled” by Socrates’ ideas (53). Instead, Plato is free to
change without severing the ties to his teacher, and as he changes, so does the
philosophical Socrates change, absorbing Plato’s new convictions, and arguing them with
the same “zest” with which Socrates argued the ideas of the earliest dialogues (53).
I am viewing the ideas I am interested in as “Socratic” based on the
historical/philosophical distinction. The “Socratic question” has minimal impact for
philosophical interpretations of the dialogues. At the beginning of his treatment of the
“Socratic question,” Vlastos (1991) asks himself, “why not let the historians have the
Socrates of history all to themselves, keeping for myself the enchanting figure whose
challenge to philosophers would be the same whether he were historic fact or Platonic
fiction?” If his aims were purely philosophical, writes Vlastos, this would have been his
decision (45). Scholars like Vlastos who are interested in history must examine the
problem of Socrates contra Socrates in Plato, but that is not my concern here.
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In Socratic ignorance we have the conjunction of two discourses that seem at odds
with one another; in this study, unraveling the paradox of this conjunction will reveal
lessons for contemporary practices, as well as a reconsideration of idealist practices. The
first discourse is definitional argument, where Socrates seeks the Idea or Form of a given
virtue (for example piety, justice, or friendship) for the sake of judgment. Consider the
exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro on the matter of what the holy is as a primary
example (Euthyphro 6d-e):3
SOCRATES: …At present, try to tell me more clearly what I asked you a little while
ago, for, my friend, you were not explicit enough before when I put the question.

Finally, I can dispatch of the problem of the “Socratic question” by pleading reliance
on the literature and the authors I utilize most heavily in my study. I am calling those
ideas and problems “Socratic” that researchers in Socratic philosophy call by the same
name. For a defense of the interpretive principles behind these determinations see
Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Nicholas D. Smith. The Philosophy of Socrates. Boulder,
CO: Westview, 2000. 11-52.
3

I use Lane Cooper’s translation of Euthyphro throughout the study because key
passages relevant to my argument are presented in a helpful way. Plato. Euthyphro.
Trans. Lane Cooper. Ithaca, NY: Cornell, UP, 1941. Reprinted in The Collected
Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns.
Princeton: Princeton UP, 1961. 170-185. The subject of the Euthyphro is considered
interchangeably by translators to be “piety” or “holiness.” The forms that appear in the
dialogue are hosion, meaning holy, hallowed, or sanctioned, and eusebes, meaning pious,
religious, or reverent. While the meanings are not precisely the same, translators
variously offer the subject of the dialogue as either “piety” or “holiness.” In the
Introduction to the Fowler (1999) translation in the Loeb Classical Library edition, for
example, the Euthyprho is described as a discussion “of the nature of piety, or holiness,
the chief theme of the dialogue.” Fowler, Harold North (Trans). “Introduction to the
Euthyphro.” Plato I: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus. Cambridge: Harvard
UP, 1999. Mark McPherran (2000) assumes, “as most commentators do,” that eusebes “is
used synonymously” with hosion “since to all appearances they are used interchangeably
and unsystematically” (300). McPherran, Mark L. “Piety, Justice, and the Unity of
Virtue.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2000) : 299-328. On this basis, I will
discuss the subject of the Euthyphro as piety or holiness interchangeably throughout my
study.
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What is holiness? You merely said that what you are now doing is a holy deed namely, prosecuting your father on a charge of murder.
EUTHYPHRO: And, Socrates, I told the truth.
SOCRATES: Well, bear in mind that what I asked of you was not to tell me one or
two out of all the numerous actions that are holy; I wanted you to tell me what is the
essential form of holiness which makes all holy actions holy. I believe you held that
there is one ideal form by which unholy things are all unholy, and by which all holy
things are holy. Do you remember that?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.
SOCRATES: Well then, show me what, precisely, the ideal is, so that, with my eye
on it, and using it as a standard, I can say that any action done by you or anybody else
is holy if it resembles this ideal, or, if it does not, can deny that it is holy.
The above is an example of Socrates’ “What is F?” question, a definitional practice
that is part of his method of moral investigation, the elenchos. As a search for eidos
(Idea), Socrates’ definitional method of questioning is a relevant practice for the problem
of order and foundation in contemporary moral rhetoric. Its most important contribution
and its possibilities for returning rhetoric to a language of being are illustrated by the role
of ignorance.
Through his disavowal of knowledge, Socrates claims ignorance on the very bases of
moral knowledge that would allow him to define the Idea of the virtue terms he pursues
in practice. Socrates’ disavowal is most prominent in the Apology, as told in the narrative
of his first speech. The oracle at Delphi has stated that he, Socrates, is the wisest of all
men. Troubled by this, Socrates wonders what the god might mean, for, he says “I am
only too conscious that I have no claim to wisdom, great or small” (21b). To examine the
Oracle’s claim, Socrates seeks out men who are wiser, first going to the politicians, who,
he finds, think they are wise, but are in fact not. Socrates concludes that he must indeed
be wiser, because it is likely that neither of them knows anything noble and good, but
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where the politician believes he knows, Socrates is aware that he himself does not know
(21c-e). Socrates similarly examines the poets and manual artisans, and comes to the
same conclusion: they think they know what they do not. The narrative ends with the
realization that, if Socrates is wise, this is based on his cognizance of the truth that he is
nothing with respect to wisdom (23b).
As a search for foundations of moral judgment and utterance, Socrates’ method
should break down before it begins. After all, his search is aimed at moral knowledge at
the level of Form and Idea, yet he has disavowed the possibility of that knowledge not
only for himself, but for his interlocutors as well. Unraveling this apparent stasis will be
my method for offering an ethics of ignorance to contemporary rhetoric. I will derive this
ethic from a description of the form, content, aims, and outcomes of dialogue that
Socratic ignorance promotes. My analysis will be directed at two primary ambitions.
First, I will offer Socratic practice as evidence that making idealist notions of ignorance
and contingency ethics in moral discourse promotes that discourse as a “genuine”
dialogue, a true recognition of otherness and other arguments, in an inclusive pursuit of
Absolutes. Socratic ignorance also allows me to offer idealist notions of ignorance and
contingency as evaluative bases for distinguishing between dialogues that are inclusive
and other-recognizing, and those that are “false,” that shut down moral argument by
various means of removal and avoidance. Idealist solutions are justified throughout the
study on the basis that they are more dialogic than their immanentist counterparts.
Second, I will generally reconsider the aims and outcomes of idealist discursive practices
through the lens of their limitations. The example of Socratic practice allows for a redescription of essentialist dialogue as ethically ordered around ignorance and
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contingency. Reconsidering the possibilities of ideal dialogue in these terms demonstrates
its potential as a response to pluralistic forms of moral debate, as well as its possibilities
for actual practice in the contemporary public sphere.
Examination on both these points will support my primary goal, to demonstrate that
ignorance promotes “genuine” dialogue as an enactment of virtue. The emphasis on
enactment contributes to idealist theories of rhetoric a thoroughly practiced perspective.
It also implies a standard for the performance of dialogue that can either be more or less
virtuous based on its ignorant and contingent qualities. Unraveling the paradox of
Socratic ignorance will provide distinctions between certainty and uncertainty, inclusive
and restrictive dialogue, and dialogic and a-dialogic notions of ignorance and
contingency. A beginning definition of dialogue as “genuine” and “enacted virtue”
provides a starting point for understanding these distinctions.
Genuine Dialogue as Enacted Virtue
In communication ethics, “dialogue” can mean anything from the general give and
take of the public political arena, to Platonic dialogue, to communication ethics that
challenge monologic models (Johannesen 2002, 55). Generally, the dialogic perspective
evaluates communication ethics based on “the attitudes toward each other held by the
participants in a communication transaction.” Participant attitudes are the basis for
judging the ethical level of communication, with the assumption that attitudes
characteristic of dialogue are “more fully human, humane, and facilitative of selffulfillment,” than are those attitudes characteristic of monologue. Dialogical attitudes are
“held to best nurture and actualize each individual’s capacities and potentials…” and
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techniques are analyzed to determine the dialogic (ethical) versus monologic (unethical)
communication content (55-56).
This study specifies a definition of “genuine dialogue” and applies it to discussions
on Socrates’ method of questioning, positing, testing, and retesting, moral theses; genuine
dialogue will be the description of enacted virtue offered throughout. My argumentative
task will be to demonstrate how ignorance promotes dialogue in its genuine form.4
Genuine dialogue will identify those dialogues that maintain discourse as a search for
Absolutes without sacrificing other-recognition, nor the recognition of the locality of
human practices; my study will discuss other-recognition primarily as an inclusive ethic
of arguments and argument vocabularies. Descriptions of dialogue as “ethical” or “true”
generally emphasize otherness. Maranhao (1990) writes that one approach to ethical
dialogue rests in “the relation between Self and Other,” so that dialogue is “ethical in the
sense of the Self’s turning to the Other” (18). The idea that Socratic ignorance is a sincere
turning to argumentative others will be an especially important focus. For Buber, this
sincerity is at the heart of “genuine” dialogue: participants must truly have the other or
4

Issues of “form” and “content” pertaining to dialogue are not without controversy.
Details on the debates that variously separate or synthesize form and content in dialogue
are outside the scope of my study. It will suffice to say here that I am taking a stance on
the interpretation of dialogue that makes form and content inextricable. Put another way,
my view does not separate dialogue as form from epistemology as content. When I
emphasize dialogue form I am implicitly discussing content, because, in the case of
Socratic ignorance, it is the content (the disavowal of knowledge) that promotes the form
(genuine dialogue). When I discuss content I am implicitly talking about form, since the
meaning of the content (the inclusiveness of ignorance, the meaning of individual
arguments) promotes and maintains the integrity of the form. In this way the meaning of
both what is said (ignorance) and how it is said (through the act of questioning and
testing) are matters of focus. For an introduction to the greater issues here, see Maranhao,
Tullio. Introduction. The Interpretation of Dialogue. Ed. Tullio Maranhao. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1990. 1-22.

11

others in mind, turning to them with the intention of establishing a living and mutual
relationship (Friedman 2002, 101).
Bakhtin (1984) echoes this requirement, with the addition that “real” dialogue is
open-ended. In Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, he writes:
the new artistic position of the author with regard to the hero in Dostoevsky’s
polyphonic novel is a fully realized and thoroughly consistent dialogic position, one
that affirms the independence, internal freedom, unfinalizability, and indeterminacy
of the hero…The hero is the subject of a deeply serious, real dialogic mode of
address, not the subject of a rhetorically performed or conventionally literary one.
And this dialogue - the “great dialogue” of the novel as a whole - takes place not in
the past, but right now, that is, in the real present of the creative process. This is no
stenographer’s report of a finished dialogue, from which the author has already
withdrawn and over which he is now located as if in some higher decision-making
position: that would have turned an authentic and unfinished dialogue into an
objectivized and finalized image of a dialogue, of the sort usual for every monologic
novel. The great dialogue in Dostoevsky is organized as an unclosed whole of life
itself, life poised on the threshold (63).5
This passage draws vital lines for my analysis. Setting “unfinalizability,”
“indeterminacy,” “unfinished,” and “unclosed” as standards for “real,” “great,” and “fully
realized” dialogue, adds to genuine dialogue an uncertain and extensive ethic of

5

The dynamic turning to the other enters people into dialogic relationship with an
“encompassing awareness” and “inclusion,” that does not compromise their individual
sense of self or agency (Friedman 2002, 356-357). On this point “Bakhtin,” writes
Friedman, “shares Buber’s emphasis upon the alternation of distancing and entering
relation as the heart of genuine dialogue” (356). This allows for a genuine turning to the
other as an act of inclusion without giving up the “ground of one’s consciousness” or the
ability to “see through one’s own eyes” (357). Friedman, Maurice S. The Life of
Dialogue (4th ed). New York: Routledge, 2002. On this distancing and entering, Bakhtin
(1984) writes: “The author speaks not about a character, but with him…only a dialogic
and participatory orientation takes another person’s discourse seriously, and is capable of
approaching it both as a semantic position and as another point of view. Only through
such an inner dialogic orientation can my discourse find itself in intimate contact with
someone else’s discourse, and yet at the same time not fuse with it, not swallow it up, not
dissolve in itself the other’s power to mean; that is, only thus can it retain fully its
independence as a discourse” (63-64). Bakhtin, Mikhail. Problems of Dostoevsky’s
Poetics. Ed. and Trans. Carl Emerson. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
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contingency. I will argue that this kind of contingency is preserved in divine views of
time and practice. Bakhtin’s oppositional list - “finished,” “finalized,” “objectivized” - as
markers of monologic discourse will be argued as the result of immanent and
programmatic views of practice.
Adding to a conception of “false” dialogue, Buber notes that “the participants do not
really have each other in mind, or they have each other in mind only as general and
abstracted opponents and not as particular beings,” so that there “is no real turning to the
other, no real desire to establish mutuality” (Friedman, 143, emphasis mine). The idea of
confronting others as dialogic opponents calls to mind Herrick’s (1992, 135) claim that
contemporary moral rhetoric is adversarial discourse in a competitive public arena. As
my argument is a general response to this problem, the conception of ignorance I offer is
a particular response to the competitive impulse in contemporary moral argument;
ignorance maintains “genuine” dialogue by promoting moral argument as a practice
aimed at mutual discovery rather than victory. I will also offer an elaboration on “false”
dialogue throughout the study by aligning it with immanentized perspectives on
contingency and ignorance that actually shut down discourse.
Buber is particularly helpful in outlining a “genuine” dialogue for my study because
he maintains an ethic of “other” recognition as its determinant, but does not translate
otherness into a relativistic form of moral pluralism or individualism that sacrifices
dialogue as a search for Absolutes. Buber’s proposal for recapturing true and genuine
dialogue as a turn to the “other” requires that we first “escape from that modern idolatry
which leads us to sacrifice ‘the ethical’ on the altar of our particular causes.” This is
manifest as the rise of a “new conscience” that will summon people “to guard with the
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innermost power of their souls against the confusion of the relative with the Absolute”
(Buber 1952, 155). Escape from this idolatry (and a return to genuine dialogue) comes
only when we “penetrate again and again into the false absolute with an incorruptible,
probing glance until one has discovered its limits, its limitedness - there is today perhaps
no other way to reawaken the power of the pupil to glimpse the never-vanishing
appearance of the Absolute” (155-156).
In addition to this beginning framework for “genuine dialogue,” Thomas Farrell’s
(1991) idea of a relational good helps us to picture enacted virtue. It upholds a standard
of dialogic “otherness,” and has the additional benefit of allowing us to derive a
characteristically rhetorical definition of virtue. Farrell’s relational goods perspective is
based on MacIntyre’s (1984) notion of goods internal and external to a practice.
MacIntyre defines a practice as follows:
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended (187).
Frentz’s (1985) unpacking of this definition is excellent. First, “a practice is a
cooperative human activity engaged in by persons who cojointly value the goods intrinsic
to that practice” (2). So, throwing a football with skill (an individual act) is not a practice,
but the game of football (a collective activity) is, just as Bricklaying is not a practice, but
architecture is (Frentz, 2; MacIntyre, 187). Second, “practices have internal goods which
can only be achieved by participating in that practice” (Frentz, 2). Using the example of
chess, MacIntyre (1984) makes a distinction between goods internal and external to a
practice. External goods are those goods “contingently attached to chess-playing and to
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other practices by the accidents of social circumstance” such as “prestige, status, and
money.” These goods can be achieved in a number of other practices and are “never to be
had only by engaging in some particular kind of practice.” Internal goods, conversely, are
goods such as “analytical skill, strategic imagination, and competitive intensity,” all of
which might be gained from playing chess. These goods are internal because they are
specific to the activity that produces them (e.g. chess or another activity of a specific
kind), and they “can only be identified and recognized by the experience of participating
in the practice in question” (188-189).
Farrell (1991) notes that the internal/external distinction becomes serviceable to
rhetoric if we realize first that the goods internal to an activity “are not necessarily the
reason one seeks to master the practice,” and more importantly that “the ‘goods’ that are
cultivated are not always localized within the autonomous agent alone” (186). One
person improves the other through his or her own excellence in an activity, and this
means “we should not confuse goods that are internal to a practice with virtues that are
somehow interior to its practitioner alone,” because some such goods “require another
person in order to be practiced and thereby cultivated” (186-187). These goods are
relational. Farrell argues that this idea is “pivotal to rhetoric” (187):
I think we are now in a position to claim that the “goods” or qualities internal to
rhetoric are necessarily relational. Like competitiveness and strategic imagination
(which mastery of rhetoric is also capable of providing), they require some other in
order to be practiced. But beyond this, some very important civic qualities – such as
civic friendship, a sense of social justice – are actively cultivated through excellence
in rhetorical practice. These qualities, in other words, are not distinctions for the
autonomous agent to master; they are qualities of the body politic itself…Truly we
have been introduced to a practice, that is – a coherent, creative activity admitting to
certain standards of accomplishment (187).
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Farrell offers two important additions to a concept of genuine dialogue as enacted
virtue. First, the idea of a good being relational reinforces the dialogic ethic of otherness,
but draws our attention more squarely on a given civic virtue, or list of virtues, as the
argumentative and creative focus of other-recognizing practices. By this idea we can
move from the general statement that genuine dialogue recognizes otherness as an ethical
act, to the specific statement that genuine dialogue relies upon otherness for the civic
investigation and cultivation of virtues - piety, justice, courage, and so on. Secondly, by
describing the idea of a relational good, Farrell implies that the goods relational to moral
rhetoric are not only a description of its possible outcomes but also realized in its form
and activity. That is, civic argument as a cultivation of virtue requires otherness in order
to become a real practice. In this way the form of the practice and its outcome are
intimately related; enacting relational rhetoric and enacting relational (civic) virtue both
require the same good of otherness, realized not only in particular arguments, but in
overall form. Added to Buber’s requirements for genuine dialogue, there is an overall
synthesis between the cultivation of dialogue and the cultivation of virtue in civic
settings, enriching the idea of enactment. Grounding virtue so thoroughly in practice
requires a fitting definition. In this study I define virtue as a craft, or techne.
Enacted Virtue as Craft
The idea that genuine dialogue and relational goods outline identifiable standards for
accomplishment in moral discourse implies an analogy of virtue as a craft or techne; the
idea is consistent with the Socratic focus of my study. Brickhouse and Smith (2000)
argue that the type of knowledge about which Socrates questions others, and seeks
himself, is “in many respects like the wisdom, or techne, a craftsman possesses, which
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enables the craftsman to produce some characteristic ergon (product or task)” (141; also
see 169). The basic idea is that virtue is a craft in the sense that it consists of doing, as a
morally creative process, and finds the knowledge for performing its practice from the
considerations and materials specific to its craft. Just as medicine and law admit of
certain standards of practice for the production of their desired ends, so does ethical
rhetoric have standards for the desired production of virtue.
The craft analogy highlights the lived aspect of morality. In his essay on ethics as
craft, James D. Wallace (1988) articulates the basic premise that views living as “an
everyday occurrence that takes place in a complex and demanding world,” noting that
this calls upon moral knowledge grounded in an understanding of the problems of our
lives, requiring intellectual resources “no more ephemeral than the intellectual resources
needed to pursue such activities as healing, carpentry, or playing a musical instrument.”
This is the craft analogy (223). What is needed to pursue a craft intelligently or
successfully depends on “the point or purpose of the activity and the sorts of difficulties
its practitioners encounter,” providing us the “standard according to which the craft is
practiced well or badly…” (223). MacIntyre’s internal/external goods perspective, and
Farrell’s relational goods, imply a craft definition of virtue, inasmuch as the goods
relevant to practices set the standards for their accomplishment.
Just as MacIntyre’s and Farrell’s theories on practices and goods have an Aristotelian
heritage, so does the craft analogy. Wallace (1988) notes that scholars who find the craft
perspective promising inherit an Aristotelian question on human practice and the good
(224). Aristotle wrote in Nicomachean Ethics,
just as the goodness and performance of a flute player, a sculptor, or any kind of
expert, and generally of anyone who fulfills some function or performs some action,
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are thought to reside in his proper function, so the goodness and performance of man
would seem to reside in whatever is his proper function. Is it then possible that while
a carpenter and a shoemaker have their own proper functions and spheres of action,
man as man has none, but was left by nature a good-for-nothing without a function?
(1097b26-31).
Aristotle’s own answer reveals the usefulness of the craft perspective for rhetoric:
if we take the proper function of man to be a certain kind of life, and if this kind of
life is an activity of the soul and consists in actions performed in conjunction with the
rational element, and if a man of high standards is he who performs these actions well
and properly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance
with the excellence appropriate to it; we reach the conclusion that the good of man is
an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several
virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete (1098a14-18, emphasis mine).
The italicized portion of the above quote points out that the craft perspective allows
us to identify rhetoric practiced well or badly, virtuously or poorly, in conformity with
the standards of excellence specific to its activity; in virtuous rhetoric, we look for
excellences of virtue in its procedures and product. In dialogue, excellence and virtue are
achieved by the standards of “genuine” dialogue. On the idea that genuine dialogue has
the identifiable standards of other-recognition and Absolute, the craft perspective allows
for questions on its accomplishments according to these standards: “do the practitioners
of genuine dialogue enact the virtues that its practice demands?” “Are the outcomes
produced by genuine dialogue in conformity with the standards of excellence particular to
its activity?” The additional question I ask in this study is “what ethics allow for the
enactment of these standards and outcomes through practice?”
Ignorance as a Mediated Solution
Given contemporary contextual emphases on historical moment, cultural diversity,
and the influence of language on human experience, an idealist proposal seeking
“otherness” must offer a full account of the local as it seeks Absolute terms of order. The
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accomplishments of genuine dialogue rely on a sense of mediation. In a practical sense
the unknown that ignorance describes is an epistemic gap between local human
experience and the realm of Ideals and Absolutes. The problem faced by an idealist
proposal emphasizing techne is a matter of negotiation: how do practitioners mediate the
epistemic gap in moral rhetorical practice between the local and the Absolute without
overemphasizing the Absolute (thus making the accomplishments of the practice
unattainable), nor the local (thus repeating the problems of emotivism and moral
pluralism)?
Ignorance becomes useful for framing an answer. The specific statement of mediation
made in this study is that ignorance can emphasize difference without turning to
relativism. By the example of Socratic practice, I will demonstrate the mediation
ignorance is capable of accomplishing in genuine dialogue between arguments invented
from local, experiential materials, and the articulation of discoveries made on the realm
of Absolutes. References to “mediation” throughout the study will describe a negotiation
of the problem of unknowing created by the limitations of human language and
experience. David Frank (1997) describes Perelman’s work on justice as an attempt at
this kind of mediation, an effort to “navigate between the polarities of idealism and
relativism,” by offering “a reason and logic designed for a world of pluralism…in need of
a system of justice” (312). Perelman’s perspective “incorporated the Jewish and Christian
prophetic view of justice” because of its “ability to include the immanent and
transcendent” and produce forms of debate “that bridged universal principles to particular
circumstances” (Frank, 314). My proposal for mediation adds a thorough discussion of
ignorance and contingency as a way to address the centrally epistemic considerations of
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immanent/transcendent forms of discourse. Systems and practices of ethical rhetoric are
generally complicated by issues of moral epistemology, and this seems especially true for
proposals that try to negotiate gaps between the local and transcendent. For this reason
the study of moral rhetoric generally, and systems like Perelmanian justice specifically,
may benefit from a better conversation on ignorance.
My focus on ignorance in the enacted form and content of dialogue also allows me to
contribute a focus on practice, potentially adding to general “systems” of justice such as
that offered by Perelman. Through the consistent focus on practice in my study the
concept of phronesis as mediation is expanded. As a concept traditionally concerned with
managing moral choice in communal, relational (other-recognizing) practices (Arnett
1987, 45; Johannensen 2002, 26-29, 68-69), practical wisdom is a situated account of
moral agency and argument. Farrell (1991) has written that because rhetoric involves
“directional choices from among an array of options,” the “other” becomes important in
considering these options, and “rhetorical phronesis cannot be enacted without at least a
partial intuition of what the ‘appropriate’ is in each historically specific context” (194).
At a deeper level, phronesis mediates between considerations of concrete situation
and the realm of Absolutes. In an essay on Aristotle’s contribution to phronesis in this
sense, Johnstone (1980) writes that “the exercise of practical wisdom (phronesis) in
choosing conduct manifests the human capacity for deliberation and self-conscious
action; it manifests, in short, the essentially human power of logos” (2). Johnstone
defines logos in a general sense as the “rational principle” that “involves a rule or
standard according to which practical deliberation proceeds and actions are judged or
appraised,” implying that the agent “can act self-consciously, with an awareness of what
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one is doing and why one ought to be doing it” (2). Practical wisdom is the enactment of
this capacity, “the power of good deliberation,” an “excellence of the practical intellect,”
with an aim “to discover through deliberation ‘truth’ about rightness in action…” (3).
Describing the mediated focus of phronesis, Johnstone writes: “The objective…therefore,
is the apprehension of moral truth, of truth in the probable and contingent realm of
action” (3).
Ignorance and contingency contribute to practical wisdom as mediation by focusing
on the epistemic gaps that make discovering truth in a probable realm so problematic. As
Farrell (1991) notes, the idea of phronesis “has always involved an uneasy tension among
form, content, and context” (196). Socratic ignorance reconciles with this unease, making
it a basis for practical action in idealist moral agency.
Dialogic Community
Finally, the dialogic focus of this study is intended to reconsider moral community as
an order of goods constructed through speech. For Buber, recapturing genuine dialogue is
the way to establish “true community” as a turn to the other (Buber 1949, 30-32, 201;
also see Friedman, 171-172). In Between Man and Man Buber (1949) writes
“community…is the being no longer side by side but with one another of a multitude of
persons…a dynamic facing of, the other…” (31). Friedman summarizes Buber’s
definition of community as “an organic unity which has grown out of common
possessions, work, morals, or belief.” This is differentiated from collectivity, which is a
“mechanical association of isolated self-seeking individuals,” “an ordered division of
society into self-seeking individuals held together by force, compromise, convention, and
public opinion” (Friedman, 52).
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The movement from community to collectivity troubles Buber as a move away from
dialogue. “Collectivity,” Buber (1949) writes, “is based on an organized atrophy of
personal existence, community on its increase and confirmation in life lived towards one
another.” Buber adds that the move toward collectivity is “a flight from community’s
testing and consecration of the person, a flight from the vital dialogic, demanding the
staking of the self, which is in the heart of the world” (31-32).
Buber reveals that a self-interested and individualistic public sphere (what MacIntyre
identifies as a state of “liberal individualism”) sacrifices both genuine dialogue and true
community according to the standard of other-recognition. By challenging contemporary
pluralism with genuine dialogue, Buber offers a discursive standard for the construction
of “true” community. The definition I derive from this standard maintains community as
an order of goods established by and tested through the relational, dialogic arguments
of people, who can establish together a common order of morals and beliefs. This
definition not only captures a dialogic focus, but also specifies the activity of Socratic
dialogue (through the What is F? question and elenchos). Throughout the study
references to “genuine dialogue,” and “community” imply dialogic standards both for
moral discourse and moral community. Applying dialogue as a standard for communitybuilding recaptures, in part, the Aristotelian notion of community as an order of goods
established through logos. In Politics, Aristotle writes “speech serves to make plain what
is advantageous and harmful and so also what is just and unjust…and community in these
things makes a household and a city (I.2.1253a13-17). Considering contemporary
community in this way relies on a restoration of discursive practice with the ability to
posit terms of order as terms of being with a relational and other-recognizing ethic.
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Preview of Chapters
My analysis will proceed through definitions and distinctions of contingency and
ignorance, offering particular notions of these as ethics for genuine dialogue and enacted
virtue. The next chapter (chapter two) will review communication ethics and virtue ethics
for the purpose of describing the virtue ethics response to moral philosophy as an opening
for rhetoric, ignorance, and contingency. Chapter two also begins a more thorough
understanding of what ignorance and contingency mean as responses to problems in
moral philosophy and rhetorical studies, providing a justification for their application,
and a demonstration of their potential.
In chapter three I will describe conceptions of contingency and ignorance as ethics in
discourse, based on comments from the first two chapters. Here I will set up the
interpretive and evaluative guidelines for the application of these main terms throughout
the study. The concept of telos as uncertain moral time will be drawn from narrative
theory as an elaboration of contingency. The teloi of differentiated moral quest narratives
- uncertain versus immanent (utopian and progressive) - will be introduced as dividing
lines for evaluating various conceptions of contingency and dialogue discussed
throughout the study. A description of the relationship between contingency and
ignorance in this chapter will offer a preview of their importance in genuine dialogue.
Chapters four and five differentiate between notions of contingency. Chapter four
presents a challenge to ideological conceptions of “immanentized” contingency through
the example of Richard Rorty’s “contingency of language.” Rorty’s proposal to do away
with metaphysical terms is rejected as an example notion of contingency that shuts down
dialogue by the removal of argumentative vocabularies. In contrast, chapter five
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reconsiders the ethics of uncertain futurity and contingent discovery maintained in
definitional arguments, calling upon the examples of Socrates’ “What is F?” question,
and Aristotle’s notion of defining virtues over time. These discourses are offered to
illustrate the importance of contingency as uncertain futurity for the maintenance of
genuine dialogue.
Ignorance is the topic of chapters six and seven. In chapter six I describe Socrates’
disavowal of knowledge and what a resulting discursive notion of “ignorance” might be
in light of the elenctic (dialogic) practice within which the disavowal appears. Here, I
argue for the sincerity of the disavowal, for the sake of demonstrating Socratic ignorance
as an ethic productive of genuine dialogue. In chapter seven I criticize notions of
ignorance after Socrates that similarly offer ignorance as an epistemic condition attached
to virtue, but dissimilarly work to shut down, or even completely turn away from,
dialogue.
With this dialogic picture of contingency and ignorance completed, chapter eight
focuses on Socratic piety as developed in the Euthyphro and practiced in the Apology.
Socratic piety is offered as an illustrative example of how contingency and ignorance can
operate within dialogue to make its practice an enactment of virtue. Socratic piety is also
provided as evidence of the praxis of the dialogue form I advocate, in terms of moral
choice and policy.
Finally, chapter nine begins by following up on the issue of praxis through a
discussion of potential contemporary contexts for investigation, and ends with the
framing of a set of implications based on the main theoretical terms developed in the
study.
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CHAPTER 2
IGNORANCE AND A RHETORICAL ETHICS OF VIRTUE
Moral philosophy was begun (at least implicitly) as a conversation on ignorance with
the publication of H.A. Prichard’s (1912) essay “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a
Mistake?,” which described as the “illegitimate” demand of moral theory the requirement
for proof at the level of certainty as the arbiter of moral choice (36). The “remedy”
Prichard offers is rooted first in unknowing - a letting-go of the requirement of moral
knowledge at the level of certainty - and second in practice - a related “face to face” turn
to particular instances of moral choice and obligation (37). Prichard’s essay is also
frequently marked as the beginning of the virtue ethics perspective (see Frankena 1970,
1; Alderman 1982, 127). The turn in contemporary rhetorical theory to virtue ethics
enters rhetoric into a longer debate between systematic moral philosophy and challenges
posed by ethicists of virtue. The point of this chapter will be to illustrate this debate as a
discussion on ignorance and contingency, and describe the entry points for a rhetorical
perspective. Rhetorical theories that affiliate with the virtue ethics perspective become
part of a challenge to moral philosophy founded on the unknown, the unknowable, and
situated conceptions of moral agency. Understanding this points out the important
contribution represented by a rhetorical perspective on ignorance. By getting involved in
virtue ethics, rhetoric has been headed for a conversation on ignorance that it is uniquely
capable of carrying out.
I will begin the chapter by outlining some general contributions and perspectives that
communication ethics has offered to the debates that interest me in moral theory. The rest
of the chapter describes virtue ethics’ epistemological and practical challenge to moral
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philosophy in discursive and ignorant terms. The desired result of both discussions is a
more thorough sense of what contingency and ignorance mean given the problems of
knowing facing rhetoric and moral reason alike.
Overview of Communication Ethics on Local and Transcendent Mediation
Research in communication ethics asks questions as to where moral discourse
practices are or should be grounded based on competing visions of ideals, context,
culture, history, and human agency. Two reviews by Ronald Arnett (1987) and Richard
Johannesen (2002) in the area of communication help to describe the major categories in
this effort. My brief overview of these categories is intended to provide an outline of
differing visions for rhetorical practice based on universalist or relativist ethics. Arnett’s
review of communication ethics literature from 1915 to 1985 leads him to describe the
study in terms of five major approaches, three of which I will focus on:
Universal/Humanitarian, Contextual, and Narrative.1 The relevant categories in
Johannesen’s review are relativist, political, and human nature.
According to Arnett (1987) the universal/humanitarian approach seeks a publicly
grounded ethics, but as a “public announcement of principles,” instead of a “public

1

The other two categories identified by Arnett (1987) are democratic and
codes/standards/procedures. Democratic communication ethics are based on a public
“process” where there is an open airing of diverse opinions controlled by majority vote.
Ideally the best ideas will rise to the top through debate (46), forging “mass collaboration
on ideas, customs, and rights” (48). The codes, procedures, and standards approach relies
on a select intelligentsia to determine ethical conduct, but the principles are created by
the members rather than discovered a priori (unlike the universalist approach). The
potential of this approach is to promote discussion and to regulate crisis and identity
formation in organizations rather than to promote behavioral conformity (50-51). Arnett,
Ronald. “The Status of Communication Ethics Scholarship in Speech Communication
Journals from 1915 to 1985.” Central States Speech Journal 38 (1987) : 44-61.
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decision-making process” (48). These principles are articulated by a select intelligentsia
but not created by them. Rather, they are a priori, universal principles. Arnett describes
this approach as opposed to the democratic ideal of process (yet necessary to the public
consideration of lofty goals for human conduct), and as a search for a more permanent
ethical position than that of relativism (48). Importantly, Arnett writes “Rhetoric is a
vehicle through which people gather their wisdom as they test propositions in everyday
communication,” which describes the universal approach as process-oriented in my
reading (48). In part, my contribution of ignorance to the universalist approach can be
seen as “democratizing” because of its other-focus and inclusive, dialogic ethic. Among
the objections to an idealist stance, its practical exclusivity to a select intelligentsia
stresses a desire for participation not only on a democratic, but a more broadly dialogic,
basis. My proposal for ignorance is offered as a possible response to this important
objection.
The “communicative task” from a universal standpoint is to make morality visible
through discourse and to uphold the idea that wisdom may be a creative and useful
vehicle in culture for the discovery of universal human knowledge (Arnett 1987, 48); the
form of wisdom I advocate for this process of discovery is ignorance. This task is implied
as mediation by universalist scholars who “suggest that the potential for ‘humaneknowledge’ is universal, always present,” but that such knowledge will be considered
differently from one historical moment to the next, so that “the potential is universal, but
the particular expression is historically grounded” (48-49).2 Conceptions vary in their

2

Arnett (1987) cites the examples of Eubanks, R.T., “Nihilism and the Problem of a
Worthy Rhetoric.” Southern Speech Journal 33 (1968) : 188-97 and Eubanks, R.T. “On
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universality from the mediated universal/historical, to Weaver’s Platonism where
transcendentals, the primacy of forms and ideals, and definitional arguments appeal to
essences as the source of potential for human betterment (49).
Mediation in the universalist approach allows for a recognition of locality without
translating the local into a relativist ethics of practice. Differentiating relativism from all
other communication ethics categories, Arnett (1987) writes “In this communication ethic
decisions emerge more form the private self, not from a democratic process, a priori
principles, or agreed upon standards and codes” (51). The contention is that values and
ethics are not universal but rather culturally or contextually rooted, and that even when an
ethical standard appears across cultures its particular implementation is generally unique
(51). The contextual perspective justifies different communication standards according to
audience, culture, or relationship, focusing on historicity and subjectivity (52).
Johannesen (2002) writes that while most perspectives make some allowances for
modifying ethical criteria due to special circumstances, extreme situational perspectives
make judgments “only in light of each different context,” avoiding reliance on “Criteria
from broad political, human nature, dialogical, or religious perspectives,” as well as
“absolute and universal standards” (77). Situational or contextual factors are instead
considered for ethical evaluation and may include the role or function of the speaker for
the audience, audience standards concerning what is reasonable or appropriate, how
aware the audience is of the communicator’s tactics, audience goals and values, and
Living in the House of Humanities.” Southern Speech Communication Journal 48 (1982)
: 1-10. See also Johnstone, C.L. “Ethics, Wisdom, and the Mission of Contemporary
Rhetoric: The Realization of Human Being.” Central States Speech Journal 32 (1981) :
177-88.
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audience standards for ethical discourse” (77). The point that should be obvious from the
foregoing description of the problem is that different audiences will embody different sets
of values, rules for ethical discourse, goals, and desires, and these divisions apply also to
members within those audiences, leaving us without a consistent basis on which to judge
communication goals or tactics as ethical or unethical. My description of the problem as a
loss of moral order and the bases for ethical argument is a fairly representative objection
to the relativist approach. The particular version of this objection appearing in my study
articulates the endangerment of genuine dialogue under the relativist vision.
Much of the recent research in communication ethics has taken a narrative direction.
Narrative ethics offers “a story to guide people…and a desire to find a vision without
locking the follower into an uncompromising pattern or technique” (Arnett 1987, 52).
Arnett writes that the narrative approach is close to universal ethics, the “key difference”
being “that the universal/humanitarian ethic is a priori grounded in an ideal while
narrative is rooted in community…the former can only be approximated in discourse
while the latter is constituted in the common communication life of a people” (54). This
distinction ignores the possibility that human communal interaction can proceed toward
an ideal notion of the good, or that disparate public narratives cannot speak to a
consistent human vision of moral excellence. That these possibilities exist in real practice
is an important contribution of mediated idealist proposals. Specifically, genuine dialogue
allows for the realization that a priori knowledge is a matter of communal and relational
discovery of Absolutes. I will marry the ethics of genuine dialogue with the idea of a
narrative moral quest in the next chapter, to uncover bases for idealist discourse in
common, communal stories.
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Johannesen (2002) additionally describes various categories that elaborate a
universal/situational ethical perspective. Political perspectives, for example, contain
“essential political values” accepted as crucial goods to the system that are identified and
employed “as criteria for evaluating the ethics of communicative means and ends within
that particular system.” Communication should foster realization of these values and
tactics that subvert “fundamental political values should be condemned as unethical”
(23). A sense of what is “essential” and “fundamental” is necessary for ethical assessment
within individual systems and the basis for reaching the lofty democratic goals of
political perspectives such as “the intrinsic dignity and worth of all persons; equal
opportunity for fulfillment of individual potential…maximization of freedom of choice,”
or “recognition that the societal worth of an end or goal seldom should be the primary
justification of the ethics of the means used to achieve that end” (Johannesen, 23-24).
These communal goals - intrinsic dignity, the realization of human potential, freedom would lack rhetorical force without their universal or idealist underpinnings.3
They are the similar outcomes of human nature perspectives, which focus on “the
essence of human nature,” or, the question as to what makes humans essentially human
“no matter the context” (Johannesen 2002, 39). The search for an essential human nature
underlies the democratic political goal of realizing human potential, according to
3

The same may be said for “postmodern” political articulations of similar goals. We live
in a time when we accept contradictory ideals, where beliefs in individual freedom and
dignity meet an increasingly postmodern articulation of truth as culturally made rather
than discovered. The problem for postmodern denials of a priori truth is that the
identification of various social “injustices” implies some stable order of “justice” as the
basis of its claims and comparisons. Put another way, when postmodernism goes
political, it often finds itself making the very truth claims it denies philosophically, in
order to retain rhetorical force and moral authority for the communities it addresses.
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Johannesen’s description of the human nature assumption: “uniquely human attributes
should be enhanced, thereby promoting fulfillment of maximum human potential” (39).
The determination of ethical communication from the human nature perspective is
whether a communicator’s techniques “foster or undermine the development of a
fundamental human characteristic” (39). Johannesen’s human nature description
reconciles a universalist approach with the “democratic” aim of helping human
individuals realize their potential and the fullness of their dignity much in the same way
that genuine dialogue does.
The sense of mediation developed by the above description of universalist/relativist
approaches in communication ethics implies that moral rhetoric can be framed as an
idealist practice without sacrificing a view to the actual practices and participation of
everyday-people-in-context, nor their development and fulfillment of personal moral
dignity as accomplished in communal dialogue. Ignorance brings to dialogue the ability
to maintain relativism’s emphasis on epistemic limitations imposed by historicity, human
experience, culture, and language, without deriving from that emphasis notions of a
baseless practice. As James Herrick (1992) notes, communication scholars tend to avoid
religious or universal approaches to ethics, and the reason may be found in “the
tendencies of religious and universalist rhetorical ethics to anchor truth in some idea
external to people and social contexts…” (136). Opponents view the practices emergent
from this “tendency” as equally external to regular people living relativized lives. My redescription of idealist practices as grounded in ignorance will reveal this as a
misconception. Rather than being external and irrelevant in a time when contemporary
theory advocates an ethics of relativism, idealist practices of ignorance are both grounded
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and Absolute, in a time when genuine dialogue can answer a call for order. In this sense,
moral rhetoric has an opportunity to direct virtue ethics’ conversation on ignorance, and
become an important part of restoring public moral order.
Contemporary Moral Philosophy and Ignorance
The rhetorical problem of finding epistemic bases for public moral judgment and
inquiry are echoed in moral philosophy. Most people know that murder is wrong, or that
forming a “just society” sounds like a good idea, but articulating how or why these things
are right and wrong at the level of proof or certainty is nearly impossible. Contemporary
moral philosophy, as an algorithmic search for how and why has produced an unrealistic,
inapplicable, and incomprehensible way to determine what makes actions, including
discursive actions, right or wrong. H.A. Prichard’s (1912) “Does Moral Philosophy Rest
on a Mistake?” objected to moral inquiry as a search for formulaic ethical certainties in a
way that made the proposal for a return to classical virtue ethics possible. The essay also
created the need for a useful way to talk about ignorance in moral philosophy, especially
from an enacted, discursive standpoint, although this opportunity has gone largely
unnoticed. I begin this part of my survey with a closer look at Prichard’s seminal
criticism of contemporary moral philosophy as the first statement in a conversation on
ignorance.
Prichard’s (1912) thesis is that “the existence of the whole subject, as usually
understood, rests on a mistake, and on a mistake parallel to that on which rests, as I think,
the subject usually called the Theory of Knowledge” (21). In stating this, Prichard points
to the problem haunting contemporary moral philosophy. Consider, as he does, a typical
moral agent who feels compelled to behave a certain way, feeling the force of obligations
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and sacrifices, who finally asks what the reasons are for acting this way her entire life.
May she not have been illusioned the entire time in thinking the way she did? After
leading a life of feeling she ought to do one thing or another, she eventually demands
proof that these feelings are justified (21-22). This is where Prichard compares the
requirement of moral philosophy to the requirements in epistemology: the requirement
for moral judgment has become why, articulated in the question “Why should I do this?,”
my duty, fulfill my obligations, keep my promises, and so on (22).
The self-created dilemma of this pursuit, Prichard writes, begins when the moral
agent, realizing a tension between what she wants to do and what she feels she ought to
do, seeks proof as to why she ought to do that thing. The “illegitimate” demand of moral
philosophy is the demand for proof that we ought to behave in a certain way. But “there
is no such knowledge, and all attempts to attain it are doomed to failure because they rest
on a mistake, the mistake of supposing the possibility of proving what can only be
apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking” (36). What is moral philosophy to do,
then? Here is where I see Prichard creating a call for a useful way to talk about
ignorance: he proposes removing epistemology at the level of “proof,” or “why” as the
standard for moral philosophy. Prichard’s replacement for proof is a better focus on
practice, and the closing of his essay opens a space for rhetorical agency in
considerations of moral philosophy. Prichard’s revised view to moral agency is more than
implicitly rhetorical:
The only remedy lies in the actual getting into a situation which occasions the
obligation, or – if our imagination be strong enough – in imagining ourselves in that
situation, and then letting our moral capacities of thinking do their work. Or, to put
the matter generally, if we do doubt whether there is really an obligation to originate
A in a situation B, the remedy lies not in any process of general thinking, but in
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getting face to face with a particular instance of the situation B, and then directly
appreciating the obligation to originate A in that situation (37).
Through this enacted perspective on moral philosophy Prichard invites rhetoric into a
central role. His essay is an important historical marker in the progression of moral
philosophy, but it also marks the early articulation in moral philosophy of two of key
ideas for rhetoric: 1) the limitations of proof in human moral agency demand that we find
a useful way to talk about the unknown and unknowable as a matter of practice, and 2)
morality revealed as a practice is relational, communal, creative, and situated; it is largely
rhetorical. According to Harold Alderman (1982), “the efforts of moral agents to make
moral sense of their experience,” points to the shortcomings of rules systems that “fail to
notice important features of the decision procedures actually employed by moral agents
in…times of moral quandary…” (129). The virtue ethicists’ objections to the
“remoteness” from real human experience of normative theories (Nussbaum 1988, 32),
and the difficulty in applying those theories to real moral dilemmas (Solomon 1988, 437438), is articulated on grounds of moral disagreement and actual human agency. Frentz
(1985) describes the usefulness of MacIntyre’s After Virtue to rhetoric on this basis: “By
grounding practices in action (praxis), MacIntyre preserves the important Aristotelian
notion that morality is less a form of knowing than of doing” (3).
Prichard’s proposed replacement of ethical proof with ethical practice is central to
understanding the general virtue ethics project. Just as some rhetorical scholars concerned
with contemporary public moral discourse seek to return to more classical models, virtue
theorists argue that a more useful perspective exists in classical systems of morality –
going back to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle – in response to predominant rules and
obligations theories. The overarching claim for these theorists is that, with the
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predominance of rules and obligations theories, virtue has been largely neglected (see for
example Becker 1975, 111; Hudson 1981, 189), for the privileging of remote, abstract
ethical systems that are severely limited in their ability to inform and describe real human
moral experience and action as compared to a focus on the virtues (see for example
Nussbaum 1988, 32; Sichel 1988, 82; Solomon 1988, 428; Wallace 1988, 222; Alderman
1982, 129).
Distinctions between virtue ethics and rules ethics become complicated, but basic
descriptions are available that will serve our purposes. Much of the difference rests on
what is logically prior - virtue or rules - in the proposed ethical system. Davis (1988)
summarizes, a virtue theory “begins with a description of virtues (showing in what way
they are required by reason, necessary for happiness, or the like)” and moral rules, duties,
or obligations are “derived by considering how to realize the virtues in practice.”
Conversely, a rule theory “begins with a set of rules (including some proof that they are
required by reason, necessary for happiness, or the like),” and virtues are then introduced,
if at all, “as dispositions to follow certain rules. The virtues serve the rules” (353).
The distinction is made more sensible by considering the goals of rules or
“normative”(deontic) theories as opposed to those of virtue (aretaic) ethics. David
Solomon’s (1988) synopsis is helpful. A normative theory that takes judgments of actions
as basic is a “deontological” theory. It typically has the following goals: “(1) to formulate
and defend a particular set of moral rules, or to defend some procedure for generating
appropriate moral rules; (2) to develop and defend some method of determining what to
do when the relevant moral rules come into conflict” (430). Consider, for example, the
Kantian determination of whether an action is good based on whether one treats others as
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ends rather than as means. The determination seems to be based on whether I propose a
course of action to another person by offering reasons to do so or by attempting to exert
influence through non-rational means. If I do the former I treat the person as a “rational
will, worthy of the same respect as is due myself,” because in offering reasons I offer “an
impersonal consideration” to be evaluated. Conversely, an attempt at non-rational
persuasion “embodies an attempt to make the agent a mere instrument of my will, without
any regard for his rationality” (MacIntyre 1984, 46).
A normative theory that takes judgments of consequences of actions (as opposed to
the actions themselves) as fundamental is a “consequentialist” theory (Solomon, 1988).
Its goals are typically as follows: “(1) to specify and defend some thing or list of things
which are good in themselves; (2) to provide some technique for measuring and
comparing the amount of the relevant good thing (or things) that might be brought about;
(3) to defend some procedures for those cases where one is not in a position to determine
which of a number of alternative actions will maximize the good thing or things” (430).
Consider, for example, Mackie’s (1977) description of act utilitarianism, a viewpoint that
holds that when an agent has a choice between courses of action “the right act is that
which will produce the most happiness, not just for the agent himself but for all who are
in any way affected.” The criterion for moral judgment is “The greatest possible total
happiness,” or “utility,” often defined as a balance of pleasure over pain. The algorithm
that results goes something like “for each alternative course of action it is possible in
principle to measure all the amounts of pleasure it produces for different persons and to
add these up, similarly to measure and add up all the amounts of pain or distress it
produces, and subtract the sum of pain from the sum of pleasure; then the right action is
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that for which there is the greatest positive or the least negative balance of pleasure over
pain” (125-126).4
In contrast to these algorithmic approaches, virtue ethics “suggests not only that
moral philosophers should pay attention to virtue concepts and include a virtue
component in a complete normative theory, but also that the concept of virtue is in
important respects a more fundamental notion than the concepts of ‘the right’ or ‘the
good’ where the good is seen as attaching to objects as possible consequences of our
action” (Solomon 1988, 430). For further clarification, Solomon offers that virtue ethics
takes “foundational moral claims to be claims about the agent,” and generally looks to
develop some conception of the ideal person, develop a list of the virtues that are
necessary to be that kind of a person, and defend a view of how persons can come to
possess the appropriate virtues (429). Wallace (1988) makes the point succinctly: “It is
the study of virtues conceived as a distinct mode of moral philosophy, different from and
in competition with the other modes that people have in mind when they use the term
‘virtue ethics’” (222).5

4

This is precisely the kind of moral theorizing that virtue ethicists object to as “removed”
from lived morality. Such utilitarian ideas have been criticized for their various
indeterminacies, such as how to determine who among people or even nonhuman beings
are to be included in “all who are affected in any way.” See, for example, Mackie, J.L.
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin, 1977, 126-127. Another typical
criticism is that they have an overly unitary view of human pleasure that cannot answer
which pleasure or which happiness should guide us. See, for example, MacIntyre,
Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nd ed). Notre Dame: U of Notre
Dame P, 1984, 63-64. Utilitarianism also did not anticipate the complexities of a global
economy, where the welfare of workers in one part of the globe may be bad for the
satisfaction of consumers in another part of the world.
5

Definitions of “virtue,” in addition to the craft definition offered in Chapter One, are
multiple. J.L Mackie (1977) has noted that conceptions of virtue from Aristotle forward
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Some moral theorists have proposed that the rules and obligations vocabulary be
thrown out altogether. G.E.M. Anscombe (1958) notably proposes that “the concepts of
obligation, and duty – moral obligation and moral duty…and of the moral sense of
“ought,” ought to be jettisoned…because they are survivals, or derivatives from
survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and
are only harmful without it” (1).6 Anscombe’s proposal to entirely “drop” the vocabulary
of “morally ought,” and instead engage in the practice of judging or naming actions
“unjust,” “untruthful,” or “unchaste,” leads her to imply a complete replacement of
normative ethics with virtue ethics, “with which, I suppose, we should be beginning some
sort of a study of ethics” (9, 15).
Most ethicists of virtue, however, wish to offer virtue as a critical component to
normative theories, proposing the centrality of virtue in varying degrees. Some theorists

differ depending on notions of rationality and various proposals for application (186189). Virtues have been found by some authors to reside in a person’s character (see, for
example, Alderman, Harold. “By Virtue of a Virtue.” Review of Metaphysics 36 (1982) :
127-153), in relationship with desires as “dispositions” (see for example Frankena,
William. “Prichard and the Ethics of Virtue: Notes on a Footnote.” Monist 54 (1970) : 117), and in practices (see MacIntyre 1984, 181-203). Johannesen’s (2002) review of the
term as it is used in ethics reveals that virtues have been variously described as “deeprooted dispositions, habits, skills, or traits of character that incline us to see, feel, and act
in ethically right and sensitive ways,” as well as “learned, acquired, cultivated,
reinforced, capable of modification, capable of conflicting, and ideally coalesced into a
harmonious cluster” (280). Johannesen, Richard L. “Virtue Ethics, Character, and
Political Communication.” Ethical Dimensions of Political Communication. Ed. Robert
E. Denton, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1991. 69-90. Reprinted in Johannesen, Richard L.
Ethics in Human Communication. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 2002. 279-297.
6

Anscombe (1958) bases this statement on the very compelling claim that senses of
obligation and “ought” have been removed from their original divine law context and
have therefore become unintelligible (6). Anscombe, G.E.M. “Modern Moral
Philosophy.” Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 33 (1958) : 119.
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claim that virtue or character must be the primary focus of moral theorizing (Becker
1975, 110), with some among them claiming that character should be the final terminus
of moral judgment (Alderman 1982, 143; Pincoffs 1986, 4-5). Yet other virtue theorists
such as Stephen Hudson (1981) are comfortable with offering virtue as a complement to
normative systems. Although Hudson claims that “a strong argument can be made for
taking virtues seriously,” he adds “moral theorists should be concerned both about
substantive moral principles which specify a person’s moral obligations and duties, and a
substantive theory of moral virtues and vices. Without either a theory will be inadequate
to the facts of morality” (189). Similarly, Michael Davis (1988) argues that “what virtue
theory can tell us is more or less equivalent to what rule theory can tell us” (352).
It is not within my interest to enter the debate on whether virtue theory or rule theory
should be privileged, in varying degrees, in macro-ethical systems. I agree with Davis’
(1988) contention that “Converting a virtue analysis into a rule analysis means giving
pride and place to rules rather than virtues, nothing more… we need not be embarrassed
if we must, for example, argue from the rules to a need to cultivate certain virtues
because they serve the rule (or, indeed from such a derived virtue to the need for certain
secondary rules)” (362). When we look at actual moral theories, Davis argues, we find
that “virtue theories always make some place for rules and that rule theories always do
the same for virtues” (363). In addition, Hudson (1981) claims moral systems that do not
include both virtues and rules will be inadequate to handle real moral situations (189),
and this would seem clear for rhetorical enactments of virtue that must end in statements
of order and policy.
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I find virtue ethics particularly attractive because of those elements of its response to
rules and obligations theories that emphasize the unknown as a matter to be handled
through moral practice. Specifically, the central objection to proof calls into question the
value of certainty claims as the standard for moral practice and judgment. In the next
chapter, contingency and ignorance will be introduced as ethics that privilege the
uncertainty of human futurity and argumentative outcomes in genuine dialogue. The
foregoing discussion on communication and virtue ethics revealed the potential of a
conversation on ignorance for both areas of inquiry; the next chapter introduces the basic
terms of that conversation.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ETHICS OF CONTINGENCY AND IGNORANCE
In the introduction I described the potential contribution of ignorance in
contemporary moral rhetoric as well as relevant notions of dialogue and enacted virtue.
The previous chapter discussed aspects of the virtue ethics perspective that invited a
rhetorical perspective grounded in ignorance. With these discussions in the background,
this chapter provides a working sense of contingency and ignorance. Succeeding chapters
will elaborate on the basic statements made here, dividing between concepts of
contingency and ignorance that either promote or disable genuine dialogue. The aim of
this chapter is to provide a framework for those discussions. To begin, I will frame
definitions of contingency and ignorance. These definitions will describe a relationship
between the two concepts, as well as their place in genuine dialogue. Next, I will add a
sense of uncertain futurity to contingent, ignorant practices by an examination of telos in
divine moral quest narratives. The discussion of narrative will enrich our understanding
of contingency, and create an evaluative structure for judging between concepts of
immanent, ideological contingency that disable genuine dialogue, and transcendent
contingency, that promote it.
Introduction to Contingency and Ignorance
Virtue ethics’ departure from proof and its related turn to practice reconstitutes moral
agency as an uncertain, situated activity. Saving moral agency (and moral rhetoric) from
an algorithmic calculus opens us for the realization that practices are thoroughly
contingent in their proceedings, in their aims, and in their outcomes. From a rhetorical
perspective, the contingent accent falls on argument; in idealist practice, the focus draws
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in on discovering, positing, testing, and retesting terms of order - justice, piety, courage,
fairness, and so on - by way of argument with relational “others.” This idealist process
remains inclusive and extensive according to the ethics of genuine dialogue by promotion
of a similarly idealist notion of contingency. The epistemic gap between locality/
difference and the realm of Absolutes means that situated though ideal discourses will be
uncertain in terms of what they are able to discover through argument. Contingency is a
recognition of this according to the ideals of genuine dialogue. That is, contingency is an
attitude toward uncertainty, a recognition that the unknown central to ideal practice is an
essentially human condition shared by a community of other arguers. Contingency
promotes reconciliation with the idea that local, experiential materials are all that we have
available for the discovery of moral arguments on terms of order; rather than making this
epistemic limitation an excuse for resignation, contingency calls upon it to form an ethics
for practice. Rhetoric becomes an art tied to the contingencies of present existence and
effort, and the unknown of future argumentative outcomes, failures, revisions, and
motivated actions. Genuine dialogue becomes possible according to contingency as an
inclusive and open-ended ethic. Human community, as a population of potential
interlocutors, is re-constituted as a place of uncertain, relational agency, and because
contingency will remain a permanent condition of immanent human activity, the
potential for “other” inclusiveness is practically endless. The resulting argument
practices, extending into an uncertain future, are promoted as open-ended and extensive.
In summary, contingency and uncertainty provide an attitudinal, ethical, and
chronological framework for ignorance.
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Ignorance is defined in the study in two senses: as a form of moral knowledge, and as
a discursive means. As a form of moral knowledge ignorance is tied to uncertainty. This
definition comes especially from Socratic ignorance. The summary idea is that knowing
that one does not know a moral thing with certainty is an important form of moral
knowledge. This is the basis for Socrates’ assignment to improve virtue in Athens; he is
the wisest because he knows that he is nothing in comparison to moral wisdom (Apology
23a-b). It is also a value central to discursive moral agency: knowing that one does not
know moral terms with certainty promotes the other-turning of genuine dialogue as a
sincerely relational practice. Ignorance promotes a spirit of inclusive discovery on the
basis of unknowing and a commitment to the unknown, making those interlocutors who
recognize their own lack of moral wisdom particularly capable participants in dialogues
on order and community. This ethic of inclusion and commitment is promoted by
ignorance as a means in discourse. Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge is the model
offered in the study, although disavowals of moral wisdom contribute generally to
genuine dialogue. When one says she does not know, or is incapable of moral certainty,
that utterance can represent a sincere and (as Buber puts it)”dynamic” facing of the other
in communal argument. This is an especially vital means of turning to others in idealist
practices, a recognition of the relational commitment to unknowing made by dialogic
participants in pursuit of the Absolute.
Based on these descriptions of contingency and ignorance, a concise, “working”
definition posits a relationship between the two: contingency is a sense of uncertainty
particular to moral agency and argument (the recognition that relational action and the
outcome and potential future revision of arguments extends into an unknown future); and
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ignorance is a discursive means that actualizes contingency in moral practices. Both of
these ideas are enriched by a sense of uncertain, divine narrative time.
Uncertain Time in Narrative Theories of Moral Rhetoric
I discuss narrative in this section not for the sake of advocating a narrative
perspective on communication or a “narrative paradigm,” but to gain a sense of openended moral time (consistent with the open-endedness of genuine dialogue), by the idea
of an uncertain telos as the moral future of unified interlocutors.1 This section begins with
a general review of rhetorical statements on moral narrative, then moves into a more
focused discussion of uncertain futurity. The narrative perspective on communication
ethics examines the stories that guide peoples’ lives and situate them in dialogue with
others, with the moment, and within communal action, while allowing for a less rigid
type of rationality as the basis for moral judgment. From this mindset Walter Fisher has
contributed the “narrative paradigm” to rhetorical theory as a new mode of moral reason.

1

This is to say, I am not proposing an explanation for all of rhetorical discourse as storytelling on the model of Fisher’s “narrative paradigm” (see Fisher, Walter. Human
Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action.
Columbia, SC: South Carolina UP, 1987). Nor am I proposing a “grand” or “master”
narrative to explain everything. Among the critics of this idea, Nietzsche has written that
it generates “truth” as “A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms-in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced,
transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem
firm, canonical, and obligatory to people” (46-47). Nietzsche, Friedrich. “On Truth and
Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense.” The Portable Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kauffman. New
York: Penguin, 1954. As much as I disagree with Nietzsche’s characterization of “truth,”
I am interested in narrative only insofar as it allows me to assign to genuine dialogue a
notion of divine, teleological time for the unification of human practices. This sense of
time binds practitioners together with a view to uncertain futurity in a way that retains
truth-seeking while resisting the restrictive form of designed “progress” narratives. I
discuss this more in my next chapter.
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Fisher (1984) proposed his “narrative paradigm” for communication in part due to the
problems he saw with public moral argument. He defines public moral argument as
having the following qualities: 1) being public it is available for “consumption and
persuasion of the polity at large;” 2) it is aimed at non-experts; and 3) it inherently
crosses fields, unlike scientific or theological debates, which are contained “by subject
matter, particular conceptions of argumentative competence, and well recognized rules of
advocacy” (12). The problem is that experts make it difficult for “untrained” audience
members to win or even effectively judge moral argument because they have to sift
through competitive technical arguments representative of the mode of debate found in
the rational world paradigm (12-13). Fisher’s use of narrative as a solution has
implications for the dialogic ethic of inclusion in public moral argument. From a
narrative perspective the role of the expert is introduced anew, as “a counselor…the true
function of the storyteller,” who contributes to public dialogue “to impart knowledge, like
a teacher, or wisdom, like a sage” (13). The expert thus has the potential to bring the
public back into the arena of moral argument by assuming “the role of public counselor
whenever she or he crosses the boundary of technical knowledge into the territory of life
as it ought to be lived,” with the result that “the public, which then includes the expert,
has its own criteria for demanding whose story is most coherent and reliable as a guide to
belief and action” (13).
Another recent theory that has implications for dialogic inclusiveness is Frentz’s
(1985) conversation model of moral discourse. Frentz has offered conversation as a moral
communication paradigm by taking some cues from MacIntyre’s After Virtue. MacIntyre
(1984) writes that “conversation, understood widely enough, is the form of human
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transactions in general.” He links conversations to narratives because both have
beginnings, middles, ends, climaxes, plots, and subplots, and presents “both
conversations in particular…and human action in general as enacted narratives” (210211). Frentz’s definition of “rhetorical conversation” is partially drawn from this idea, as
well as MacIntyre’s general concept of narrative as the “moral unity of an individual life”
(Frentz 1985, 2):
A rhetorical conversation is a narrative episode in which a conflict over opposing
moral viewpoints re-unites agents with their own moral histories, with the moral
traditions of which they are a part, and – perhaps most important – with an awareness
of the virtues. As a practice, the goods internal to rhetorical conversations are an
awareness of the moral unity of individual life and a sense of the quest for the
ultimate good for self and humanity (4-5).
The limitation of conversations to discover the “moral unity of individual life” as an
expression of “the ultimate good for humanity” is that they are overly local. In his
analysis of the film My Dinner With Andre, Frentz writes of the moral outcomes of
Wally’s and Andre’s dinner conversation that Wally “rediscovers the wonderment of
being alive as an individual connected with all that surrounds him,” while Andre’
“realizes that self-awareness devoid of moral tradition has no purpose and that
surrendering life to disconnected moments of ‘pure being’ can lead to the fascistic
horrors of Nazism which forever haunt his mind” (13). A dialogic connectedness to the
other, and to moral tradition and community, is described by Frentz’s claim that Andre
and Wally needed each other to “rediscover the constituents of a moral perspective:”
Andre’ “imparted a sense of selfhood to Wally” and Wally “gave Andre’ a renewed
appreciation for a teleological tradition.” There are also ties to the continuity of an
individual life and moral tradition through the virtues with which the conversation
accorded: “justice (the desserts each owe the other), courage (to risk one’s self for the
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other), and honesty (to be truthful beyond all else)” (13). This conversation is an
illustrative example of the function of moral dialogue, and the potential contribution
made by narrative to dialogic discourse. But while these statements speak to a narrative
unity between self, other, and moral tradition, the virtue outcomes of conversations are
too local for the purpose of seeking a communal Good and an Absolute Justice.
Condit (1987), for example, does not doubt that “for these two individuals, the social
interaction…produces improved individual virtue,” but writes that “their
discovery…lacks breadth and depth,” providing answers far from significant to collective
moral quandaries such as nuclear war, resource allocation, and abortion (80). Condit may
overstate the private outcomes of a public conversation presented in a film, but her
criticism is, I think, accurate. The important idea to retain from conversation for my
purposes is that narrative can be connected with dialogue in a way that unifies arguers in
the common hope for a fuller moral development of self and other.
Fisher’s and Frentz’s theories are in part derived from the narrative thesis of
MacIntyre’s (1984) After Virtue, that “man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his
fictions, essentially a story-telling animal…a teller of stories that aspire to truth” (216).
MacIntyre’s version of moral narrative promotes a view of human action as teleological
narration, happening in the present yet moving toward a possible, contingent future of
shared ends, goals, and goods. For MacIntyre, in understanding the actions of others “we
always move towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set of narrative
histories, histories both of the individuals concerned and of the settings in which they act
and suffer” (211). The identification of individual, present actions within a narrative
structure infuses those actions with meaning by showing the present as extending into a
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potential future (Frentz 1985, 5). As MacIntyre articulates this idea “An action is a
moment in a possible or actual history or in a number of such histories” (214).
This idea of a “potential” or “possible” future as the context of moral action is where
telos and contingency become a sense of future, uncertain time in discursive practice. For
MacIntyre what links futurity and narrative is unpredictability, a characteristic that all
stories rely upon, and an accurate description of human life: “unpredictability…is
required by the narrative structure of human life” (215). What is vital about
unpredictability is that it “coexists with a second crucial characteristic of all lived
narratives, a certain teleological character (215):”
We live out our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other, in
the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future, a future in which certain
possibilities beckon us forward and others repel us, some seen already foreclosed and
others perhaps inevitable. There is no present which is not informed by some image
of some future and an image of the future which always presents itself in the form of
a telos – or of a variety of ends or goals – towards which we are either moving or
failing to move in the present. Un-predictability and teleology therefore coexist as
part of our lives; like characters in a fictional narrative we do not know what will
happen next, but nonetheless our lives have a certain form which projects itself
towards our future. Thus the narratives which we live out have both an unpredictable
and a partially teleological character (215-216, emphases mine).
By conjoining narrative unity and teleological unpredictability in a notion of shared,
uncertain futures, MacIntyre enriches the goods of practice in a sense of time. The
standards described though goods internal/external/relational to practices are now
determined by a gaze forward to communal conceptions of an uncertain future by which
participants can judge practiced virtue in the present. In genuine dialogue, telos as
unpredictable includes participants in a shared future that colors arguments and mutual
discovery as uncertain and open-ended. Recognizing the teleological unpredictability of
human life and practice becomes a guideline for attitudes toward the contingency of
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enacted virtue; but, just as all moral stories are not the same, neither are all notions of
contingency. The implications for genuine dialogue are that varying senses of time
gained through competing moral narratives will contribute to differing theories of
contingency that can either promote, or hinder, inclusiveness other-turning, and the
extensive future trajectory of arguments. Viewing telos as unpredictability or contingency
makes narrative a potentially powerful and unifying construct for communal moral
dialogue. As MacIntyre explains, the agent may ask two questions. The first, “what is the
good for me?” asks how I might live out the unity of my life with all of the considerations
of narrative– present action, future possibilities, and unpredictability. The question “what
is the good for man?” asks “what all the answers to the former question must have in
common.” Most importantly, “it is the systematic asking of these two questions and the
attempt to answer them in deed as well as word which provide the moral life with its
unity,” a unity similar to the unity of a narrative quest (218-219).
MacIntyre notes that without at least some conception of the final telos a quest could
not even begin. A quest begins in “looking for a conception of the good which will
enable us to order other goods, for a conception of the good which will enable us to
extend our understanding of the purpose and content of the virtues, for a conception of
the good which will enable us to understand the place of integrity and constancy in life,”
and this is how we define a life which is a quest for the good (219). As much as
MacIntyre contributes narrative time as unpredictability, his description of telos is limited
in its capacity to make the moral quest a search for Absolute terms of order. This is so
because MacIntyre offers a version of telos stripped of its transcendent power and
potential. Frentz’s (1985) criticism on this point is excellent:
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MacIntyre preserves a teleology by recasting it in Homeric terms, as a narrative quest.
What MacIntyre fails to see is that a narrative quest in the Homeric tradition is
inextricably linked to a supernatural telos – the desires and actions of the gods, as
memorialized in poetry…By divorcing the narrative quest from the gods, MacIntyre
has changed its meaning and, in so doing, created a moral fiction of his own. When
he then grafts that fiction onto a teleological tree, itself having been pruned of its
theological impulse…the resultant bush does not exactly burn with moral authority.
For when the telos of humanity is a quest plus humanly derived moral concepts, all
that can follow is a humanly grounded morality, and those are at base emotivist, no
matter how persistent the protests to the contrary (15).
Based on this criticism, MacIntyre’s telos as unpredictability can be kept as a useful
contribution to contingency, but a transcendent impulse must be added for the purposes
of genuine dialogue. Frentz (1985) proposes a return to “the gods,” to conceptions of the
moral quest on Homeric terms as a search for spirit and transcendence (15). His
recommendations are a good place to begin dividing narrative contingency along
immanent/ideological and transcendent lines.
Immanent Versus Transcendent Narrative: An Evaluative Basis for Contingency
This final section establishes evaluative categories for contingency and ignorance by
dividing ideological narratives from transcendent (divine) narratives. The discussion here
follows from the idea that contingency is connected to conceptions of telos as either
uncertain (unpredictable) as it appears in transcendent narratives, or as a perfected or
progressive new age, as it appears in ideological narratives. The former sense will be
privileged in my analyses of contingency and ignorance, the latter denied as an
endangerment to genuine dialogue.
Frentz (1985) posits the restoration of a teleological morality of transcendence by
calling for the reunion of the narrative quest with “the gods,” a re-conceptualization of
human history in the most meaningful sense as pointing to something other than itself, to
a ground of Being and Divinity (15). This return would constitute a marriage back to the
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teleology of the Homeric tradition that Frentz finds lacking in MacIntyre. In the resulting
system “practices and their attendant virtues would be vehicles for gaining access to the
moral truths of the gods,” making the “narrative unity of an individual’s life and the
historical unity of moral traditions…narrative quests in the fullest Homeric sense, quests
for universal moral truths” (15).
Recapturing the divinity of Homeric telos contextualizes present practice in a richer
framework of uncertain time. It also returns us to an ancient Greek sense of mediation.
Kitto (1957) describes what the divine background of Homeric poetry did for the Greeks,
and does for us: “It makes us see that particular action that we are watching not as an
isolated, a causal, a unique event; we see it rather in its relation to the moral and
philosophical framework of the universe” (55). Here, Kitto eloquently describes the
narrative unity between an individual life and the transcendence of its moral history.
Homer, Kitto writes,
sees that there is a unity in things, that events have their causes and their results, that
certain moral laws exist. This is the framework into which the particular action is
seen to fit. The divine background of the epic means ultimately that particular actions
are at the same time unique and universal ( 55).2
By Kitto’s description, the Homeric divine “framework” unifies peoples’ moral
actions with a greater moral community. 3 Rushing (1985) writes that when people

2

For a description of a similar sense of mythic, divine connectedness revealed in
contemporary film see Rushing, Janice Hocker. “E.T. as Rhetorical Transcendence.”
Quarterly Journal of Speech 71 (1985) : 188-203.
3

The importance of divinity in Homer is also revealed in descriptions of rhetorical
agency within his prose . In describing the early rhetorical consciousness displayed in
Homeric poetry, Enos (1993), notes that the revelation of characteristically human
capacities for discovery and heuristic in Homer should not come without an appreciation
of the divine sources that allow humans to produce “genuine eloquence” (8). “There is
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address the contemporary need for transcendence they “reaffirm the centrality of the
present as one chapter in an evolutionary and cosmological narrative that stretches into
the past as history and into the future as spirit” (189). When the unity of a human life is
robbed of its divine telos, present actions lose the context for their meaning. The problem
for contingency is that practices and practitioners become detached from the transcendent
uncertainty of their aims and outcomes, unique, but no longer communal and universal.
Of course, practices will still picture futures, but the old contingency has to be replaced
for the new, de-spiritualized vision. When immanently revised narrative teloi are posited
as corrective procedures for problems of transcendence in human history,4 the resulting
contingency endangers genuine dialogue.
In the broader narrative sense, two very different stories are told. Bass and Cherwitz
(1978), for example, offer a basic distinction between sacred myth and ideologies. Sacred
myth “is an immutable truth from which a system of normative ethics is derived,” while
ideologies “are more programmatic and materially oriented” (214-215). Like sacred
myths, ideologies attempt to build community, but organize people “through references
to historical and political events, and appeals to a material orientation of the world” with
a “necessarily pragmatic” focus (215). Expanding from these basic categories, the

little doubt” writes Enos “that in Homer eloquence is god-produced and god-given.”
Humans struggle with the development of their own techne, but individuals who are
considered eloquent are seen as the beneficiaries of divine intervention, recipients of a
gift from the gods that makes them “god-like” (8-9). Enos, Richard Leo. Greek Rhetoric
Before Aristotle. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1993. See also Kennedy, George. The
Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1963. 36.
4

Here I am referring to the problem of local/transcendent mediation as discussed in the
first chapter.
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re-articulation of human narrative life along ideological lines is a simultaneous reduction
and revision of spirit. In The New Science of Politics Eric Voegelin (1987) describes this
revision as it has taken place in modern politics. Certain versus uncertain notions of
contingency are implied as guiding political ethics in Voegelin’s argument. His
description of the differing attitudes toward human history emergent from Gnosticism, in
opposition to the “inner quest for transcendent reality” characterized by Greek
philosophy, Judaism, and Christianity (Germino 1987, vii), help me to frame evaluative
categories for contingency. For the remainder of the study I set in opposition the basic
possibilities of immanent versus uncertain contingency as established by Voegelin’s
polemic against Gnosticism.
In the foreword to The New Science of Politics, Dante Germino (1987) summarizes
Gnosticism as “a symbolic form” that “arose out of the fragile nature of earthly existence,
which leaves many people thirsting for a certain and immediate deliverance from so
hazardous a condition” (vi, emphasis mine). Germino’s summary continues with a
description of the sort of secret Divine knowledge that marks Gnosticism and the Gnostic
“sage,” who “typically believes that he has become one with the godhead and has
achieved liberation from the world of ordinary human beings” (vi). Nilsson (1948) writes
that Gnosticism was (and continues to be for Voegelin) “an attempt to restate Christianity
and express it in terms and ways of thought which fitted the natural science and
philosophy of the time,” in order to meet the transcendental problem of “the relation
between the transcendent and sensuous worlds” (131). Nilsson adds that Gnosticism
“split into numerous sects and every Gnostic teacher spoke with this own tongue
according to the promptings of his higher enlightenment” (130). Germino (1987) writes
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that early Gnosticism “tended to be politically quietistic,” but later “became revolutionary
and destructive in the West” as a “result of the coincidence of the revival of ancient
Gnosticism with the remarkable expansion of power resulting from the growth of urban
centers and increased trade” (vi).
Voegelin (1987) tracks Gnosticism’s historical development up to the end of he
twelfth century (107-110) and begins his analysis with the form of Gnosticism
articulated in Joachim of Flora’s “trinitarian eschatology” that “created the aggregate of
symbols which govern the self-interpretation of modern political society to this day”
(111). The first symbol is the conception of history “as a sequence of three ages, of which
the third age is intelligibly the final Third Realm,” an immanent state of perfection (11112).5 The second symbol is the leader, which can be discerned in Machiavelli’s Prince,
and the supermen of Comte and Marx (112).
The third symbol is “that of the prophet of the new age:” “In order to lend validity
and conviction to the idea of a final Third Realm,” writes Voegelin, “the course of history
as an intelligible, meaningful whole must be assumed accessible to human knowledge,
either through a direct revelation or through speculative gnosis,” raising the importance
of the “Gnostic intellectual” as someone who can articulate this vision (112).6 This

5

Since Looking Backward (1887), almost all Utopian schemes have been Dystopias (We,
1984, Brave New World).
6

Here Voegelin (1987) returns us to the idea of a (modern) Gnostic prophet articulating
the secret knowledge that will move human history to a final state of immanent
perfection. Among several examples, Voegelin identifies the person of Marx, who
pictures a mystical “realm of freedom and the withering away of the state” (113).
Voegelin, Eric. The New Science of Politics: An Introduction. Chicago: U of Chicago P,
1987. In my study ignorance denies the immanent certainty of the Gnostic prophetic
voice.
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prophetic voice is important to contingency and dialogue. Recall Bakhtin’s (1984)
statement that a real dialogue avoids the “author” who “has already withdrawn” and
looks “over” the dialogue, being now “located as if in some higher decision-making
position,” thereby turning “an authentic and unfinished dialogue into an objectivized and
finalized image of a dialogue” (63). The program histories of Gnostic speculation
articulate a secret or privileged sort of emancipatory knowledge that progresses human
history to a discernible final end, or at least toward a new “progress.” Part of overseeing
the conversation on history through Gnostic speculation is the sacrifice of spirit for
immanence; this is done for the sake of making the historical end accessible to the
knowledge of the intellectual. But removing spirit puts certain designs on uncertain
contingency, and places the Gnostic voice in direct violation of the open-ended standards
for genuine dialogue. Bakhtin’s description of the “overseeing” author locates the
intellectual prophet of the new age7 (and general speculators on immanent designs of
perfection or progress) as enemies to dialogue.
The fourth symbol is “that of the brotherhood of autonomous persons.” Voegelin
explains “by virtue of its new descent of the spirit,” the final age “will transform men into
members of the new realm without sacramental mediation of grace.” The church will
“cease to exist because the charismatic gifts that are necessary for the perfect life will

7

From here on, most references to this idea will go by the name, “intellectual prophet of
the new age,” or “intellectual prophet” for short. The basic idea retained from Voegelin’s
description is that of an intellectual who by speculation or revelation articulates access to
a vision of a final, immanent state of perfection for human history, or a new discourse
that will lead to ethical “progress.” The importance of promoting this vision at the cost of
spirit is that the contingency of history becomes immanentized, and the open-endedness
of genuine dialogue is violated.
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reach men without administration of sacraments” (113). If we trace the narrative
progression of Joachim’s symbols we witness a movement away from spirit as a means to
articulate and justify a certain futurity. This narrative can be grafted onto scientific
positivism’s move away from mystery as easily as it is onto immanentized politics.8 The
important violation described by Voegelin is a denial of uncertainty and a resulting
reduction of Divine futurity to immanent symbols of society or political order as a
supposed correction to problems of transcendence.
For Voegelin, modern political Gnosticism characteristically immanentizes symbols
of transcendence (120) and puts them to work in local existence in order to project a
perfected end to human history (129-132). In this way it is ideological.9 When the

8

Kenneth Burke (1954), for example, writes that rationalization has moved from magic,
to religion, to science, in a “corrective” way: “The ‘mystics’ are condemned for failing to
abide by the established canons of positivistic science, quite as though science had never
put itself forward as a deliberate and untiring questioner of any and all established
canons. We begin to see that there are certain fixed Marquis of Queensbury rules for
scientific combat, and anyone who would turn his skepticism against these vested
interests of the scientific rationalization is suspected of a strong hankering to sink back
into the Dark Ages of human thought” (63). Burke, Kenneth. Permanence and Change:
An Anatomy of Purpose. Los Angeles: U of California P, 1954.
9

I use the term “ideology,” and by extension “ideologue,” throughout the study in a
specific sense. Gnosticism is an example. Borrowing from John Bliese’s (2001) synopsis,
“‘Ideology’ denotes an abstract, utopian idea of the perfect society,” and an “‘ideologue’
is one who believes that people and society can be perfected, if only they can be forced to
conform to that utopian notion” (66-67). Bliese, John. The Greening of Conservative
America. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001. Russell Kirk’s (1969) definition is more
elaborative: “Ideology does not mean political theory or principle, even though many
journalists and some professors commonly employ the term in that sense. Ideology really
means political fanaticism-and, more precisely, the belief that this world of ours may be
converted into the Terrestrial Paradise through the operation of positive law and positive
planning. The ideologue… maintains that human nature and society may be perfected by
mundane, secular means, though these means ordinarily involve violent social revolution.
The ideologue immanentizes religious symbols and inverts religious doctrines” (154).
Kirk, Russell. Enemies of the Permanent Things. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House,
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“accent” of Gnostic narrative “lies strongly on the state of perfection” then utopianism
becomes it particular articulation. When the “accent lies strongly with movement” then
“progressivism” is the interpretation of human history, holding that various qualitative
and quantitative increases of goods are evidence of progress such as that in the human
sciences and technology (Voegelin, 121; Germino, vii). I will criticize both utopian and
progressive variants of spiritual reduction for their restraint of dialogue. While
progressive advances in the sciences and technology have had the positive results of “an
unprecedentedly high level of material comfort, health, literacy, and philanthropy,”
Gnosticism’s move away from spirit and uncertainty means that these advances represent
the simultaneous decline of civilization (Germino, vii; Voegelin, 132). While the tradition
of Greek philosophy, Judaism, and Christianity “acknowledged the limitation of the
human condition and fundamental ‘uncertainty’ of man’s knowledge about the
transcendent divine ground” of existence,10 modern Gnosticism “has been dedicated to
the hubristic attempt to overcome the anxieties and uncertainties of human life by
building a terrestrial paradise” (Germino, vii). This attitude toward uncertainty and divine
epistemic limitation has meant that even the most worthy projects for resolving human
misery have compromised “the inner quest for transcendent reality that motivated Plato,

1969. My definition and criticism of ideological programs will not be limited to
utopianism, but will also extend to generally “progressivist” visions of human futurity as
well.
10

See, for example, David Frank’s (1997) discussion of Perelman’s reliance on Jewish
narrative to offer a transcendent ethic of pluralism: Frank, David. “The New Rhetoric,
Judaism, and Post-Enlightenment Thought: The Cultural Origins of Perelmanian
Philosophy.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 83 (1997) : 314-317.
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Amos, and Paul” (Germino, viii), so that “The death of the spirit is the price of progress”
(Voegelin, 131).11
Epistemic limitation and uncertainty form the bases for contingency as I conceive of
it. Differing attitudes toward them, as Voegelin explains, result in competing visions for
the telos of human history: discomfort and anxiety about uncertainty and limitedness are
the grounds for a spiritual departure that motivates visions of progress toward a
terrestrial paradise (or at the very least some notion of social perfectibility); reconciliation
with and preservation of the transcendent pictures human history into an extensive and
uncertain future. The second vision confirms the open-endedness of genuine dialogue,
and the divine moral quest. For Voegelin, preservation of the quest involves maintaining
the transcendent uncertainty of divine symbols. By putting these symbols to use in
visions of human “progress” Gnosticism proposes a fallaciously certain telos for human
activity. Specifically, the Gnostic story of progress reduces the Christian eschaton from a
symbol of transcendent uncertainty, to a symbol of immanent certainty.12 The spiritual
disconnect of identifying immanent symbols of Perfection (symbols of progress, or
utopias, for example) in the here and now is fallacious, because,
11

Rushing (1985) writes that our time “is marked by a yearning for wholeness.” Even as
we benefit from “the progress wrought by the Enlightenment and the Scientific
Revolution,” we are asking about the costs. The twentieth century “has enjoyed laborsaving devices…and increased lifespans,” but has also seen us suffer several
“technological nightmares.” Few would actually return to a pre-industrial age, but “many
feel an undeniable, if unspoken, sense of fragmentation and separation - from their world,
their fellow human beings, and themselves” (188).
12

Thus, it examples the inter-penetration of both of our primary sources of contemporary
order: politics (the order of the world below), and religion (the order of the world above).
The problem created by the Gnostic variants of utopianism and progressivism is that this
inter-penetration is spiritually reductive, favoring political truths for the truth of the soul.
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Things are not things, nor do they have essences, by arbitrary declaration. The course
of history as a whole is no object of experience; history has no eidos, because the
course of history extends into the unknown future. The meaning of history, thus, is an
illusion; and this illusionary eidos is created by treating a symbol of faith as if it were
a proposition concerning an object of immanent experience (120, emphasis mine).
Later in the work, Voegelin offers a clarifying summary of this fallacy and its
practical outcomes:
The truth of gnosticism is vitiated…by the fallacious immanentization of the
Christian eschaton. This fallacy is not simply a theoretical mistake concerning the
meaning of the eschaton, committed by this or that thinker… On the basis of this
fallacy, Gnostic thinkers, leaders, and their followers interpret a concrete society and
its order as an eschaton; and, in so far as they apply their fallacious construction to
concrete social problems, they misinterpret the structure of immanent reality. The
eschatological interpretation of history results in a false picture of reality; and errors
with regard to the structure of reality have practical consequences when the false
conception is made the basis of political action. Specifically, the Gnostic fallacy
destroys the oldest wisdom of mankind concerning the rhythm of growth and decay
which is the fate of all things under the sun (166).13
In revising the divine context for human practices, progressive and utopian visions
resolve their anxieties with the unknown future by reducing spirit to certainty; the move
is consistent with the Gnostic departure from the transcendence of the Greek, Jewish, and

13

One of the clearest examples of the fallacy offered by Voegelin (1987) is Hobbes’ civil
theology. “Hobbes,” writes Voegelin, “saw that public order was impossible without a
civil theology,” but “He denied the existence of a tension between the truth of the soul
and the truth of society; the content of Scripture, in his opinion, coincided in substance
with the truth of Hobbes” (160). Voegelin continues “With this idea…of abolishing the
tensions of history by the spreading of a new truth, Hobbes reveals his own Gnostic
intentions; the attempt at freezing history into an everlasting constitution is an instance of
the general class of Gnostic attempts at freezing history into an everlasting final realm on
this earth” (160-161). Voegelin emphasizes that Gnostic variants are all around us, and
that gnosticism “has by far not spent its drive.” In its Marxist variant “it is expanding its
area of influence…while other variants of gnosticism, such as progressivism, positivism,
and scientism, are penetrating into other areas under the title of ‘Westernization’” and the
expansion of developing countries (164-165). In my study I will be especially interested
in criticizing Gnostic “utopianism” and “progressivism,” but the larger point to be made
here is that the general impulse of gnosticism as a move away from “the truth of the soul”
is productive of several variants that underlie contemporary problems.
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Christian tradition. Voegelin writes that uncertainty “is the very essence of Christianity,”
(122) and so, we can say, of these other transcendent perspectives too. Voegelin’s
description of the Gnostic move toward immanent certainty and perfection, and away
from spirit, uncertainty, and the “inner quest for transcendent reality,” serves as a general
framework for understanding the implications of attitudes toward contingency for
genuine dialogue.
The Gnostic moral quest can be generally conceived as ideological narrative,
picturing a perfected end to human history, or progress toward a new age or
emancipation. It importantly violates the open-endedness of genuine dialogue by its
denial of divine, uncertain futurity. It also endangers the inclusiveness of genuine
dialogue by seeing time as movement toward immanent perfection or progress that relies
on the death of spirit and transcendence. This becomes a revised telos that changes the
ethics of dialogue entirely. In the utopian or progressivist vision, dialogue must be
manufactured against spirit to meet the ends of the program. Inevitably, this results in the
exclusion of arguments, and other-objections that would revise the historical plan and its
outcomes. I will argue this point in the next chapter. Retaining the uncertainty of
contingency through spirit, on the other hand, promotes both the open-endedness and
inclusiveness of genuine dialogue.
This chapter has provided a general framework for dividing between notions of
contingency and ignorance according to differing senses of present and future time as
certain (immanent, ideological) or uncertain (divine, transcendent). The next four
chapters offer specific analyses on the discursive results of conceiving of contingency
and ignorance in either of these ways. Chapter four criticizes Rorty’s immanent
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“contingency of language” and his resulting proposal for a “liberal utopia” as an example
of contingency that shuts down dialogue. The chapter on Rorty will demonstrate how
notions of contingency that propose a departure from spirit and transcendence must place
limits on dialogic participation, vocabularies, questions, and arguments, in order to
accomplish the aims of immanent teloi. Rorty will be presented as an example of the
intellectual prophet of the new age. Conversely, chapter five describes the operation of
contingency as uncertainty in definitional practices, with a focus on Socrates’ “What is
F?” question, and advocates this as a concept that makes genuine dialogue possible. The
distinction drawn between Rorty and Socrates is that, while Rorty’s proclamation of a
program for human history demands that he restrict dialogic participation, Socrates’
construction of a dialogue based in ignorance allows him to invite argumentative others.
Chapters six and seven treat ignorance within the same evaluative framework. Chapters
four through seven, then, work through a full theoretical development of contingency and
ignorance that begins with my interrogation of Rorty.
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CHAPTER 4
IMMANENT CONTINGENCY AND THE RESTRICTION OF DIALOGUE
The previous chapter proposed that not all contingent views on language and the telos
of a human moral life allow for dialogue. This chapter describes how contingency can be
ideologically turned to discursive prohibition. The division proposed in the last chapter
held that immanentizing transcendent symbols for utopian or progressivist visions
represents a closure to the otherness and open-endedness of genuine dialogue. Here I
back that claim by the paradigmatic example of Richard Rorty’s liberal utopia. Rorty is
examined especially because he offers “contingency of language” as the motive for his
utopian vision. In doing so he provides a specifically language-based notion of immanent
contingency as an ethic of closure in discursive practice. Rorty’s prophetic intellectual
voice is representative of the “overseer” who reframes real and open dialogue into a
fabrication so that ethical talk can, in a predetermined fashion, accord with a desired end.
Rorty reveals the disingenuous nature of ideological “dialogue” generally, and uncovers
that especially troubling aspect of program history that demands programmed talk. My
criticism moves from Rorty’s proposal for the removal of metaphysical terms for a new
moral vocabulary, through the practice of this vocabulary in the public sphere of his
liberal utopia. It is aimed at utopianism and progressivism generally, as both produce
practices that sacrifice spirit in the name of “progress.”
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Rorty’s Liberal Utopia and a New Moral Vocabulary
Rorty’s (1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity sets out with the ethical aim of
directing its arguments toward the alleviation of human suffering.1 But while the end may
be noble, the means are not only suspect, but dangerous to open moral discourse. The
agent in Rorty’s proposal for reform is the “liberal ironist,” liberal because she or he
believes, that “cruelty is the worst thing we do,” and ironist because she or he “faces up
to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desires – someone
sufficiently historicist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those central
beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance” (xv,
emphasis mine). The idea of questioning is not objectionable on its own, but Rorty asks
us to question those beliefs having already abandoned the idea that they have
metaphysical attachments. Inasmuch as this results in the death of central human beliefs
on uncertainty, what questions are left? This seems to be exactly the point, as Rorty will
later seek to remove metaphysics from our vocabulary and our catalog of questions.
The liberal ironist, apparently, will be relieved to be done with the religious and
rationalist discussions of the masses. Rorty’s contempt on this matter is remarkable.
Many people believe in and discuss an extra-human order, and “ironist intellectuals who
do not believe that there is such an order are far outnumbered (even in the lucky, rich,
literate democracies) by people who believe that there must be one.” This unfortunate
reality is due to the fact that “Most nonintellectuals are still committed either to some

1

All references to “Rorty” in this chapter refer to Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony,
and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989.
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form of religious faith or to some form of Enlightenment rationalism” (xv).2 The
ideological alleviation of this problem would be the opening of a space for Rorty’s liberal
utopia, which becomes possible in a “postmetaphysical culture,” which seems to Rorty
“no more impossible than a postreligious one, and equally desirable” (xvi).
In Rorty’s “liberal utopia” human solidarity would become “a goal to be
achieved…not by inquiry but by imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange
people as fellow sufferers.” Solidarity is central to Rorty’s ethics, and is “created by
increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other,
unfamiliar sorts of people.” Increased sensitivity results in the inability to marginalize
other people because they feel things differently from the way we would (xvi).
Rorty’s focus on Solidarity and “otherness” does not make his theory friendly to
genuine dialogue. He creates an obvious bind for himself in claiming solidarity as a
major ethical term, then defining it as increased sensitivity to “others’” feelings,
viewpoints, and humiliation. Consider that Rorty has just split two classes of people:
liberal intellectuals are the fortunate unbelievers, a smaller class that has the right idea
but is unfortunately stuck with a nonintellectual class that still clings to ideas of
metaphysics and religion. The formation of a privileged class based on the beliefs of us
versus them obviously undercuts solidarity as Rorty defines the idea. Moreover, he
repeats the cruelty Solidarity attempts to repair by silencing or making ridiculous the
discourse of a whole community of people and their most central beliefs, especially as

2

It would only be fair to note that this sort of snobbishness is not typical of all
ideological projects, but the metaphysical classism (which I object to most centrally) is an
important component to similar proposals. Nietzsche’s death of God as a release from
slave morality, and Marx’s post-metaphysical rise of the proletariat, are examples.
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those beliefs and their articulation have, at various historical times, become attached to
humiliation and suffering. The ideal of sincere other-turning is most centrally inclusive,
and a classist solution (designing class division on metaphysical belief) immediately
reveals itself as misfit for real, genuine dialogue.3 The paradox of meeting cruelty with
spiritual murder discolors the rest of Rorty’s program.
This is most obvious when Rorty actually defines “contingency” in the “contingency
of language” by connecting solidarity to narrative. He contributes to the narrative ethical
perspective I have described thus far, but trouble lurks. Rorty writes “The process of
coming to see other human beings as ‘one of us’ rather than as ‘them’ is a matter of
detailed description of what unfamiliar people are like and of redescription of what we
ourselves are like,” a task not for theory but instead for narrative genres. Works of fiction
such as books, television shows, and movies give us a sense of the suffering of people
unlike us, Rorty claims, and this is why narrative forms have increasingly become
vehicles for moral change and progress (xvi). In connecting narrative to his liberal utopia
Rorty provides comments on discourse and narrative futurity. On replacing “the sermon
and the treatise” with narrative as the primary form of moral change, he writes:
In my liberal utopia, this replacement would receive a kind of recognition which it
still lacks. That recognition would be part of a general turn against theory and toward
narrative. Such a turn would be emblematic of our having given up the attempt to
hold all the sides of our life in a single vision, to describe them with a single
vocabulary. It would amount to a recognition of what…I call “the contingency of
language” – the fact that there is no way to step outside the various vocabularies we
have employed and find a metavocabulary which somehow takes account of all
possible vocabularies, all possible ways of judging and feeling. A historicist and
nominalist culture of the sort I envisage would settle instead for narratives which
connect the present with the past, on the one hand, and with utopian futures, on the
3

For additional criticism see Phillips, Hollibert E. “The Ironist’s Utopia: Can Rorty’s
Liberal Turnip Bleed?” International Philosophical Quarterly. 32 (1992) : 363-368.
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other. More important, it would regard the realization of utopias, and the envisaging
of still further utopias, as an endless process – an endless proliferating realization of
Freedom, rather than a convergence toward an already existing Truth (xvi).
In sum, Rorty is advocating an ejection of metaphysical terms for the sake of
narrative disunity; in doing so he goes in the opposite direction from Homer. The phrase “
there is no way to step outside the various vocabularies we have employed and find a
metavocabulary which somehow takes account of all possible vocabularies, all possible
ways of judging and feeling” articulates a clear policy of “contingency” as exclusion.
Here Rorty is offering but one conception of narrative contingency and a matching role
for language; of the multiple stories of language, morality, and future, he is telling the
version that would form and vitalize his liberal utopia. Divinity in narrative provides
meaning for human practices that relationally move forward into an uncertain future.
Rorty’s contingency is a discontinuity that fragments the relational grounds of those
practices by undoing the notion that a single, unifying (metaphysical) vocabulary exists
that can carry people together toward their uncertain end. The summary problem is that
the ends of otherness and other-sympathy symbolized by Solidarity and Freedom are to
be built from discontinuity and narrative disunity.
That he proposes an end, in the teleological sense, Rorty denies (16); his utopia is an
endlessly proliferating Freedom rather than a historical convergence on Truth. But
judging by his own examples, Solidarity and Freedom are in fact teloi, despite objections.
Rorty provides “the discovery of truth,” and “the emancipation of humanity” as
examples of teloi (17), implying a reference back to his Solidarity and Freedom as ends
of “Realization” and “Emancipation.” The objection that endless proliferation protects
Rorty’s program from a final telos falls short because the emphasis on endlessness
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translates as an immanentization of the transcendent teleological symbol of Eternity in
an Afterlife, or, at the very least, as the immanentized achievement of a new,
Emancipated Age as an end-time of proliferation. The most important qualification is that
Solidarity and Freedom are articulated as the ends of a language program; here is the
centrality of the “contingency of language.” Rorty envisions his utopian program
progressing toward Solidarity and Freedom after a moratorium on metaphysical symbolic
action. The justification is centrally epistemic: that we cannot position ourselves for the
discovery of a unifying meta-language, means we should eject the relevant vocabulary
and, with that blockade removed, map a new end through a revised discursive program.
Understanding this epistemic justification provides a clear view on Rorty’s “contingency”
and the discourse ethic of closure it promotes.
Further evidence comes in Rorty’s description of language as a game. Rorty writes
that when we rid ourselves of the notion of language as “description of the world,” to a
conception of “language games as wholes, games which we do not choose between by
reference to criteria, the idea that the world decides which descriptions are true can no
longer be given a clear sense,” so that it becomes “hard for us to think that our
vocabulary is somehow already out there in the world, waiting for us to discover it” (6).
Essentialism is a “temptation” in language produced by the general temptation “to think
of the world, or the human self, as possessing an intrinsic nature, an essence…to
privilege some one among the many languages in which we habitually describe the world
or ourselves.” As long as we hold on to this idea, Rorty argues, we will be caught in the
traditional philosophical search for criteria by which to judge these various vocabularies
as having the “desirable feature” of “fitting the world,” or “expressing the real nature of
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the self.” Justifying resignation in light of the unknown, Rorty argues if we could
reconcile with the idea that descriptions of reality and the human self are constructed
through vocabulary “rather than being adequately or inadequately expressed in a
vocabulary,” then we can come to the realization that “languages are made rather than
found, and that truth is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences” (6-7).
From this basic stance on language, Rorty makes specific proposals involving the
removal of metaphysical vocabulary terms. Consider the following quote as a clear
example of his overall proposal on vocabulary:
To say there is no such thing as intrinsic nature is not to say that the intrinsic nature of
reality has turned out, surprisingly enough, to be extrinsic. It is to say that the term
“intrinsic nature” is one which it would pay us not to use, an expression that has
caused more trouble than it has been worth. To say that we should drop the idea of
truth as out there waiting to be discovered is not to say that we have discovered that,
out there, there is no truth. It is to say that our purposes would be served best by
ceasing to see truth as a deep matter, as a topic of philosophical interest, or “true” as a
term which repays “analysis.” “The nature of truth” is an unprofitable topic,
resembling in this respect “the nature of man” and “the nature of God”…But this
claim about relative profitability, in turn, is just the recommendation that we in fact
say little about these topics, and see how we get on (8).
Rorty’s compromise - that the nature of humanness, God, and truth may be out there,
but we should say very little about them and see how we do - only works for one side.
Not only does it promote a turn away from vital questions of human existence, it also cuts
out an entire argument community and a set of metaphysical terms that could be used in
potential, future dialogues. Rorty’s contingency disables dialogic agency at its most basic
level - the ability to raise questions and articulate terms of experience and value that have
meaning for me, and so, potentially, for an other. What Rorty either ignores or omits is
that a thing not symbolically acted upon in human community atrophies, and eventually,
may die from neglect. The same is true for dialogues. If the allowable vocabulary no
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longer makes metaphysical terms available for argument and discovery, the meaning of
community and “otherness” must go through a steady progression of reduction and
decline, until the coming of a symbolically cleansed, argumentative new age. For the
surviving dialogues, even those that are seemingly open-ended (rather than prefabricated) the potential outcomes will be reduced to an immanent set of possibilities.
The prohibition against metaphysical dialogue through “contingency” is necessary for the
end of Emancipation.4
Rorty praises the German idealists, French revolutionaries, and Romantic poets for
having the common vision that “human beings whose language changed so that they no
longer spoke of themselves as responsible to nonhuman powers would thereby become a
new kind of human beings” (7). The method this opens up is one where people “describe
and redescribe “lots and lots of things in new ways” until they have created language

4

The prohibition against metaphysical questions (exampled by Rorty) is typical of
ideological proposals. Consider Marx’s prohibition in the Manifesto of the Communist
Party: “The charges against communism made from a religious… standpoint, are not
deserving of serious examination” (225). Marx, Karl. “Manifesto of the Communist
Party.” The Portable Karl Marx. Ed. Eugene Kamena. New York: Penguin, 1983.
Voegelin (1987) has noted that such passages in Marx and similar thinkers mark a
recognition of “the validity of metaphysical questions,” but a refusal “to consider them
because such consideration would make their irrational opining impossible” (25).
Voegelin, Eric. The New Science of Politics: An Introduction. Chicago: U of Chicago P,
1987. Noting the potentially damaging effects of metaphysical questions on ideological
proposals, Voegelin (1968) argues that Marx’s prohibition against them is a “swindle:”
“In view of the reality of the order of being in which we live, Marx’s prohibition of
questions had to be characterized as an attempt to protect the ‘intellectual swindle’ of his
speculation from exposure by reason; but from the standpoint of the adept Marx the
swindle was the ‘truth’ that he had created through his speculation, and the prohibition of
questions was designed to defend the truth of the system against the unreason of men”
(57). Voegelin, Eric. Science, Politics and Gnosticism. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1968. I
am interested in the prohibition in a more general sense as an endangerment to genuine
dialogue.

69

patterns that the new generation will be tempted to adopt.5 The aim is not to have that
new generation work “piece by piece,” analyzing each concept and testing thesis after
thesis, but rather to act pragmatically, making recommendations like “try thinking of it
this way,” or “try to ignore the apparently futile traditional questions by substituting the
following new and possibly interesting questions.” This may sound like a heuristic use of
language, and in several ways it is. But it is a strangled heuristic. It is already clear that
Rorty proposes we not talk about metaphysical terms and see how we do from there. “Try
thinking of it in this way” suggests to the new generation that they not think about it the
other way, and “substitute futile traditional questions with new, interesting questions,”
means ask these questions from now on, and don’t ask the old, meddlesome
(metaphysical) ones. The important point is that Rorty attaches his proposal to a historical
method as progress toward a discursive end, a new vocabulary with new questions to be
passed down generation to generation. If Rorty wishes for progress toward a liberal
utopia with an ever-proliferating Solidarity and Freedom as the end, he will have to
derive that Solidarity and Freedom from a constraint of public discourse.
Historical progress ( what Rorty describes as a “nonteleological view of intellectual
history”) becomes a process of symbolic death and fertilization: “Old metaphors are
constantly dying off into literalness, and then serving as a platform and foil for new
metaphors,” an analogy which helps us to think of “our language” “as something that
took shape as a result of a great number of contingencies” (16). It is important to drop the
idea of “language as representations,” and thus “de-divinize the world,” accepting the
5

Rorty notes that new generations will use terms largely borrowed from the previous
generation, so that cultures will adopt new terms, and then have those terms challenged
by the “avant-garde,” a process of changing present terminologies in the development of
one culture after another (56).
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argument that “truth is a property of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their
existence on vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made by human beings, so are
truths,” an abandonment of the “’intuition’ that truth is ‘out there’” (21). For Rorty if we
can avoid (on the impulse of thinkers such as Nietzsche and Freud) treating anything as
quasi divinity, or worthy of our worship, and treat language, conscience, and community
as products of time and chance, that will be the opening of our fate, of history, to chance
(22). Again, historical “progress” is marked by a process of dying metaphysical terms
and rising (immanent) contingencies in language. Placing a consistent emphasis on
removal describes Rorty’s language program with great clarity: it is a progressive
ejection and deterioration of metaphysical terms to be handed down from generation to
generation as a set of questions not to ask any more, and a collection of possible
dialogues not to engage in.
Rorty’s prophetic intellectual voice articulates a discourse program of boundaries and
prohibitions to describe and justify movement to a final age of proliferating
Emancipation, Solidarity, and Freedom. Immanent “contingency” works in this
justification as a necessary departure from the unprofitable unknowns and unknowability
of metaphysical questions, which are traditional blockades to human progress. The
obvious violation of genuine dialogue is the denial of discourse as a search for Absolutes,
and the related restriction on what questions can be raised, and what terms can be acted
upon. The problem for potential interlocutors is a matter of participatory constraint and
other-inclusion. By closing off the discourse of “nonintellectuals” and others who wish to
speak of and ask about metaphysics, Rorty has shortened the reach of his Solidarity, and
created an outside “other” arguer that has no voice or place in the surviving dialogues of
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his liberal utopia. The next section will reveal that dialogues formed under constraints
against metaphysics (as they would be under any constraints) are fabricated and
necessarily pre-determined.
Moral Discourse in Rorty’s Public Sphere
Rorty’s contingency of language produces a contingent moral community pictured
within a new public sphere. The product of Rorty’s new vocabulary of “redescription” is
a separation from the search for foundations, forging a difference between old cultures of
metaphysics and new cultures of “liberalism,” one which would be “enlightened, secular,
through and through… one in which no trace of divinity remained, either in the form of a
divinized world or a divinized self.” Through a process of de-divinization, this culture
would drop the ideas of “holiness,” “devotion to truth,” and “fulfillment of the deepest
needs of the spirit,” ideally culminating in “our nor longer being able to see any use for
the notion that finite, mortal, contingently existing human beings might derive the
meanings of their lives from anything except other finite, mortal, contingently existing
human beings” (45). The understanding of language in the de-divinized public sphere
finds it trapped in the present standpoint of our current, temporary, and historically
conditioned vocabulary without an external standpoint from which to judge the moral
qualities of what we are saying (48).
In fact, the term “morality” becomes useful to us only “insofar as we can cease to
think of morality as the voice of the divine part of ourselves and instead think of it as the
voice of ourselves as members of a community, speakers of a common language” (59).
This shift in thinking makes it impossible to consider the question of ours as a “moral
society,” or that there might be something common to the individual and the larger
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community such as “humanity” or “intrinsic nature.” Instead society becomes conceived
of “as a band of eccentrics collaborating for purposes of mutual protection rather than as
a band of fellow spirits united by a common goal” (59).
Here Rorty commits to a falsified moral pluralism. He seeks to encourage an
“increasing willingness to live with plurality and to stop asking for universal validity,”
with “freely arrived at agreement as agreement on how to accomplish common
purposes… but I want to see these common purposes against the background of an
increasing sense of the radical diversity of private purposes…” (67). In this condition we
become content to consider “true” whatever the “upshot” of free and open encounters is.
Problematically, the way to establish such “free and open encounters” is to remove talk
of foundations which presuppose a natural order of topics and arguments and overrides
the need for new vocabularies to confront old ones (52). Typically, Rorty will derive
Freedom from constraining dialogue. Of course he has simply repeated the problem.
Proposing these new secular terms instead of those old metaphysical terms will have the
inevitable result of establishing a new hierarchy of topics and questions. A close look at
Rorty’s “ideal liberal state” reveals a public sphere with questionable potential for a truly
“open” speech situation:
A liberal society is one whose ideals can be fulfilled by persuasion rather than force,
by reform rather than revolution, by the free and open encounters of present linguistic
and other practices with suggestions for new practices. But this is to say that an ideal
liberal society is one which has no purpose except freedom, no goal except a
willingness to see how such encounters go and to abide by the outcome. It has no
purpose except to make life easier for poets and revolutionaries while seeing to it that
they make life harder for others only by words, and not deeds. It is a society whose
hero is the strong poet and the revolutionary because it recognizes that it is what it is,
has the morality it has, not because it approximates the will of God or the nature of
man but because certain poets and revolutionaries of the past spoke as they did (61).
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In Burkean terms, Rorty has simply re-weighted the old vocabulary of privileged
terms. Rorty’s distinction between persuasion and force is immediately problematic. It
would be naï ve to say that persuasion cannot be forceful, and it is troubling to note that
rejoining these two ideas reveals the possibility that “might” in speech and argument
makes for the moral “right” is Rorty’s state. The response may be made that Rorty
ensures against this by offering the ideal of placing one argument up against another in a
free and open speech situation, “seeing how it goes,” and then abiding by the outcome.
This is fine, but in Rorty’s construct the arguments and dialogues are rigged. In a dedivinized state the arguments have to be on topics not metaphysical, and the dialogic
investigations have to be directed away from matters of foundations and holiness, so that
“abiding by the outcome” means abiding by the decisions of dialogues that have worked
through allowable topics employing allowable terms. In Rorty’s speech situation the
crime is not that some terms and questions have been privileged over other ones, but that
they have been removed from consideration altogether. The simultaneous violation of
genuine dialogue and genuine community is that inclusion and other-turning are
restricted to those arguers and language-users who ask those questions I would ask, and
use the terms I use, and can reach the same potential set of conclusions that I might reach.
What is to be done with the population of metaphysicians who are moved to the outside
of this restrained argument community is an issue Rorty does not address.
The summary idea of this chapter is that Rorty’s prophetic intellectual voice
articulates a representative ideological threat to genuine dialogue. Whether this threat is
articulated through utopian or progressivist variants, the pervasive problem is the
sacrifice of spirit in the name of ethical progress. This proposed sacrifice excludes the
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“other” metaphysician and metaphysical arguments by portraying these as oppositional
barriers to human development . Recall Buber’s description of “false” dialogue, where
“the participants do not really have each other in mind, or they have each other in mind
only as general and abstracted opponents and not as particular beings,” so that there “is
no real turning to the other, no real desire to establish mutuality” (Friedman 1987, 143).
Rorty’s metaphysical classism, his (de-divinized) narrative disunity, and his proposal to
eject metaphysical terms, demonstrate his ethic of “otherness” and “sensitivity” as falsely
dialogic. His polemic against metaphysics and his various prohibitions make the
establishment of mutuality through other-turning impossible because there exists an
enormous group of (“nonintellectual”) others that he must turn away from. Considering
the description of immanentization in the last chapter, and considering the hope to
develop a terrestrial paradise by a reduction of spirit, ideological programs generally
mandate this turn away from metaphysical “others” not part of the envisioned solution.
Kirk (1969) writes that “For the ideologue, humankind may be divided into two classes:
the comrades for Progress, and the foes attached to reactionary interests” (157). Rorty’s
classism is an example, and his notion of progress as a successive death of spirit was the
target of Voegelin’s general argument against ideological “progress” in the previous
chapter. In summary, ideological prophesy is thoroughly antithetical to dialogue.
Genuine dialogue, as a search for Absolutes, is rejected outright, and the general ethical
spirit of dialogue as inclusive, other-turning, and other-recognizing also suffers under
ideological restrictions.
Socratic contingency and ignorance provide a move away from the discursive
program of the ideological prophet who, by overseeing dialogues, promotes “progress”
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toward a certain final end, and toward a practice of genuine dialogue based on an
uncertain, open-ended, and inclusive ethic. The next chapter focuses on contingency as
uncertainty in definitional practices. In Socratic and Aristotelian notions of definitional
practice, I demonstrate that uncertainty and unknowability are not justifications for
departing from Absolute searches, but rather, starting points for an ethics of dialogic
practice.
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CHAPTER 5
CONTINGENCY AS UNCERTAINTY: VIRTUE AND ARGUMENTS FROM
DEFINITION
The previous chapter revealed the immanentist view on the contingency of language
as a justification for departing from symbolic metaphysical action. Violating the
uncertain time of the divine moral quest, immanent contingency projects progress, or a
perfected end, through restrictions on dialogue. In this chapter I seek an ethic of
contingency as uncertainty more fitting to the open-endedness of genuine dialogue.
Through the example of definitional arguments (arguments that seek essential terms like
Justice and Piety), I demonstrate that those who wish to continue investigations of
permanence think about contingency as the challenge of an uncertain future. By focusing
on the ends of definitional arguments as contingent, I describe their successful mediation
between the local (especially as they maintain experiential examples as the basis for
argumentative discovery) and the Absolute.1 I begin with an introduction to arguments
from definition and their uncertain ends. Next, I analyze Socrates’ argument from
definition, the “What is F?” question, introducing its form, then moving into a discussion
of how it mediates between examples and essences. Finally, to elaborate the claims on
contingency made in my analysis of the “What is F?” question, I offer Aristotle’s
comments on defining virtue terms over time.

1

I depart somewhat from the Aristotelian tradition in rhetoric that has equated
contingency with probability (something probably true or probably likely, as opposed to
demonstrative or necessary), an idea that has also largely been tied to opinion. In my
study, contingency as uncertainty constitutes a collaborative discovery of contingent truth
through a testing of opinion and other materials of experience.
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Introduction to Arguments From Definition
A well-known proponent of definitional arguments in contemporary rhetorical theory
is Richard Weaver. Weaver establishes a hierarchy of ethical arguments from most to
least ethical, with arguments from genus and definition at the top. For Weaver (1953)
genus and definition reveal a way of thinking about reality and experience expressed in
the language of philosophy as “being,” where the world is viewed in terms of things
belonging to certain classes and having certain essences (86). Summarizing definitional
arguments in Language Is Sermonic (1970) he writes “Definition is an attempt to capture
essence” that deals with “fundamental and unchanging properties” (209). This is the basic
aim of Socrates’ “What is F?” question, as we will see momentarily.
Weaver also provides a general description for the examples used in Socrates’
definitional arguments. Socrates targets examples in refuting the proposed definitions of
his interlocutors, but examples are also the materials he uses to discover his own
responses. This incongruency will be resolved as a matter of mediation in the section of
this chapter on definitional knowledge. That resolution is previewed by Weaver’s second
most ethical argument, the argument from similitude. Similitude is a way of thinking
about reality through “relationship,” where we see that something has a significant
resemblance to something else. Implying a fellowship with arguments from definition,
Weaver writes that proponents of similitude believe “in a oneness of the world” and look
toward “some final, transcendental unity” (57). This idea of “oneness” comes from an
emphasis on similarity and relationship, so that “those who argue from similitude invoke
essential (though not exhaustive) correspondences” (56-57). We will discover that
Socrates binds definition and similitude together in the “What is F?” question: his aims
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are essentialist (definitional), and the way he uses examples (similitude) in his refutations
employs the materials of human experience in a way consistent with those aims.
Finally, Weaver frames the uncertain ends of definitional arguments is a helpful way
for my analysis through his description of dialectic as a method of definitional
investigation. For Weaver (1953), dialectic precedes rhetoric as an art of defining terms.
Dialectic is a method of investigation whose object is the establishment of truth about
doubtful propositions.” But, there is also a branch of dialectic that involves “choice or
avoidance” and this is where rhetoric is found joined. This is a rhetoric “involving
questions of policy,” and the dialectic which precedes it will determine not the
application of positive terms (what is “iron” or “gold”) but terms that are subject to
contingent evaluation (what is “good,” or what belongs to the category of the “just”) (16).
For Weaver, any piece of persuasion contains as its first process a dialectic establishing
terms of policy (17). A term of policy is essentially a term of motion, that acts upon the
congruency between compulsion and the soul: “The soul’s perception of goodness,
justice, and divinity will depend on its proper tendency, while at the same time contacts
with these in discourse confirm and direct that tendency.” Dialectical terms “direct” these
tendencies by creating motion in the human soul toward the good or the bad (17).
Weaver’s description of dialectic hints at the possibility that other forms of definitional
investigation - Socrates’ “What is F?” question, Socrates’ elenchos, and genuine moral
dialogue - aim at uncertain ends as well. By describing the uncertain ends of the “What is
F?” question, and the use of examples for the discovery of arguments and refutations, the
next two sections demonstrate the contingency and practicability of Socrates’ version of
the definitional argument.
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Socrates’ Argument From Definition
The “What is F?” question2 is articulated by Socrates primarily in Plato’s early
dialogues, where Socrates places great emphasis on it. Socrates’ practice of definition is
part of the larger Socratic elenchos, which is defined and discussed in the next chapter. In
his well-known treatment of Socratic Definition, Richard Robinson (1941) points out that
when Socrates asks the “What is F?” question, (asking, for example, what “piety” is in
the Euthyphro) he demands that his interlocutor tell him what that virtue is “in and of
itself,” not what it is in terms of other things (52- 53). Moreover, it is implied in
dialogues such as the Euthyphro (6e) that our knowledge of F (piety in this case) is prior
to our knowledge of its cases (instances of piety). Socrates says that when Euthyphro
defines F for him, he will use it as a paradigm to determine which things are F and which
are not. Robsinson writes that “the impression vaguely given by the early dialogues as a
whole is that Socrates thinks that there is no truth whatever about X that can be known
before we know what X is” (53).
At Euthyphro 4e-5d, Euthyphro claims moral superiority over others when he says he
has “precise” knowledge of divine things and how they are structured. This is important
because Euthyphro is about to enter court to prosecute his own father for murder.
Consider the importance Socrates and Euthyphro together place on accuracy of a moral
thesis in this case (4e-5a):

2

Different scholars refer to this question variably as “What is F?” (where F stands in for
the Greek word, phusis, or “nature”), “What is F-ness?,” and “What is X?” When quoting
from direct sources I will quote the scholar’s use of X or F verbatim, and these uses
should be taken as interchangeable. When I am discussing Socratic definition outside of
direct quotations, I will use “What is F?”
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SOCRATES: But you, by heaven! Euthyphro, you think that you have such an
accurate knowledge of things divine, and what is holy and unholy, that, in
circumstances such as you describe, you can accuse your father? You are nor
afraid that you yourself are doing an unholy deed?
EUTHYPHRO: Why, Socrates, if I did not have an accurate knowledge of all
that, I should be good for nothing, and Euthyphro would be no different from the
general run of men.
Brickhouse and Smith (2000) note “Euthyphro’s claim of superiority over other
people is not just that he has some knowledge about divine things but the kind of
knowledge that allows him to recognize truths others would miss, or at least misjudge,”
meaning that Euthyphro takes himself to be an expert about piety (110). To test his
knowledge of what piety is, and hopefully to be taught this for his own improvement,
Socrates asks his “What is F?” question of Euthyphro (5c-d):
So, in the name of heaven, tell me now about the matter you just felt sure you knew
quite thoroughly. State what you take piety and impiety to be with reference to
murder and all other cases. Is not the holy always one and the same thing in every
action, and, again, is not the unholy always opposite to the holy, and like itself? And
as unholiness does it not always have its one essential form, which will be found in
everything that is unholy?
Euthyphro answers that what he is doing now, “prosecuting the wrongdoer who
commits a murder or a sacrilegious robbery, or sins in any point like that, whether it be
your father, or your mother, or whoever it may be,” is holy and pious (5e-6a). But
Socrates refutes these as mere examples of holy deeds, and gets Euthyphro to admit that
there a multitude of other holy things as well (6b-e). In his refutation, Socrates
demonstrates that the sort of knowledge he is after is not simply specific to one or two
cases of piety, but would allow him to judge all instances of piety. On this basis Socrates
asks his question again, with a clarification. Recall Euthyphro 6d-e:
SOCRATES: Well, bear in mind that what I asked of you was not to tell me one or
two out of all the numerous actions that are holy; I wanted you to tell me what is the
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essential form of holiness which makes all holy actions holy. I believe you held that
there is one ideal form by which unholy things are all unholy, and by which all holy
things are holy. Do you remember that?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.
SOCRATES: Well then, show me what, precisely, this ideal is, so that, with my eye
on it, and using it as a standard, I can say that any action done by you or anybody else
is holy if it resembles this ideal, or, if it does not, can deny that it is holy.
Euthyphro responds that “what is pleasing to the gods is holy, and what is not
pleasing to them is unholy” (7a). Socrates famously refutes this definition on the basis
that the gods may disagree on what things are right and wrong, and that these disputes
mean the gods may love and hate, or be pleased and displeased, by the same things (7d8a). And so the refutations of Euthyphro’s definitions (via examples) continue in this
manner.
Other primary examples appear in the Laches, the Charmides, and the Hippias Major.
Consider the exchanges between Socrates and Laches on courage as another example of
what Socrates seeks by the “What is F?” question. Proceeding from the agreed-upon need
to understand the nature of virtue before it can be taught, the dialogue between Socrates
and Laches turns to that part of virtue that is called “courage.” Socrates asks, “Then,
Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the nature of courage, and in the
second place proceed to inquire how the young men may attain this quality by the help of
studies and pursuits. Tell me, if you can, what is courage?” (190e).
Laches responds by saying that he who “does not run away but remains at his post
and fights…” is a man of courage (190e). Socrates seems mildly pleased by the answer,
but says that he must not have asked the question correctly, because Laches has not
answered the question he intended to ask. Moreover, Socrates rejects the example of
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courage that Laches has offered on the grounds that the Scythians are said to fight and
fly, retreating and pursuing, at the same time, so that Laches’ response only applies to
heavy-armored soldiers, but not to all soldiers (191a-c). Blaming his own question on
Laches’ partial answer, Socrates asks again: “…For I meant to ask you not only about the
courage of the heavily-armed soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other
type of soldier – and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in
perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in politics, are courageous, and
not only who are courageous against pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires
and pleasures” (191 d-e). By way of clarification, and similar to the request for a
paradigmatic definition that appears in the Euthyphro, Socrates tells Laches “I was
asking about courage and cowardice in general. And I will begin with courage, and once
more ask what is that common quality, which is the same in all cases, and which is called
courage?” (191e-192a). Laches responds “I should say that courage is a sort of endurance
of the soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all” (192c), but
Socrates rejects this definition based on the claim that not every kind of endurance is to
be deemed courage. For example, when one who knows he will be successful in a
conflict “endures,” this is not an instance of courage (192c-193d).
Similarly in the Charmides Socrates asks “In order, then, that we may form a
conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me…what, in your
opinion, is temperance?” (159a-b). Charmides’ definition of temperance is “doing all
things orderly and quietly – for example, walking in the streets, and talking, and indeed
doing everything in that way. In a word…I should answer that, in my opinion,
temperance is a kind of quietness” (159b). Socrates’ refutation of this definition of
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“temperance” is, once again, that it is an example that does not apply to all cases. After
all, Socrates argues, temperance is held to be in the class of the good, yet in activities
such as writing, reading, learning, deliberating, playing the lyre, wrestling, and boxing,
quickness, not quietness, are considered goods (159c-160e).
What emerges from these examples is that the importance of knowing the definition
of a moral property (its F-ness) is that such knowledge will provide the expertise required
to judge all cases of F-ness. For this reason, Socrates is committed to defining virtues as
essences and paradigms. This is clear from the way he clarifies, via re-statement, his
questions to Euthpyhro and Laches, especially in his requests for “the essential form,”
and “ideal” of holiness in the Euthyphro.3
But Socrates’ consistent refutations of his interlocutor’s examples seems to insure
that he will not get the answers he is looking for. Neither does Socrates seem to have the
answers himself. The result is that dialogues in which Socrates asks “What is F?” usually
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The claim that Socrates’ “What is F?” question reveals an ontological belief is a
controversial one in Socratic studies. John Beversluis (1974) points out that two
“radically different accounts” co-exist among scholars as to the commitment that
Socrates’ “What is F?” question denotes. One group claims that the question seeks the
mere meaning of a word, such as “piety,” so that the request for an eidos need not be
taken as attached to any ontological commitment. Another group sees the “What is F?”
question as centrally and vitally concerned with the discovery of a “real definition,” the
eidos of the thing “piety,” and that accordingly “the ontological character of the question
is to be regarded as central and irreducible” (332). Beversluis, John. “Socratic
Definition.” American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1974) : 331-336. My analysis of the
textual examples provided here, as well as Socratic ignorance in the next chapter, defend
the idea that Socrates does, in fact, ask a centrally ontological question. For an example
of the claim that the “What is F?” question seeks the mere meaning of a word, see Cross,
R.C. “Logos and Form in Plato.” Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics. Ed. R.E. Allen. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965. 27-29. For an example argument supporting the
ontological stance see Beversluis, John. “Does Socrates Commit the Socratic Fallacy?”
American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987) : 219.

84

end in aporia, with an adjournment rather than a conclusion. At Euthyphro 15d-16a we
have a primary example:
SOCRATES: And so we must go back again, and start from the beginning to find out
what the holy is. As for me, I never will give up until I know. Ah! Do not spurn me,
but give me your mind with all your might now at length to tell me the absolute truth,
for if anybody knows, of all mankind, it is you… If you did not know precisely what
is holy and unholy, it is unthinkable that…you ever would have moved to prosecute
your aged sire on a charge of murder… But now I am sure that you think you know
exactly what is holy and what is not. So tell me, peerless Euthyphro, and do not hide
it from me what you judge it to be.
EUTHYPRHO: Another time, then, Socrates, for I am in a hurry, and must be off this
minute.
SOCRATES: What are you doing, my friend? Will you leave, and dash me down
from the mighty expectation I had of learning from you what is holy and what is
not…?
Similarly, having failed to come to an acceptable definition of courage in the Laches,
(199e-200c), Socrates, Nicias, and Laches together have failed in their task of learning
what virtue is (by learning that part of virtue called “courage”), so that they could teach
virtue well to the young. Socrates’ recommendation on whether he should tutor Niceratus
at the end of the dialogue is as follows (200e-201d):
And if I had shown in this conversation that I had knowledge which Nicias and
Laches have not, then I admit that you would have been right in inviting me to
perform this duty, but as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be
preferred to another? I certainly think that no one should… I maintain, my friends,
that every one of us should seek out the best teacher whom we can find, first for
ourselves who are greatly in need of one, and then for the youths, regardless of
expense or anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are…
Finally, Socrates’ lamentation at the conclusion of the Charmides illustrates the
oftentimes frustrating end to his “What is F?” question (175d-176a):
And yet, after finding us so easy and good-natured, the inquiry is still unable to
discover the truth, but mocks us to a degree, and has insolently proved the inutility of
temperance or wisdom is truly described by a definition such as we have spent all this
time in discussing and fashioning together…

85

But for your sake, Charmides, I am very sorry – that you, having such beauty and
such wisdom and temperance of soul, should have no profit nor good in life from
your wisdom and temperance. And still more am I grieved about the charm which I
learned with so much pain, and so little profit… in order to produce a thing which is
nothing worth. I think indeed that there is a mistake, and that I must be a bad inquirer,
for wisdom and temperance I believe to be really a great good… I would rather
advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never able to reason out anything,
and to rest assured that the more wise and temperate you are, the happier you will be.
What we see by the above textual examples is that the “What is F?” question involves
Socrates and his interlocutors in a discourse where the difficult pursuit of an essential
moral definition is productive of refutation after refutation leading up to a final
adjournment. What ties the discourse in knots is that Socrates refutes a given example for
the definition of holiness or courage with another example. What Socrates is up to, I
argue in the next section, is a practice of mediation. The emphasis for analyzing that
mediation falls on examples and their epistemic importance to Socrates. From the above,
it would seem that examples have little epistemic value for his purpose of defining. But a
closer look reveals Socrates’ employment of examples as consistent with the contingent
and mediated aims of definitional argument.
The Priority of Definitional Knowledge Debate: Resolving the “Socratic Fallacy”
The Priority of Definitional Knowledge debate (PD hereafter) focuses on the
epistemic problem of examples in Socratic definition. A close look at the debate outlines
considerations on the epistemic value of examples for Socrates, and the sort of mediation
he accomplishes by their use in argument. Peter Geach (1966) began the PD dispute in a
famous article where he deemed Socrates’ way of seeking moral definitions a fallacy, “a
style of mistaken thinking” based on two assumptions: 1) that you must know what the
general criterion is for a thing being “F” in order to know that you are predicating it
correctly, and 2) that it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning of “F” by giving
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examples of it (371). Benson (1990) summarizes the problem of PD as follows: “If A
fails to know what F-ness is, then A fails to know anything about F-ness” (19).
Brickhouse and Smith (2000) offer a summary that has closer ties to what I have
described as the purpose of the “What is F?” question: (PD) Only if one knows the
definition of some quality (F-ness) can one know anything about F-ness or F-things,
including whether any instance of F-ness is really an instance” (113).
Scholars who wish to attribute PD to Socrates point to several passages that seem to
indicate Socrates’ belief that knowledge of F must be prior to knowledge of anything
about F, including whether a particular case is an instance of F. Geach (1966) ascribes
PD to Socrates through some example passages I have quoted above, such as from the
Euthyphro, where Socrates claims that Euthyphro must know what the pious is in order to
judge his prosecution of his own father as a pious act (4e-5a; 15d-16a). When one adds
the requirement that Euthyphro must defend his knowledge of the pious not by means of
examples, but by a formal definition, then PD apparently sticks to Socrates. John
Beverlsluis (1974) offers one of the more lucid arguments in favor of PD (later he will
change his mind). He writes that Socrates’ theory of definition “requires that a knowledge
of the eidos is a necessary condition for the ability to recognize instances of it,” yet he
continually assesses the definitions offered by his interlocutors based on whether he
thinks they are compatible with instances and particular cases (336). By this means,
Socrates rejects conventional definitions (based in examples and normative views) on the
basis of previously established examples and normative views. Beversluis points out that
Socrates cannot simultaneously hold that knowledge of the eidos (say, of piety) is “a
necessary condition for the ability to recognize instances” (of piety), and that a
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satisfactory definition will be based on previously agreed-upon instances of piety (336).
In short, Socrates cannot devalue the epistemic status of examples and conventional
views on things like piety, courage, or justice, then reject the proposed definitions of
piety, courage, or justice based on examples and conventions. Here, Beversluis (1974)
clearly articulates the issue of mediation relevant to examples and Absolutes in
essentialist discourse.
Beversluis would reverse his position (1987) and argue that we do not have good
reason to attribute PD to Socrates, offering further clarity by his reversal. Beversluis
claims that if Socrates truly believes “that it is impossible to search for a definition of F
by means of examples of things that are F, he is guilty of repeated self-contradiction; for
that is exactly what he urges his interlocutors to do in every early dialogue in which the
What-is-F question is raised” (212). Turning to the texts, Beversluis notes Laches 190e,
where Socrates responds to Laches’ definition of the courageous man – he who “remains
at his post and fights against the enemy” – not by immediately rebuking Laches for
appealing to an example of a courageous action, but instead by accepting his example,
then producing additional examples himself, such as courage amid perils at sea, in
disease, poverty, and so on (212) (Laches 191d-e). “Thereupon,” Beversluis writes,
Socrates “exhorts Laches to attend to this inventory of particular cases and search for the
common character which is the same in each” (212). Similarly, at Charmides 159c-160b
Socrates refutes Charmides’ definition of temperance as “quietness,” “by producing
examples of temperate actions which do not require quietness but quickness and agility,
and then urges him to resume his search for a definition by investigating a wider range of
cases” (213). Euthyphro is directed toward further cases of piety as the basis of his
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continued examination with Socrates in the same manner (Euthyphro 6d9-e1) (213). The
claim Beversluis advances on this basis is that Socrates does not shun examples “until he
has discovered the definition of the relevant moral or evaluational term,” but rather
“habitually operates on the opposite methodological principle that it is by means of a
scrutiny of examples that the definition is to be achieved. For only by examining diverse
instantiations of F can the inquirer be in a position to discern the eidos which is the ‘same
in all cases,’ ‘includes all the various uses of the term,’ and constitutes ‘the universal
nature that pervades them all’” (213; Laches 191e-192b).
Beversluis’ argument indicates that Socrates holds examples to be of a much higher
epistemic status than advocates of PD claim. This does not mean his practice avoids
criticism of examples, as has been made obvious by the foregoing examples of “What is
F?” quoted from the dialogues. Beversluis notes, however, that Socrates’ rejection of
examples occurs only in “one exceptional and methodologically isolated context, namely,
whenever his interlocutor offers an example as an answer to the What is F? question”
(213). While he “never tolerates” this move, Socrates does usually accept the example as
an example, revealing that rather than holding contempt for the particular case, he holds
“a context-dependent and context-provoked protest against confusing definition with
enumeration of instances…” (213, emphasis mine). Here is Socrates’ definitional
mediation.4

4

By “mediation,” I am relying on the definition I provided in the first chapter. By
recognizing the locality of argumentative discovery from examples, Socrates makes his
definitional practice practical. But he does not overemphasize locality in a way that
sacrifices the ideal standards of the discourse.
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Beversluis’ argument is in concert with the arguments of Gregory Vlastos on this
matter, and their combined perspective is notable for its currency in the literature (Benson
1990, 21). Vlastos’ (1994) addition to Beversluis can be summarized in his statement
that, in Socrates’ method of inquiry, “nothing is ever ‘known through itself’ but only
‘through other things’ and there is always a security gap between the Socratic thesis and
its supporting reasons” (56). There are “knowledge gaps,” for example, between the eidos
of a virtue – piety, courage, temperance – and examples or instances of that virtue. The
gaps produced in knowing virtues through examples are not found by Socrates to be
debilitating, but rather “exhilarating” (58). Vlastos argues that “At no time does his
method require of him that he produce himself the answers to the questions his
interlocutors fail to find,” but rather to refute “bogus” beliefs, “and this he does by
eliciting from them the beliefs which generate the negation of their false answers” (58).
Inasmuch as these beliefs are based in examples and instances, Socrates has to employ
further examples to keep the dialogue, and his investigation, going.
The evidence above suggests that Socrates holds examples to be of higher epistemic
status than advocates of PD claim. If we were to successfully attribute PD to Socrates, we
would have to assign him the belief that if one does not know the definition of piety,
courage, temperance, or any other thing, then one cannot know anything at all about
these terms. But a further examination of the relevant dialogues reveals that Socrates
affirms knowledge of examples both for his interlocutors, and offers his own examplebased knowledge as a form of response to proposed definitions (Beversluis 1987, 211215). If Socrates were to truly hold that definitional knowledge was prior to knowledge
of particular cases (as PD would have it), then he could neither affirm nor articulate any
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form of knowledge based in instances and examples. That he clearly does both is central
to the arguments above that refute PD (Beversluis, 1987; Vlastos, 1994; see also
Brickhouse and Smith 2000, 109-120).
Resolving the PD debate in favor of examples-as-epistemologically-valuable has
implications for the practicability of definitional arguments. The example of Socrates
shows that they are mediated and contingent. They are mediated in the sense that they
discover refutations on the eidoi of virtue terms from examples of, and experiences with,
those terms. They are contingent in the sense that the ends they seek are uncertain. This
is evidenced by the aporific conclusions of the Euthyphro, Laches, and Charmides, as
well as Socrates’ commitment to example after example, filling knowledge gaps as a way
to further dialogue. Even as Socrates appears frustrated at the aporific ends of these
dialogues, he maintains a commitment to continue the discourse, either by revisiting the
issue in future (and we can assume, equally uncertain) dialogues, or by seeking out other
teachers and interlocutors for the sake of greater learning. Vlastos (1994) writes that
Socrates has to accept the uncertain futurity of his method because it is a limited
discourse. If he wins the argument today, that does not mean he will be right for now and
forever; it merely means he may be the better debater, but it “could not show that there is
no inconsistency within his own set of beliefs…” “Socrates,” Vlastos writes, “could not
have been unaware of this uncertainty, built into his instrument of research, which infects
all its findings” (57). Rather, Socratic definition recognizes this contingency and retains
it as part of its practice; this will be seen in my discussion on ignorance in the next
chapter.
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Opposite to immanent contingency, Socratic contingency (as uncertainty) motivates a
continuous and open-ended dialogue on Absolutes, rather than positing a departure based
on the unknown or apparently unknowable. Vlastos (1994) writes that the realization of
uncertainty allows for a condition where “if an inquiry should run into aporia,” Socrates
can “reckon the exercise not failure but incomplete success. Nothing has transpired to
show that the unfound answer is unfindable, nor yet to invalidate the fragmentary truths
unearthed along the way…” (58). Reflective of the telos of the divine moral quest, the
ends of Socratic inquiry are contingent in a sense productive of genuine dialogue, a
relational practice that unifies interlocutors in a commitment to an extensive and openended discourse on the terms in question. Contingency as uncertainty is especially
important to sustaining the open-endedness of genuine dialogue.
Aristotle’s Practice of Virtue Definition
Adding to the Socratic tradition of defining virtue, there is an additional classical
source for this idea worth noting. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (abbreviated as NE
hereafter) is the starting point for most examinations of virtue ethics because that work
established the prominence of virtue in moral theory. In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle
offers commentary on virtue definition that maintains the sense of contingency I am
advocating in this chapter. The additional value of this section is that it offers further
descriptions of attempts at virtue definitions and the contingent quality of definitional
commitments. I rely upon Martha C. Nussbaum’s (1988) observations on this topic, as
well as excerpts from the Nicomachean Ethics.
Nussbaum’s essay is largely an effort to mediate the relativistic turn in virtue ethics
by revisiting Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics for thoughts on how the virtues might be
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seen as universal, while recognizing that arguments, negotiations, and definitions
pertaining to the virtues will inevitably be produced locally. The most interesting aspect
of her essay, from a rhetorical standpoint, is the way it reads Aristotle in dealing with the
tension produced by the search for universality within a given locality, context, or
situation, and how that tension plays out in discourse. Through Aristotle, Nussbaum
derives a series of experiential spheres for moral discourse, as well as right actions within
those spheres. Through experience and action within these spheres, definitions of the
relevant virtues go from “thin” to “thick,” as starting points for further discourse.
A partial list of some of “the most important spheres of experience” recognized by
Aristotle is as follows (listed by the sphere and its corresponding virtue): Fear of
important damages, especially death – courage; bodily appetites and their pleasures –
moderation; distribution of limited resources – justice; management of one’s own
personal property, where others are concerned – generosity; attitude to slights and
damages – mildness of temper; attitude to the good and ill fortune of others – proper
judgment (as opposed to enviousness or spitefulness) (Nussbaum 1988, 35).5 Nussbaum
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Nussbaum derives this list from Aristotle’s treatment of examples of the mean in
particular virtues in Nicomachean Ethics 2.7, a list that he elaborates from 3.5 to the end
of 4. In writing on the various virtues Aristotle describes the sphere within which each is
experienced, and attempts to name each of its extremes (its excess and deficiency), and
its mean. The mean is important as a central part of Aristotle’s definition of virtue, as
indicated particularly at NE 1106b18-30, where he writes that experiences of emotion
such as fear, confidence, desire, anger, or pity experienced “at the right time, toward the
right objects, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner – that
is the median and the best course, the course that is the mark of virtue.” The same is true
for actions, and, since virtue is concerned with emotions and actions, “virtue is a mean in
the sense that it aims at the median,” avoiding the various ways of going wrong, and
finding the one way of going right (NE 1106b28-30). For more on the broader
Aristotelian view of virtue, see the description from NE 2.4 to the conclusion of Book 2,
where Aristotle defines virtue in terms of species and differentia, and further describes
the mean. For an excellent summary of Aristotle’s account of virtue also see MacIntyre,
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indicates that Aristotle isolates each of these as spheres of human experience that figure
“in more or less any human life, and which more or less any human being will have to
make some choices rather than others, and act in some way rather than some other,”
highlighting the importance of experience and judgment in virtuous choice and action
(35). This also illustrates the experiential background for the discursive action undertaken
by a particular moral agent. What becomes difficult is finding the proper criteria to make
sound decisions and take the “right” direction within each sphere, and this problem
becomes a discursive one. There is a specific difficulty with naming the virtues in terms
of their excesses, their deficiencies, and their means.
For some virtues, the mean and its extremes appear easy to name. Regarding honor,
for example, Aristotle writes that “the mean is high-mindedness, the excess is what we
might call vanity, and the deficiency is small-mindedness” (NE 1107b23-25). But further
on honor, Aristotle writes that it can be desired either too much or too little, and here the
criteria for properly describing these extremes become slippery: “a man who exceeds in
his desires is called ambitious, a man who is deficient unabmitious, but there is no name
to describe the man in the middle” (1107b25). As a result of this inability to name the
mean disposition, we “sometimes call the middle person ambitious and sometimes
unambitious; sometimes we praise an ambitious and at other times an unambitious man”
(1107b30-1108a). Aristotle explains why we name (or define) a virtue inconsistently, and
why we sometimes praise, and sometimes blame the same virtue, as a necessary attempt
“in order to see more clearly that the mean is to be praised in all things and that the
extremes are neither praiseworthy nor right, but worthy of blame… most of the virtues
Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nd ed). Notre Dame: U of Notre
Dame P, 1984, 146-164.
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and vices have no name, but for the sake of clarity and easier comprehension we must try
to coin names for them…” (1108a15-20, emphasis mine). This is an important statement
on the purpose of at least attempting to define the virtues, and should ring familiar with
the above comments on the purposes and ends of Socratic definition. Both Socrates’
“What is F?” question and Aristotle’s attempt to name virtues within universal spheres of
human moral experience serve the similar purpose of providing mediation points in
efforts at definition. They also re-describe the moral “progress” of immanent, ideological
discourse as progress in articulating contingent (uncertain) definitions that extend into a
future unknown.
Nussbaum (1988) describes Aristotle’s approach as beginning “from a
characterization of a sphere of universal experience and choice, and introducing the
virtue name as the name (as yet undefined) of whatever it is to choose appropriately in
that area of experience” (36). This name “as yet undefined” serves as a “thin” or
“nominal” definition, described by Nussbaum as “whatever it is that being disposed to
choose and respond well consists in, in that sphere” (36). The descriptive and active
quality of the initial or “thin” definition points to the idea that the relevant virtue is
defined, at this point, through the actions of the moral agent in particular circumstances.
Consider Aristotle’s comments on dispositions in regard to money (NE 1107b15-25):
In giving and taking money, the mean is generosity, the excess and deficiency are
extravagance and stinginess. In these vices excess and deficiency work in opposite
ways: an extravagant man exceeds in spending and is deficient in taking, while a
stingy man exceeds in taking and is deficient in spending. For our present purposes,
we may rest content with an outline and a summary, but we shall later define these
qualities more precisely.
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The virtue of generosity is defined as these particular actions in a particular context
(giving and taking money), but the sphere of experience described here is supposed to
have the universal quality of describing a typical human situation. Even so, the limitation
noted by Aristotle illustrates the fact that the thin definition is unsatisfactory for this
purpose.
The “more precise” definition comes later at NE 4.1. In that first chapter of Book 4,
Aristotle begins by establishing “generosity” as “the mean within the sphere of material
goods,” by which he means value as measured in money (1119b20). In offering a more
precise definition of generosity here, Aristotle goes through a detailed exposition on what
constitutes this virtue as a mean between the excess of extravagance and the deficiency of
stinginess. Most of the treatment focuses on providing more detail toward a developed
definition of generosity. One is generous who gives to the right people and takes from the
right sources instead of the wrong sources. Giving to the right person, the right amount, at
the right time, makes the act of giving noble rather than base. Moreover, the giving will
give the generous person pleasure and not pain “for to act in conformity with virtue is
pleasant or painless, but certainly not painful” (1120a20-25). Giving to the wrong people
means that the generous person will have nothing to give to the right people, and the
same implication is true of giving the wrong amount, or giving at the wrong time. An
example of the right place to take from is one’s own possessions (1120a30-1120b5). In
addition, generosity is relative to a person’s property, so that a generous act does not rely
on the amount given; it is possible that a lesser gift can be more generous if it comes from
smaller resources (1120b5-10).
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This more developed definition of generosity is contrasted with its excess,
extravagance. One who is extravagant has many of the features of one who is generous,
giving but not taking, but this is done wrongly. Extravagant people tend to take from the
wrong sources “because they want to spend, but they are unable to do so with an open
hand, since their own resources are soon exhausted.” Moreover, this appetite for giving
causes them to ignore what is noble and take indiscriminately from any and all sources,
which makes their gifts neither generous nor noble. These are people of the sort who
would “make wealthy those that ought to be poor; they would give nothing to people of
respectable character but much to those who flatter them or provide them with other
kinds of pleasure” (NE 1121b-10).
Stinginess is then defined as the opposite of generosity, a condition much worse than
extravagance, as extravagance can be cured through proper training, and turned into
generosity. The stingy person is incurable, and marked by “deficiency in giving and
excess in taking.” Some stingy people are motivated by a fear of having to resort to a
wrong doing as a result of not having enough of their own possessions, which results in
their miserliness, an excessive reluctance to not give anything to anyone else. Others take
“anything from any source” through wrongful occupations such as pimps, gamblers, and
highwaymen, all who are motivated by profiteering and “take from the wrong sources
and more than they should” (NE 1121b15-122a5).
The point of this detailed example is to illustrate the way Aristotle offers, by
comparison to the initial “thin” definition, a much fuller treatment of the virtue
“generosity” later in the work. Even though this definition is more elaborate, it still relies
on behavioral examples of generosity, as well as its excess (extravagance) and deficiency
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(stinginess), and descriptions of the experiences typical of agents faced with decisions
within this sphere. Moreover, the definition of generosity is offered partly in contrast to
extravagance and stinginess, so that the mean is defined in terms of what it is not, rather
than what it is, in and of itself. In short, Aristotle offers definitions by example, contrast,
and experience, just like Socrates. “Progress” from thin to fuller in Aristotelian virtue
definition projects into a contingent future much in the same way that Socrates’ dialogues
continue past their aporific endings. The similar role of contingency in both conceptions
is the commitment to uncertain futurity it promotes as an ethic of practice.
In Aristotle, then, the spheres can be seen not only as typical and recurrent realms of
human moral choice, but also rich places for moral discourse to flourish. Virtue definition
carries on within these universal spheres of experience as a limited, relational human
process of developing moral terms, which suggests that “the reference of the virtue terms
is fixed by spheres of choice, frequently connected with our finitude and limitation that
we encounter in virtue of shared conditions of human experience” (Nussbaum 1988, 37).
Here is another contribution to mediation by Aristotle.
Nussbaum (1988) points out that when Aristotle attaches the actual name, or word,
associated with a virtue or vice, to a sphere of shared human experience, he establishes
the marker of human moral progress as discursive; progress is measured by progression
toward a fuller definition of the name or word of a given virtue: “And we can understand
progress in ethics, like progress in scientific understanding, to be progress in finding the
correct fuller specification of a virtue, isolated by its thin or ‘nominal’ definition” (37).
This notion of discourse- or term-based based progress in ethics is part of Aristotle’s
broader conception of ethical progress. In Politics, Aristotle defends the argument that
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laws should be revisable rather than fixed by pointing to evidence of progress toward
“greater correctness in our ethical conceptions,” in politics just as in the arts and sciences
(Nussbaum, 38; Politics 1268b31). In defense of keeping laws flexible enough to change
along with moral progress, Aristotle writes:
There is evidence to be found, one might claim, in the facts themselves, for the
ancient laws are overly simple and barbaric: the Greeks used to go about carrying
arms and purchased their wives from each other, and, one supposes, everything else
that has been left over from ancient customs is altogether simple-minded. There is,
for instance, the law in Cyme about cases of homicide, that if the plaintiff can get
together a certain number of witnesses to the crime from his own kin, then the
defendant is guilty of the murder.
In general, all seek for what is good, not for what is ancestral…
In addition it is not even better to leave written laws unchanged. Just as it is
impossible in the case of the other arts to write down everything accurately, so it is
also in the case of political arrangement. For one must write in universal terms, but
actions concern particulars (1268b31-1269a12).
The most important phrases here are “it is impossible… to write down everything
accurately,” in politics as well as in all arts, and “one must write in universals, but actions
concern particulars.” Taken together, these claims indicate a method of pursuing ethical
progress where particular actions are compared to and judged against what is sought as
universal, and that what is written of these things (including definitions of moral terms)
must reflect the changeability of all of the elements involved – ethical historical progress,
human action and choice, and the elusiveness of universal searching. Here, an openended legal discourse is maintained as the only proper practice for the maintenance of
moral human progress. For the same reason arguments from definition must turn agents
back to the discourse to preserve the possibility that we might move past the point where
we are now, to fuller, and “thicker” definitions.
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The idea of embarking on this long and collective search in ethical theory is
summarized very well in a quote from Aristotle at the end of his discussion on human
nature in Nicomachean Ethics I:
This will suffice as an outline of the good: for perhaps one ought to make a general
sketch first and fill in the details afterwards. Once a good outline has been made,
anyone, it seems, is capable of developing and completing it in detail, and time is a
good inventor or collaborator in such an effort (NE 1098a20-25).
Conclusion
The summary idea of this chapter is that arguments from definition in Socrates and
Aristotle accomplish mediation by promoting an ethic of contingency as uncertainty.
Being consistent with the telos of the divine moral quest, contingency conceived this way
makes genuine dialogue possible as an open-ended and inclusive discourse on being. By
describing the epistemic value of examples, similarities, dissimilarities, and experiences,
I have argued that the aim to essences in definitional practices does not spell their
impossibility. Rather, mediation can occur when examples are allowed to hint at
universals through contingency. Nussbaum (1988) writes that attention to the particular
situation is fully compatible with attention to universal standards, as evidenced in
Aristotle’s treatment of the spheres: “The fact that a good and virtuous decision is
context-sensitive does not imply that it is right only relative to, or inside, a limited
context… It is right absolutely, objectively, from anywhere in the human world, to attend
to the particular features of one’s context; and the person who so attends and who
chooses accordingly is making, according to Aristotle, the humanly correct decision,
period” (45). For this reason, Nussbaum claims, the perspective she advocates is able to
capture much of the sensitivity to local conditions that the relativist would desire, while
not sacrificing objectivity. Most importantly, Nussbaum notes a discursive sensitivity to
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this approach, one that allows for new circumstances to give rise to newer, more concrete
measurements of a previously defined virtue, or changed views as to what the virtue itself
is. This sensitivity relies on holding all general accounts of the virtues provisionally “as
summaries of correct decisions and as guides to new ones” (45). Nussbaum’s comments,
and Socrates’ articulation of future discursive commitments post-aporia, elaborate the
ideas of “open-endedness” and “uncertain futurity” so central to genuine dialogue,
mediation, and contingency.
The discursive outcome of contingency as uncertainty is a recognition that this
present discourse will posit contingent moral theses (such as virtue definitions) that
extend into an unknown future where they will be exposed to new discourses, arguments,
and dialogic testing by others. In Socratic discourse, what actualizes contingency as
uncertainty is the disavowal of knowledge, the subject of my next chapter. The next
chapter will introduce Socrates’ elenchos (of which the “What is F?” question is a part),
and describe the categorization of moral knowledge as uncertain (versus certain)
accomplished by Socrates’ disavowal. Ignorance will be identified as a central utterance
for making genuine dialogue an enactment of virtue, especially as the means by which
Socrates is able to turn to other interlocutors as valuable participants in being.
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CHAPTER 6
THE MEANS OF IGNORANCE: SOCRATES’ DISAVOWAL OF KNOWLEDGE
I come to the topic of ignorance after a distinction, made in the last two chapters,
between immanent and uncertain contingency. The general movement of the study has
been away from certainty: proof, program histories, perfected futurity, and, in total, the
temptation to translate the limitations of local, human epistemology on being into an
immanentist retreat. Departing Rorty’s liberal utopia and the ideological vision at large
brought us to contingency as uncertainty as per the example of definitional arguments in
Socrates and Aristotle. In definitional practices, the contingency of human relational
action and argumentative outcomes on matters of being was the basis for a mutual
commitment to genuine dialogue. Definition pictured moral progress not as a succession
of dying vocabularies in line with a new program for interaction, but instead as the
contingent and relational discovery of terms of unification and order. Immanent
contingency offered a false hope for dialogue on the argument that death and restriction
could equal proliferation, Solidarity, and Freedom. Definition described contingency in a
way that made genuine dialogue possible as a relational and uncertain participation in
being. With contingency divided this way, I can now discuss its relationship to ignorance.
Through the example of Socrates, this chapter will describe how ignorance actualizes
contingency as an ethic in genuine dialogue. My analysis will proceed through a
discussion of Socratic ignorance and moral uncertainty as follows: 1) Socrates’ disavowal
of knowledge will be described as promoting genuine dialogue; 2) the disavowal will be
defended as sincere; 3) Socrates’ claims to certain types of moral knowledge will be
explained, leading to the paradox that Socrates alleges both to not know, and to know,
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moral things; 4) this paradox will produce the categorization of moral knowledge as
uncertain versus certain, a distinction important to genuine dialogue.
Where Socrates’ “What is F?” question is part of the Socratic elenchos, this chapter
takes a broader look at Socrates’ moral method as it is affected by the disavowal of
knowledge. The elenchos is Socrates’ method of questioning and refutation, whereby he
attempts to reveal the inconsistent beliefs of others, typically on moral matters.1 Much of
the format of the “What is F?” question, as I have described it, illustrates Socrates’
elenctic method and its aims. Gregory Vlastos (1994) writes “Socratic elenchus is a
search for moral truth by question-and-answer adversary argument in which a thesis is
debated only if asserted as the answerer’s own belief and is regarded as refuted only if its
negation is deduced from its own beliefs” (4). Although elenchi may vary, the “standard”
pattern, according to Vlastos, is as follows: “1) The interlocutor asserts a thesis, p, which
Socrates considers false and targets for refutation;” 2) Socrates secures agreement to
further premises, say q and r, which is ad hoc, as Socrates argues from q and r, not to
them; 3) “Socrates then argues, and the interlocutor agrees, that q & r entail not-p;” 4)
“Socrates then claims that he has shown that not-p is true, p false” (1994, 11; see also
Brickhouse and Smith 2000, 77-80).
The purpose of the elenchus is to test interlocutors’ knowledge, eliminating false
conceit, and bringing them to a realization of their own ignorance (Benson 1990, 61;

1

Scholars use either “elenchos” or “elenchus” (derived from the Greek word elenchos,
“which means ‘to examine’ or ‘to refute’) when referring to Socrates’ method.
Brickhouse, Thomas C., and Nicholas D. Smith. The Philosophy of Socrates. Boulder,
CO: Westview, 2000. 47. Throughout the study, I will use “elenchus” only when
referring to the arguments of scholars who use the term this way. In all other instances, I
will use the Greek “elenchos.”
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Beversluis 1974, 334). Beversluis describes the moral purpose of the process: “in the
absence of both knowledge and true belief, the attempt to live the good life proves
abortive at its very inception,” requiring that “the interlocutor’s presumed, but premature,
confidence must be undermined; everything must be thrown into question” (334). This is
done for therapeutic aims according to May (1997), the engendering in the interlocutor of
better and better moral understandings of things like “courage,” or “justice” (48). In
describing Socrates’ aim to “help one lead a more moral life,” May describes the course
of therapy as occurring over time into an extensive and uncertain future (48). Consistent
with my claims on the “What is F?” question, she writes on the therapeutic result of
elenctic investigation,
Hopefully, our interlocutor would revise her definition accordingly, and hence, have a
definition which is not as broad. That is, our interlocutor will formulate a definition
whose extension is closer…than her original definition. The process of definitionattempt, refutation, re-attempt, engenders in the interlocutor an awareness of the
characteristics that she associates with ‘courage,’ an awareness that is sharpened with
each successive definition attempt. Doubtless, our interlocutor may still, like
Socrates, fail to say what the one thing common to all courageous acts is - even after
many definition attempts, but this does not preclude her sharpening of her conception
of courage (48).
This is an excellent summary of the idea of open-endedness, extensiveness, and the
uncertainty of future moral outcomes, with the additional idea that the elenchos is a
practice of inclusive betterment. Reflective of the purpose of Socratic and Aristotelian
virtue definition, May’s view of the elenchos sees human moral development as enabled
through an ethic of contingency as uncertainty. The connection between this ethic, and
the dialogic outcome of enacted virtue, is ignorance.
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Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge
Recall the definition of ignorance offered in chapter three: 1) ignorance is a form of
moral knowledge, where one knows that she does not know a moral thing with certainty;
2) ignorance is a means in discourse that actualizes contingency (as uncertainty) as an
ethic of genuine dialogue. The first part describes a valuable epistemic position for the
agent of genuine dialogue, a form of moral self-knowledge that becomes otherknowledge when uttered in the happenings of a relational discourse. The second part
describes ignorance promoting a contingent ethic in dialogue that makes it open-ended,
extensive, and inclusive of equally contingent and uncertain arguers and arguments. This
section will clarify how my definition of ignorance is derived from Socrates’ disavowal
of knowledge.
In the Apology, Socrates makes the famous statements whereby he claims his own
moral ignorance. At the beginning of the dialogue we hear of Chaerephon’s question to
the Oracle at Delphi, as to whether there is anyone wiser than Socrates. When the Oracle
answers “no,” this causes Socrates to become perplexed:
When I heard about the oracle’s answer, I said to myself, What does the god mean?
Why does he not use plain language? I am only too conscious that I have no claim to
wisdom, great or small (Apology 21b).
In order to investigate the oracle’s claim, Socrates goes to the politicians, poets, and
manual artisans, all reputed to have great knowledge, only to find that those with the
greatest reputations were actually deficient (22a). At the end of his examination of the
politician, Socrates provides a clear statement of his own ignorance as an important form
of moral knowledge, when he tells the jury,
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I reflected as I walked away, Well, I am certainly wiser than this man. It is only too
likely that neither of us had any knowledge to boast of, but he thinks that he knows
something which he does not know, whereas I am wiser than he is to this small
extent, that I do not think that I know what I do not know (Apology 21d-e, emphasis
mine).
Two general schools of thought have developed on the debate over what Socrates
means when he says he has no knowledge of what is right or good. The first is that
Socrates’ profession of ignorance is insincere, and designed to encourage his interlocutor
to seek the truth, to make him think he is genuinely participating in a voyage of discovery
with Socrates (Vlastos 1994, 39). The basic accusation here is that Socrates knows the
answers to his questions, and the conclusions of his dialogues, beforehand, and so
engages others in a false heuristic.
The accusation of insincerity undercuts the dialogic other-turning of Socrates’
ignorance. Opposing this view, I will argue that Socratic ignorance is a genuine turning to
an other arguer and a commitment to an open-ended, relational, and contingent search for
terms of being. It is inclusive of the other and her arguments on the recognition that both
she and Socrates share a common epistemic condition of not knowing moral things with
certainty. Consider Socrates’ defense against insincerity at Meno 80d-81e as evidence of
these claims:
…It isn’t that, knowing the answers myself, I perplex other people. The truth is
rather that I infect them also with the perplexity I feel myself. So with virtue now. I
don’t know what it is. You may have known before you came into contact with me,
but now you look as if you don’t. Nevertheless I am ready to carry out, together with
you, a joint investigation and inquiry into what it is (80d).
Here, Socrates defends his disavowal as sincere and inclusive (of Meno in this
instance) uniting both interlocutors in a committed and uncertain search for the essence
of virtue. Meno asks what the point is:
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But how will you look for something when you don’t in the least know what it is?
How on earth are you going to set up something you don’t know as the object of your
search? To put it another way, even if you come right up against it, how will you
know that what you have found is the thing you didn’t know? (80d-e, emphasis
mine).
Unknowing for Meno (on the model of Rorty), is a potential justification for leaving
the dialogue.2 But for Socrates, it is a starting point; ignorance motivates their relational
search and promotes a contingent ethic within it. After Socrates responds that Meno has
brought up the “trick argument that a man cannot try to discover what he knows or does
not know” (80e), he explains that they ought not be led astray by this argument because
“It would make us lazy, and is music in the ears of weaklings” (81e). Rather, allowing
what is seemingly unknowable motivate dialogue “produces energetic seekers after
knowledge…” to which Socrates adds the invitation to include Meno (an open-ended
other-turning) “and being convinced of its truth, I am ready, with your help, to inquire
into the nature of virtue” (81e).
This passage from the Meno describes Socratic ignorance as a good relational to
genuine dialogue. Other-turning in Socrates’ elenchos is a method of therapy by
infection: Socrates “infects” his interlocutors with the same knowledge of ignorance that
gives him moral authority in the city, and makes him wiser than those who think they
know what they do not know. The example of the Meno shows that this is done for the
purpose of inclusion in a contingent dialogue: Meno, who before he met with Socrates

2

It is also worth noting the dialogue within the dialogue here. Socrates is putting himself
up against the very arguments, especially the one articulated by Meno, that could
undermine the purpose of his entire philosophy. That he takes responsibility for
responding to them is a dialogic act of inclusion (including other arguments), and a very
different strategy from ideological speech, which might delete such foundational
challenges.
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seemed sure of the eidos of virtue, now is uncertain. This epistemic revision makes him
ready for an uncertain, relational search as an equally contingent “other” with Socrates.
For Socrates, the whole city is ignorant because of the limitations of human
knowledge. Not knowing this, however, not everyone is available for genuine dialogue.
The elenchos attempts to repair this condition and reveal that the message of the oracle
on ignorance as wisdom is meant for the whole city, addressed to potential interlocutors
of genuine dialogues. After he professes ignorance at Apology 23a Socrates explains the
meaning of the oracle, “that real wisdom is the property of God,” and that “human
wisdom has little or no value” and reveals the meaning for potential interlocutors in the
city: “It seems to me that he is not referring literally to Socrates, but has merely taken my
name as an example, as if he would say to us, The wisest of you men is he who has
realized, like Socrates, that in respect to wisdom he is really worthless” (23b).
The argument that Socratic ignorance provides the grounds for other-inclusion in
genuine dialogue demands additional evidence that the disavowal of knowledge is
sincere. If Socrates’ claim to lack moral knowledge is genuine, then he is sincerely
uncertain when it comes to the moral outcomes and essential terms he seeks via dialogue;
this would mean the maintenance of the open-ended requirement of genuine dialogue. If
he is sincerely uncertain, then his profession of ignorance can introduce an ethic of
contingency into moral dialogue, making it inclusive of other interlocutors’ arguments,
and extensive into an uncertain future; this would mean the maintenance of contingency
as uncertainty. Ignorance can be seen as the participatory framework of Socratic
dialogue, and genuine dialogue generally, but only if unknowing is sincerely uttered to
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the relational others involved. For this reason, my next section provides a thorough
defense of the sincerity of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge.
In addition to the insincerity charge, the second typical response to Socrates’
disavowal is that Socrates should be taken at his word: he has renounced knowledge and
claims no true belief (Vlastos 1994, 39). If the second position is to be held, that Socrates
engages in his searches with no moral knowledge or true belief, then we cripple Socrates
as a moral agent by making his lifelong philosophical activity pointless, and his
continuous questions on virtue and morality the stumblings of a lost man. Moreover, we
leave Socrates without the materials - claims to moral knowledge on some level - to lead
a practical discourse on ethics. The section following the defense of sincerity indicates
that there are moral things that Socrates claims to know. In addition to maintaining
Socrates’ moral agency, these claims also present the disavowal as a paradox: Socrates
both knows, and does not know, moral theses. This paradox will produce a categorical
distinction between moral knowledge as uncertain, as opposed to certain, that I will
describe as important to genuine dialogue.
The Sincerity of the Disavowal
Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith (2000) summarize a common objection that
readers of Plato’s early dialogues have: if Socrates claims to be merely a seeker of
knowledge who does not to know the answers to his own questions, then why is he so
good at “finding just the right issues to pursue and just the right questions to ask to
confound his interlocutors and reveal their ignorance”? (58). This protest assumes that
Socrates resorts to a kind of trickery by saying he does not know anything about the
moral truths he seeks. This frustrates Socrates’ critics and we have indications that
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Socrates recognized this as the product of his investigations. He articulates his awareness
of this in the Apology (22e-23c):
The effect of these investigations of mine, gentlemen, has been to arouse against me a
great deal of hostility, and hostility of a particularly bitter and persistent kind, which
has resulted in various malicious suggestions, including the description of me as a
professor of wisdom. This is due to the fact that whenever I succeed in disproving
another person’s claim to wisdom in a given subject, the bystanders assume that I
know everything about that subject myself. But the truth of the matter, gentlemen, is
pretty certainly this, that real wisdom is the property of God, and this oracle is his
way of telling us that human wisdom has little or no value.
The summary conviction is that Socrates’ moral discourse is not a real heuristic, but
one manufactured to move in a certain direction, toward preconceived conclusions.3
Siding with this argument would of course lead one to believe that Socrates’ disavowal
has an equally cunning purpose, a false invitation to a prefabricated argument.
This very concern is perhaps articulated best by one of Socrates’ actual interlocutors.
Consider Thrasmymachus’ statement in Republic I ( 336e-337a):
(Socrates speaking)…Thrasymachus, don’t be harsh with us. If I, and my friend,
have made mistakes in the consideration of the question, rest assured that it is
unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not suppose that while, if our quest were
for gold, we would never willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in
the search and so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for
justice, a thing more precious than much fine gold, we should then be so foolish as to
give way to one another and not rather do our serious best to have it discovered...But
you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more
reasonably receive from clever fellows like you than severity.
And he, on hearing this, gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said,
Ye gods! Here we have the well-known irony of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted
that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather
than answer any question that anyone asked you.

3

This is the accusation Richard Enos (1993) levels on Platonic dialogue in general. Enos’
objection is that Plato is deceiving his readers and interlocutors alike. He writes “Plato’s
use of questioning is a heuristic employed not to discover Truth but rather to create his
interpretation of reality in the minds of his readers” (99; see also 93, 100). Enos, Richard
Leo. Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1993).
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Here we have an example form for the objection to Socrates’ disavowal: Socrates
assures Thrasymachus that any twists and turns in their search for justice are the product
of ignorance, the result of “our lack of ability,” but certainly not a purposeful or willing
effort to “truckle to one another and make concessions in the search,” spoiling the whole
thing by design. There is also the claim here that Socrates’ sincerity is based on the
mutual benefit of the quest: finding gold, but even more, justice, would benefit both
Socrates and his interlocutor alike. Thrasymachus objects that this represents Socrates’
usual “irony,” and that if we look closely we might discern a method whereby Socrates
credits the interlocutor (“we should far more reasonably receive from clever fellows like
you..”) and discredits himself, only doing so to dodge answers to questions that, we can
assume by extension, everyone knows Socrates has in mind already. This should ring
familiar with Socrates’ recognition in the Apology of the disfavor he has built against
himself. The summary of the objection – noted by critical scholars, by Socrates himself,
and by Thrasymachus – is that Socrates’ ignorance indeed has a discursive purpose, but
one that falsely disguises a preconceived moral discourse as an open dialogue.
It is upon me to refute this argument. Defending Socrates’ disavowal as sincere is
important because I am offering ignorance not as a rhetorical ploy, but as a statement
promoting the ethic of contingency central to genuine dialogue. Certainly ignorance can
be articulated insincerely, as when a politician, or a defendant, or a student, or a child,
“pleads” ignorance in the face of impending trouble. Certain brands can even be
dangerous, as when ignorance of “others” different from us produces racism,
misunderstandings, and stereotyping. But these, of course, are not the notions that I am
after; none of them posit ignorance as a form of moral knowledge. The form of ignorance
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I do wish to privilege comes from a greater understanding of Socrates’ moral discourse,
and how his disavowal invites others into dialogue through contingency. I will begin with
the charge that Socrates is “ironic,” demonstrating that, in fact, he is, but this irony is of a
certain kind.
Vlastos (1991) constructs a workable conception for “irony” by noting that its Greek
ancestors eironeia, eiron, and eironeuomai, indicated “the intention to deceive,” a
meaning foreign to our contemporary usage (23). In its contemporary usage, Vlastos
argues, the trope “irony” has “shed completely its disreputable past,” its meaning being
handed down from Cicero and Quintillian to now denote “speech used to express a
meaning that runs contrary to what is said – the perfect medium for mockery innocent of
deceit” (28).4
Vlastos (1991) provides three examples of irony that remove deceit from its intent.
The first type is sarcasm. When, for example, someone remarks in the middle of a
downpour that the weather is “fine” today, there is no trouble understanding that the
contrary of what is said was the intended meaning. The second is when a joke is put upon
someone as a socially acceptable put-down, as when Mae West explains that she is
declining an invitation to dinner from President Gerald Ford by saying “It’s an awful long

4

Quintilian comments that “the whole life of Socrates was colored by irony: he went
about like an ignorant man wondering at the wisdom of others” (9.2.44-47). Quintilian.
Institutio Oratoria. Trans. Charles Edgar Little. Nashville, TN: George Peabody College
for Teachers, 1951. The accusation of deceitful irony is leveled against Socrates in a
particularly severe way in the Symposium (216e): “He doesn’t care a curse…for any of us
either - yes, I’m telling you - and he spends his whole life playing his little game of irony,
and laughing up his sleeve at all the world.” Plato. Symposium. Trans. Michael Joyce.
London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1935. Reprinted in The Collected Dialogues of Plato,
Including the Letters. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton
UP, 1961. 527-574.
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way to go for just one meal” (21). While these are fairly common examples of irony, the
third has gone so much without notice “that there is no name for it.” This is a riddling
sort of irony. The example Vlastos gives is as follows: Paul, a normally good student, is
not doing well today, stumbling through his lesson. His tutor says “Paul, you are
positively brilliant today.” In this case, Paul knows he is being scolded, but he is not sure
for what particular failing. Instead of being told specifically what he has done wrong, he
has “been handed a riddle and left to solve it for himself.” While this third form is not
universal, it is not as rare as one might think. Only in the “most artless” forms of irony
does it not show up. There is a touch of it in the Mae West example: her excuse is
obviously not her real reason for declining the dinner, but she has left it up to President
Ford to guess what the real reason is (21-22). Vlastos notes that when “irony riddles it
risks being misunderstood,” but none of the above forms should be taken as deception. If
deception does occur, it must be contrary to the speaker’s intent, as when the hearer
misunderstands or misses the irony altogether. This is because the speaker could not utter
an ironical statement that was intended as an obvious contradiction, and simultaneously
deceive. The two ends would be at odds. If Paul’s teacher, for example, meant to mock
Paul ironically, and Paul thought he had indeed said something brilliant, the deception
could not be seen as intentional, because the purpose of mocking would not be met (22).
Vlastos (1991) applies this type of irony to Socrates, claiming that Socratic practice
actually changed the meaning of the word, manifesting a form “as innocent of intentional
deceit as is a child’s feigning that the play chips are money, as free from shamming as are
honest games, though, unlike games, serious in its mockery…dead earnest in its
playfulness…” (29). Vlastos identifies the kind of irony Socrates creates as “complex

113

irony,” to be distinguished from “simple irony.” Simple irony is irony as it appears in
Vlastos’ foregoing examples, where “what is said just isn’t what is meant.” In complex
irony “what is said both is an isn’t what is meant: its surface content is meant to be true in
one sense, false in another” (31).
This understanding clarifies some of the paradoxes we find in Plato’s early dialogues,
including the disavowal of knowledge. Vlastos (1991) writes that the disavowal “is
intelligible only as a complex irony:”
When he professes to have no knowledge he both does and does not mean what he
says. He wants it to assure his hearers that in the moral domain there is not a single
proposition he claims to know with certainty. But in another sense of “knowledge,”
where the word refers to justified true belief - justifiable through the peculiarly
Socratic method of elenctic argument - there are many propositions he does claim to
know (32).
By this statement Vlastos previews the split in moral knowledge between uncertainty
and certainty that I am building to. When Vlastos argues that Socrates’ disavowal is not a
form of deceit, then follows that with the argument that he both claims to know and not
know at the same time, the concept irony, which started as an indictment, becomes
productive of a practice consistent with contingency as uncertainty.
Brickhouse and Smith (2000) come to similar conclusions by claiming that Socrates
practices a certain sort of “mocking” irony. Brickhouse and Smith echo Vlastos in saying
that Socrates does in fact use a mocking sort of irony, but that this does not make the
disavowal insincere. Starting with Thrasymachus, Brickhouse and Smith note that the
main focus of his complaint is the thought that Socrates is “cheating at a high-stakes
game in which the loser will suffer a certain degree of humiliation in defeat” (61). This is
supported by Thrasymachus’ humiliation at his own defeat: (Socrates speaking)
“Thrasymachus made all these admissions…with much balking and reluctance and
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prodigious sweating…and it was then I beheld what I had never seen before –
Thrasymachus blushing” (Republic I, 350d). Brickhouse and Smith add that
Thrasymachus never accuses Socrates of finding humor in his opponents’ defeat, but
instead accuses him of using unfair tactics to avoid defeat himself, as evidenced by the
passages between Republic I 340d-341a, where he accuses Socrates of arguing like a
“pettifogger.” Here, Thrasymachus responds to Socrates’ question “You think, do you,
that it was with malice afterthought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I
asked that question?,” by saying “I don’t think it, I know it, and you won’t make anything
by it, for you won’t get the better of me by stealth…” (341b). Brickhouse and Smith
conclude that the basis of Thrasymachus’ accusation is that Socrates is “cheating by
refusing to say what he really believes.” They also detect some evidence that he is
objecting to Socrates’ use of mocking irony, as well (61).
Recall that before Thrasymachus’ accusation of irony, Socrates says he himself is
inept, yet praises Thrasymachus for his wisdom. Brickhouse and Smith note that
Thrasymachus “might sense that in characterizing himself as inept and pitiable, Socrates
was, in part, actually mocking others, including especially Thrasymachus himself” (62).
There are good reasons for thinking that Socrates does make a habit of using this kind of
irony, especially where he deems his interlocutors as deserving of such mockery. In those
cases where Socrates claims to want to have others teach him something, this kind of
mockery can be cutting, according to Brickhouse and Smith. This is due to the fact, they
argue, that Socrates thinks little of human wisdom. Consider a passage on this that I have
already quoted from the Apology (23a-b): “…real wisdom is the property of God, and this
oracle is his way of telling us that human wisdom has little or no value.” Brickhouse and
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Smith add that at Meno 71b-d, Socrates responds to Meno’s question as to whether he
really does not know what virtue is, by saying “Not only that, you may say also that, to
the best of my belief, I have never met anyone who did know.”
If Socrates has such a low opinion of human wisdom, it would follow, argue
Brickhouse and Smith, that any time we find him praising one of his interlocutors as
“wise,” attributing knowledge to him, or saying he hopes to become their “student,” that
“mocking irony” is at work (63). Moreover, Socrates’ mockery seems to increase
proportionate to his interlocutors’ self-assuredness, so that the most pretentious
characters, such as Euthyphro and Hippias, are given “the most lavish ironical praise”
(63).
This evidence causes Brickhouse and Smith no hesitation in attributing the practice of
mock irony to Socrates, but, they stress, this does not mean that his disavowal of
knowledge qualifies as an instance of such irony. While there is clear mocking irony
when Socrates calls others wise or recognizes them as having knowledge that he himself
lacks, the mockery does not work through his disavowal. The mockery, they write, “is in
the mocking compliments and flattery Socrates lavishes on others,” but he “is not guilty
of mock-modesty; his modesty is genuine” (63, emphasis mine). In other words, Socrates
is mocking others who think they know, but his own claims to not know are sincere.
While I do not wish to propose an ethic of mockery derived from Brickhouse and
Smith’s argument, this form of irony does raise an important point. If we maintain the
therapeutic view of the elenchos, we can argue that Socrates mocks those who need
therapy the most - those most certain about their moral knowledge, and therefore, least
available to engaging in a genuine dialogue on the uncertainties of being.
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Brickhouse and Smith (2000) discuss a “contrast” revealed by mocking irony
between Socrates’ customary disclaimers of knowledge and wisdom, and his
acknowledgement of others’ knowledge and wisdom (63). “But,” they note, “such a
contrast does not require us to assume – as Thrasymachus seems to assume – that
Socrates actually supposes that he possesses the knowledge and wisdom he claims to
lack, whereas his interlocutors lack the knowledge and wisdom they claim to have.”
Rather, the contrast works to highlight the target of Socrates’ mockery: the interlocutor’s
presumption to have knowledge. If neither Socrates nor the interlocutor have the
knowledge that the interlocutor claims to have, then the real contrast in wisdom is
“between one who recognizes his own lack of wisdom and one who does not” (63-64).
This is a key recognition in deciphering what I will come to recognize as the kind of
“ignorance” that can be morally productive: there is the ignorance of the interlocutor,
which is ignorance of her not knowing something that she thinks he knows, and this is
likely based on her over-estimation of human knowledge in general; and conversely,
there is ignorance that comes from understanding the limitations of human wisdom,
especially in moral matters, and building a discourse that accords with that recognition.
This distinction becomes clear in the next section, where Socrates’ disavowal categorizes
between certain and uncertain moral knowledge.
For now, this “contrast” has bearing on the defense of Socrates’ disavowal as sincere.
For Brickhouse and Smith (2000), the contrast in knowledge and ignorance shows that
nothing in Plato’s texts “supports the idea that mocking irony undercuts or nullifies
Socrates’ profession of ignorance,” even though they find that mocking irony is at work
when Socrates praises others for their wisdom. Nor does Thrasymachus’ accusation that
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Socrates is up to his “well-known” method of irony support the idea that Socrates’
profession of ignorance is itself such a form of irony (64). Socrates’ profession is directed
at himself, a statement on his own lack of knowledge; inasmuch as he mocks the
presumption of human wisdom in others, he would not turn around and praise himself for
having something that he holds in such low esteem.
Vlastos (1994) also maintains the disavowal of knowledge as sincere, and suggests
that if one wished to support the argument that Socrates’ claims to not know were a
“pretence,” that person would have a tough time finding textual support.5 Some may
argue that Socrates is using his disavowal in order to maneuver his interlocutor into the
role of answerer, keeping the role of questioner for himself. This is part of
Thrasymachus’ accusation that Socrates feigns ignorance and is “dissembling,” “saying
what he does not believe.” But, Vlastos asks, how can we account for such pretence in
cases where Socrates does not mean to bring his interlocutor into the answerer’s role?
(41). A notable example, Vlastos writes, comes at the conclusion of Socrates’ debate with
Callicles in the Gorgias. Socrates says at that point in the dialogue “…I do not speak with
any pretense to knowledge, but am searching along with you…” (506a). Then, just a few
pages later he says “These facts, which were shown to be as I state them some time
earlier in our previous discussion, are buckled fast and clamped together…by argument
of steel and adamant” (508e-509a), followed immediately by the statement “…what I say
5

Vlastos (1994) derives “pretence” as a key word when he quotes a definition of “irony”
in Webster’s dictionary: “A pretence of ignorance and of willingness to learn from
another assumed in order to make the others’ false conception conspicuous by adroit
reasoning – called also ‘Socratic irony.’” Here, Vlastos makes the point that the charge
against Socrates for insincere ignorance has become so “ubiquitous” that it has made its
way into the definition of “irony” as a purposeful “pretence” (40). Vlastos, Gregory.
“Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge.” Socratic Studies. Ed. Myles Burnyeat. New York:
Cambridge, 1994. 39-66.
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is always the same – that I know not the truth in these affairs, but I do know that of all
whom I have ever met either before or now no one who put forward another view has
failed to appear ridiculous” (509 a-b). Why, Vlastos asks, if Socrates’ disavowal is a false
“pretence” designed to manipulate his interlocutors into the answerers’ role, would he
“dish out the falsehood at this late moment in the debate?” (42). Although Vlastos does
not offer them as examples, the aporific conclusions we find at the end of several
dialogues featuring the “What is F?” question make the same point. Why, if Socrates’
disavowal is insincere for the purposes of manipulation or victory, would he articulate
aporia at the end of a dialogue, where it would serve him no such benefit?
While this evidence is compelling, for Vlastos (1994), the strongest reason to claim
that Socrates’ disavowal is genuine appears at Apology 21b and 21d, passages I have
already quoted. Vlastos claims at Apology 21b, where Socrates wonders to himself what
the god must mean when saying he is the wisest of all men, for “I am only too conscious
that I have no claim to wisdom, great or small,” that Socrates could not have said this to
himself if he thought it were not true. Similarly, when Socrates, at Apology 21d, begins to
recount the narrative of his investigations of the politicians, poets, and manual artisans,
that narrative cannot be fiction because that would violate Socrates’ promise at 20d to tell
the jury the “whole truth” (42).
Of course this could all be a big performance. Socrates could be lying to the jury,
fabricating his state of ignorance and twisting the story for his own defense, which would
make Vlastos’ argument thin. But then we would need to be willing to say that Socrates
made a habit of using speech to deceive. If this were so, then the narrative of the Apology
would not hang together very well, and neither would Socrates’ moral discourse within it.
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Especially from a rhetorical standpoint, if Socrates had gone through his whole life using
speech dishonestly – as deception, or as a falsification of his own truthfulness and moral
authority – why, at the end of his life, would he not use it in the same way to save
himself? In the Apology, Socrates notes the risk of his investigations, that they have
aroused against him “ a great deal of hostility, and hostility of a particularly bitter and
persistent kind, which has resulted in various malicious suggestions…” (23a-b). But, he
continues, he must keep questioning others in accordance with his divine obligation to
reveal in people a lack of wisdom (23c). Moreover, his well-known address at the
beginning of the dialogue does nothing to support the idea that Socrates would employ
any such self-saving measures as lying or twisting his story. Imagining that the jury
might offer to acquit him on the basis that he give up his quest and stop philosophizing,
or they would otherwise put him to death (Apology 29c-d), Socrates says:
I should reply, Gentlemen, I am your very grateful and devoted servant, but I owe a
greater obedience to God than to you, and so long as I draw breath and have my
faculties, I shall never stop practicing philosophy and exhorting you and elucidating
the truth for everyone that I meet. I shall go on saying, in my usual way, My very
good friend, you are an Athenian, and belong to a city which is the greatest and most
famous in the world for its wisdom and strength. Are you not ashamed that you give
more attention to acquiring as much money as possible, and similarly with reputation
and honor, and give no attention or thought to truth and understanding and the
perfection of your soul? (29d-30a).
This is followed by more criticisms of what the people of city care for – possessions,
bodies, offices – and what they should care for, the state of their souls, as Socrates will
continue to persuade them (30a-c). Furthermore, Socrates attests to his commitment to
this mission by asking, if he were not sincere, would it make sense “that I should have
neglected my own affairs and endured the humiliation of allowing my family to be
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neglected for all these years, while I busied myself all the time on your behalf…?,” doing
all of this without ever exacting a fee and remaining in poverty (31b-d).
If Socrates is in fact lying, then we have to ask for what purpose? Certainly it would
not be to save himself, not by berating the jury and the entire city on moral grounds, as
well as refusing to stop philosophizing and engendering anger toward himself, even if it
means death. This is not only secured by evidence of his philosophical activity, but also
by the importance he places on sincerity in speech, rather than flattery, as indicated near
the end of the Apology. Socrates claims that his speech fails to persuade not due to a lack
of effectiveness in his arguments, but a lack of “effrontery and impudence, and the fact
that I have refused to address you in the way which would give you the most pleasure,”
such as weeping and wailing (Apology 38d-e).
Accusing Socrates of being insincere in his profession of ignorance would rest, in the
context of the Apology, on assigning his dishonesty a purpose. In a trial, it could only be
self-protection, an aim Socrates directly undermines in his speeches. If Socrates had been
practicing at deception his entire life through philosophy, why would he not utilize it
now, with his life at stake? Additionally, Socrates’ commitment to seeking moral
knowledge through philosophy has been a practice motivated by his own ignorance; the
therapeutic ends of the elenchos are meant for the alleviation of Socrates’ ignorance as
well as his interlocutors’ certainty. If this ignorance was simply feigned, would the quest
that it motivated be a ruse worth dying for? This also speaks to the greater sincerity of
Socrates’ discursive investigations; if Socrates is having his interlocutors on, as some
would suggest, then he dies in the Apology for a sham rather than a real practice.
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Brickhouse and Smith (1984) note that “Socrates claims throughout the early
dialogues to be committed to discovering the truth, and in the Apology he places the
pursuit of this goal at the heart of his philosophic mission in Athens” (126). To dispute
the sincerity of Socrates’ ignorance, then, “is to convict Socrates of outright mendacity,
and therefore of running afoul of his mission…” (126). The option for an aggressive
deconstruction of these texts is there for the scholar, who might choose to see everything
that Socrates says as dishonest or deceptive, but this undermines the meaningfulness of
the texts that are available to us. Brickhouse and Smith (2000) get at this idea well when
they argue that if we are to convict Socrates of “misleading presentations of his own
views…we are obviously at serious risk of losing any value we hoped to get from reading
these texts to begin with, since what they actually say is now to be ignored…” If this is to
be the way of our interpretations, they conclude, “we are probably better off simply
abandoning our texts altogether and discussing other matters” (66). In no way is this
general stance on interpreting the Socratic disavowal, or Plato’s dialogues at large, an
encouragement against imagination. Even a scholar as conservative as Richard Weaver
has advocated an imaginative reading of Platonic texts in response to readings that have
been “too literal and too topical” (1953, 3). In his essay “The Phaedrus and the Nature of
Rhetoric,” Weaver advocates a reading of that dialogue guided by “even a portion of that
imagination which Plato habitually exercised,” the kind of reading justified by “a work of
art which touches on many profound problems” (3). Textual fidelity certainly is not
meant to strangle creativity in reading Socratic text; very much to the contrary, those
texts call upon us to be as imaginative in our thinking as possible so as to benefit from
their rich possibilities. But if we too aggressively deconstruct Socrates as a trickster, a
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deceiver, or a liar, then we have to throw out everything he says and read something else
for lessons on ethics.
Socrates’ Claims to Know
The importance of this section is twofold. First, explaining Socrates’ claims to know
moral things maintains his moral agency. If he has no moral knowledge whatsoever, he
has nothing to contribute to genuine dialogues on virtue, and no basis for refutations and
responses. Secondly, Socrates’ claims to moral knowledge reveal the manner in which he
categorizes that knowledge as uncertain as opposed to certain. This distinction is
important to the contingency of genuine dialogue, as I argued in the previous chapter, and
is accomplished in the proceedings of Socratic elenchos.
Vlastos (1994) readily helps with a refutation of the hypothesis that Socrates means
exactly what he says when he claims that he has no moral knowledge whatsoever. He
points out two places in the Gorgias where Socrates articulates the moral nobility of
coming to know: “we should all be contentiously eager to know what is true and what
false in the subject under discussion…” (505e-506a); “For the questions in dispute are by
no means trivial, but are, one might say, matters wherein knowledge is noblest and
ignorance most shameful – the sum and substance of them being knowledge or ignorance
of who is happy and who is not” (472c-d). If the stakes of Socrates’ search are that virtue
is knowledge, and that knowledge leads either to happiness or unhappiness, then, Vlastos
writes “If after decades of searching Socrates remained convinced that he still knew
nothing, would not further searching have become a charade – or rather worse? For he
holds that virtue ‘is’ knowledge: if he has no knowledge, his life is a disaster, he has
missed out on virtue and, therewith, on happiness” (43).
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Protecting himself from this tragic end, Socrates “flatly” states in several instances
that “he knows a moral truth” (Vlastos, 43). The most important of these is at Apology
29b-c, where Socrates says “But I do know that to do wrong and to disobey my superior,
whether God or man, is wicked and dishonorable, and so I shall never feel more fear or
aversion for something which, for all I know, may really be a blessing, than for those
evils which I know to be evils (29b-c, emphasis mine).
This knowledge claim motivates Socrates’ continued practice of philosophy in service
of the god: he knows that service to the god is good, and he knows that to not do so is
evil. Inasmuch as this knowledge motivates the philosophical practice that leads him to
his death, how could the claim be insincere? Vlastos (1994) argues that this passage
should alone hold enough weight to suffice in showing “that Socrates claims knowledge
of a moral truth” (43).
Adding to Vlastos’ example from Apology 29b-c, Brickhouse and Smith (2000) cite
Apology 37b, where Socrates discusses his sentence:
So, being convinced that I do no wrong to anybody, I can hardly be expected to
wrong myself by asserting that I deserve something bad, or by proposing a
corresponding penalty. Why should I? For fear of suffering this penalty proposed by
Meletus, when, as I said, I do not know whether it is a good thing or a bad? Do you
expect me to choose something I know very well is bad by making my
counterproposal? (emphasis mine).
“If Socrates had no morally significant knowledge,” Brickhouse and Smith (2000)
argue, “the contrast between his lack of knowledge about death with his knowledge that
some things are evil” (see, for example, Apology 29b-c, Gorgias 486e, 512b, and
Republic I 350c, 351a-b) would “make no sense” (103).
Vlastos (1994) provides additional support from Gorgias 486e. Socrates tells
Callicles “I am convinced that if you agree with the opinions held by my soul, then at last
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we have attained the actual truth,” implying confidence in the epistemic outcomes of his
discursive method (Vlastos 1994, 44-45). Vlastos calls upon certain passages on
ignorance to make the point that Socrates claims to know something moral. In his
refutation of the argument of “the multitude” in the Protagoras, Socrates maintains that
wrong action comes about not because the person has been “overcome by pleasure,” but
because of ignorance of the good: “and you know yourselves that a wrong action which is
done without knowledge is done in ignorance” (357d-e, emphasis mine). Vlastos argues
that Socrates cannot say that they know this without knowing it himself (46).
Additionally, at the conclusion of his refutation of Thrasymachus’ argument that “the just
man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust” (Republic I
343b-344e), Socrates says “Then the just man has turned out on our hands to be good and
wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant” (350c). Then, without any intervening
comments to strengthen the argument, Socrates adds “if justice is wisdom and virtue, it
will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is
ignorance – no one could now fail to recognize that… (Republic I 351a-b, emphasis
mine). If everyone knows this, then Socrates must include himself as well (Vlastos 1994,
46-47).
There are two more passages, according to Vlastos (1994), where Socrates implies
knowledge without actually saying so. The first comes near the end of the Gorgias, where
Socrates tells a parable about a sea captain at the end of his argument with Callicles.
Socrates’ imagined sea captain thinks, in a Socratic way, about whether or not he has
done his passengers a service by bringing them home safely from a perilous journey. He
reasons that if any one of them had been “afflicted in the body with serious and incurable
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diseases,” coming home alive would be of no benefit for him. Neither would it benefit the
person who “suffers many incurable diseases of the soul, which is so much more precious
than the body,” to have been returned home alive. The sea captain is especially cognizant
of this because, Socrates says “he knows it is not better for an evil man to live, for he
must needs live ill” (Gorgias 512b, emphasis mine). Vlastos argues that because this sea
captain is “Socrates’ creature,” made up of his own thoughts and reasoning, “for Socrates
to say that the sea captain knows that for an incurably wicked man death would be better
than life is as good as saying that he, Socrates, knows this” (47).
The same argument is made in the Crito, where Socrates says that life is neither worth
living in the diseased body nor in the damaged soul, which he himself articulates from
47d-48a. Vlastos (1994) points out a particular part of this argument, where Socrates
refers to following “the one” who knows, rather than following the opinion of the many
(47d). Vlastos argues that “the one” who knows, as well as the sea captain, are
“constructs” of Socrates’ argument, and that he would have “no ground for imputing
knowledge to either figure unless he were convinced that he himself had that knowledge”
(48).
By simultaneously disavowing knowledge and claiming to have knowledge, Socrates
presents us with a paradox. To understand ignorance in light of this paradox, the kind of
moral knowledge Socrates is claiming and disclaiming has to be identified and divided.
This way, ignorance is revealed as productive of uncertainty in Socrates’ dialogue
method, the elenchos. Vlastos (1994) argues that “if we keep looking as carefully and
imaginatively as we should, we can satisfy ourselves that Socrates is himself convinced
that he has found what he has been looking for: knowledge of moral truth that he avows
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openly…programmatically…,” and “by clear implication…” (48). This is not knowledge
at the level of moral certainty, but rather, uncertainty.
Brickhouse and Smith (2000) argue that the Apology, where Socrates makes his
clearest profession of ignorance, categorizes those “most important things” which
Socrates has devoted his life to, and which he does not know with any certainty, are
moral things, thus dividing the moral from the realm of certain knowledge (103).
Inasmuch as others do not recognize that these important things escape certainty, they are
ignorant of their own ignorance. The next section takes a closer look at the contingent
outcomes of ignorance as knowledge in Socrates’ elenchos.
The Elenchos and Moral Uncertainty
Vlastos (1994) notes that the paradox where Socrates denies that he has moral
knowledge “while being well aware that he does have it,” is productive when we suppose
he is making a dual use of the word “knowing:” “When declaring that he knows
absolutely nothing he is referring to that very strong sense…where one says one knows
only when one is claiming certainty. This would leave him free to admit that he does
have moral knowledge in a radically weaker sense – the one required by his own
maverick method of philosophical inquiry, the elenchus” (49, emphasis mine). The use of
the word “required” previews the importance of uncertainty in making Socrates’
elenchos, and genuine dialogue in general, practicable as a discourse of mediation, otherinclusion, and open-endedness.
Vlastos (1994) outlines our basic categories for analysis by describing two types of
knowledge encountered in Socratic practice. The first, “certain knowledge”
(knowledgeC), he uses to designate knowledge conceived with “infallible certainty” as its
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hallmark (55). The second type, “elenctic knowledge” (knowledgeE), is the sort of ethical
knowledge Socrates thought possible by way of his elenchos. Vlastos argues that
“whatever Socrates might be willing to say he knows in the domain of ethics would have
to be knowledge reached and tested through his own personal method of inquiry…this is
his only method of searching for moral truth.” So, when Socrates avows moral
knowledge “the content of that knowledge must be propositions he thinks elenctically
justifiable” (56). Vlastos implies elenctic knowledge as the limited outcome of
local/transcendent mediation when he claims that Socrates could not have expected it to
meet the “fantastically strong demands” of certain knowledge, because “In elenctic
argument nothing is ever ‘known through itself’ but only ‘through other things’ and there
is always a security gap between the Socratic thesis and its supporting reasons” (56).
Here we return to the uncertainty of Socrates’ mediation between examples and eidoi in
the “What is F?” question.
Further reinforcing the connection between uncertainty and Socrates’ method, recall
Vlastos’ (1994) argument that Socrates “could not been unaware of this uncertainty, built
into his instrument of research, which infects all its findings” (57). This is evidenced, for
example, by a remark he makes at Charmides 166c-e:
…How can you think I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have
in examining into myself? This motive would be just a fear of my unconsciously
fancying that I knew something of which I was ignorant. And at this moment, I assure
you, I pursue the argument chiefly for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also
for the sake of my other friends. For would you not say that the discovery of things as
they truly are is a good common to all mankind?
Vlastos (1994) sees this passage articulating Socrates’ fear that his moral theses
which have fared well in past arguments may in fact be false, but have not yet been
revealed as such. When Socrates makes this fear the motivator for his searching “he
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reveals the haunting sense of insecurity of knowledgeE – his awareness that in respect of
certainty it is the diametrical opposite of knowledgeC” (57). John Beversluis (1987)
articulates a similar principle as the grounds for elenctic testing: “It is not enough to
believe propositions which happen to be true. Until the person holding such beliefs
submits them for elenctic interrogation and discovers that they can survive, he necessarily
lacks all epistemic warrant for believing them” (217). All moral claims, including those
Socrates himself makes, are subject to extensive future testing through the elenchos.
Socratic moral knowledge, Vlastos (1994) writes, may be terribly far from certain
knowledge, “full of gaps, unanswered questions,” and “surrounded and invaded by
unresolved perplexity,” but Socrates does not find this troubling or debilitating; in fact,
he finds it “exhilarating” (57-58). He does not need completeness to make his method
work, but rather the ability to test the consistency of beliefs articulated within the
dialogue. The elenchos does not require Socrates himself to answer the questions he
raises, and that his interlocutors fail to answer. It is upon Socrates merely to refute their
inconsistent beliefs on the way to a better understanding of the subject at hand. “So,”
Vlastos writes, “if an inquiry should run into aporia , he can reckon the exercise not
failure, but incomplete success. Nothing has transpired to show that the unfound answer
is unfindable, nor yet to invalidate the fragmentary truths unearthed along the way and
shake his claim that in their case he does have knowledgeE” (58). Vlastos summarizes his
argument by stating that for Socrates, “in the domain of morals – the one to which all of
his inquiries are confined,” when he says he knows something he is referring to
knowledge gained through his dialogue method (knowledgeE); when he says he knows
nothing, he is referring to certain knowledge; when he disavows knowledge on a
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particular topic “he may mean either that in this case, as in all others, he has no
knowledgeC and does not look for any or that what he lacks on that topic is knowledgeE,
which, with good luck, he might still reach by further searching” (58).
Uncertainty, then, makes the knowledge aims of the “What is F?” question and the
elenchos accomplishable, and, moreover, protects the unknowable and the aporific from
becoming justifications to depart from genuine dialogue, or eject its vocabulary of being.
Going back to the conversation between Socrates and Meno, the “exhilaration” Socrates
derives from epistemic ignorance, knowledge gaps, and unresolved perplexity, is an
invitation to other arguers and arguments to the open-endedness and contingency of
genuine dialogue.
Adding to Vlastos’ knowledgeE, Paul Woodruff (1990) offers a distinction between
expert and non-expert knowledge in Socrates. According to Woodruff, among its other
functions, the elenchus guards against the error of taking another person as an expert on
something which, in reality, “no one is more expert than another.” On moral questions
“Socrates’ audience are all in the same boat,” complete with pretensions of knowing.
Every elenctic search leads to an impasse, leaving its audience “near dangerous moral
shoals, without a specialist to guide them to shore.” Yet the elenchus finds that the people
examined are better resources for moral realization than might have been first thought
(80-81). This important point summarizes Socrates’ dialogue as a method that allows him
to turn to other interlocutors who have real value as participants in his philosophical
searches. On the contingency of this relational practice, Woodruff writes:
The same argument that unmasked the pretenders disclosed an impressive consensus
on its moral premises. We have seen that elenchus discovers beliefs the believer never
knew he had, and evidently does the same for knowledge… Socrates holds that, in the
last analysis, you believe the consequences of whatever views you are left with after
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the elenchus has done its work. The elenchus thus exposes what you believe in the
last analysis, and simply treats this sort of belief, without apology, as non-expert
knowledge… Discovery, not justification, is the positive legacy of the elenchus (81,
emphasis mine).
I have emphasized this “positive legacy” of “discovery” as participatory and openended. Through the common condition of ignorance, interlocutors can participate
together in being, so long as they choose not to make the unknown a justification for
closing off an entire set of vital, invigorating questions. Socrates’ genuine disavowal, in
short, is an invitation to genuine dialogue.
Conclusion: Ignorance and Genuine Dialogue
The uncertainty of Socratic moral knowledge (knowledgeE) is a summary statement
on dialogic contingency and its relationship to ignorance. Recall the basic idea of genuine
dialogue as a sincere turning to argumentative others in an open-ended and uncertain
search for Absolutes. For Buber, sincerity was at the heart of genuine dialogue, where
participants truly have each other in mind, and establish a living and mutual relationship
through interaction (Friedman 2002, 101). Bakhtin (1984) added that “real” dialogue is
open-ended, affirming “independence, internal freedom, unfinalizability, and
indeterminacy;” it is “unfinished” rather than “finished” or predetermined by its author,
and maintained as “an unclosed whole…poised on the threshold” (63). According to
these standards, Socratic ignorance allows interlocutors to engage one another in an
open-ended and contingent discourse on being. In doing so it preserves that final element
of genuine dialogue that summons its participants “to guard with the innermost power of
their souls against the confusion of the relative with the Absolute” (Buber 1952, 155).
When, by means of ignorance, Socrates urges Meno or any interlocutor to commit with
him to an extensive practice of discovery, he represents the escape from relativist idolatry
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and immanence whereby, Buber writes, we “penetrate again and again into the false
absolute with an incorruptible, probing glance until one has discovered its limits, its
limitedness,” glimpsing “the never-vanishing appearance of the Absolute” (1952, 155156).
As a form of moral knowledge, ignorance - knowing that one does not know with
certainty - is a move away from false dialogue. For Bakhtin false dialogue was
“finished,” “finalized,” and “objectivized” by the author (1984, 63), an idea I transferred
to Rorty as an “overseer” and “intellectual prophet” of restricted dialogues that accorded
with a historical program. For Buber false dialogue was “oppositional,” with no effort to
turn to the other, or establish “mutuality” (Friedman 2002, 143), precisely the violation of
restricting metaphysical vocabularies and turning away from a community of “other,”
metaphysical arguers. Socratic ignorance has provided a way to maintain the vocabulary
of being as a motivation for dialogic inclusion.
As part of the elenchos and the “What is F?” question, Socratic ignorance promotes
genuine dialogue because it is situated in local, human discourse. Categorizing moral
knowledge as uncertain, it enables the elenchos to accomplish local/Absolute mediation.
By preserving the epistemic value of examples and other interlocutors’ arguments (as per
the “What is F?” question), it makes genuine dialogue practicable, reconciling with the
materials available to participants for the discovery of arguments. The significant
accomplishment of ignorance and contingency for genuine dialogue is that they make its
both local and Absolute practice possible. But not all conceptions of ignorance benefit
genuine dialogue. The next chapter looks at theories of moral ignorance and virtue after
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Socrates that fail to provide interlocutors with the ability to practice dialogue. My
criticism of these theories will be based on the Socratic standards articulated above.
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CHAPTER 7
IGNORANCE AS A DEFICIT OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DEPARTURE
FROM DIALOGUE
The previous chapter described Socratic ignorance as a form of moral knowledge that
built dialogic relationships. Recognizing his own ignorance, Socrates turns to (equally
ignorant) others so that they might together alleviate, at least in part, their common
condition. This other-turning is articulated in the Apology as a method of social change:
“For I spend all my time going about trying to persuade you, young and old, to make
your first and chief concern not for your bodies nor for your possessions, but for the
highest welfare of your souls, proclaiming as I go, Wealth does not bring goodness, but
goodness brings wealth and every other blessing, both to the individual and to the state”
(Apology 30b). Socrates understands the message of the oracle to mean that “human
wisdom has little or no value,” and that the lesson is not just for him, but for the whole
city: “It seems to me that he is not referring literally to Socrates, but has merely taken my
name as an example, as if he would say to us, The wisest of you men is he who has
realized, like Socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless” (23b). The
knowledge of ignorance, then, is extended to the community as an ethic of other-turning
and contingent discovery. For communal change, a true practice of dialogue requires the
presence and participation of others who question, challenge, disagree, and agree about
ordering virtue terms. Socrates’ method of social change, the elenchos, is motivated when
participants begin to take virtue seriously as a matter of self and other examination.
Echoing the contemporary value of this perspective, Tracy Isaacs (1997) argues that
if ignorance produces dialogue, rather than reproach, it has potential for “getting people
to examine their role in wrongful social practice, their responsibility in perpetuating those
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practices, and the potential contribution they may make in helping to effect widespread
changes” (677-678). Isaacs recognizes that people will inevitably disagree even when
they recognize a moral dimension to a given practice. With this lack of uniformity, those
with some insight into the issue “should try to convey to the general population an
awareness of the issue” and its relevant moral questions and points of view, as a way to
“bring more people into the dialogue, to urge more people to examine what was
previously unexamined”(681). Isaacs’ proposal echoes Socrates’ effort in the Apology,
with the common ideal that moral issues are raised for the community at large; ignorance
assures that the discussion will become an inclusive dialogue, with the intended outcome
of social and individual change, or “progress” as conceived of in definitional practices.
Ignorance as community-building can be evaluated according to its promotion of genuine
dialogue.
In this chapter I investigate theories of ignorance and virtue proposed by Nicholas of
Cusa, John Rawls, and Julia Driver, as an extension of my comments on Socratic
ignorance. My argument is that Nicholas, Rawls, and Driver alike hold positions on
ignorance that remove the knowledge base needed by moral agents to engage one another
in dialogue. More specifically, Nicholas asks for an end to the “distractions” of discourse,
Rawls creates a discourse situation (the original position) in which dialogue becomes
impossible, and Driver, while advocating a communal sense of virtue, places the agent in
an unrealistic position with self-knowledge. All three theorists compromise the
possibility of moral agency in a communal, civic setting, by necessitating ignorance as a
deficit of self-knowledge.
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By arguing against these proposals, I want to retain a sense of ignorance as a
productive, motivating concept. In a series of articles on knowledge and ignorance in the
philosophy journal Diogenes (1995), ignorance is described as a starting point for both
personal and institutional inquiry.1 Jacques Schlanger (1995) notes that ignorance is a
prerequisite to inquiry because, as representative of what we do not know, it stands out
from what we do know: “The desire to know engages with a pre-existing body of
knowledge, enabling us to circumscribe the unknown within the frontiers of the known”
(169). Calling upon a personal example, Pierre Pachet (1995) notes that he makes efforts
to measure his own ignorance not to “dispel” it, but “to profit from it and receive the
radiated influence of the things that I do not know and shall never know,” on the idea that
there is an “essential affinity between ignorance and the very substance of the human
mind.” Moreover, human thought is “shrouded in a grey area” which “enables” it to
progress, since thinking “requires the unknowable…behind which hides a great deal of
the substance which gives it sustenance” (50). Focusing on institutions, Bernadette
Bensaude-Vincent (1995) describes the suggestion by some scientists that ignorance is
“active everywhere” in the scientific research enterprise as a heuristic force that enables
scientists to leave behind the constraints of convention and false or inaccurate
knowledge, and pursue new, innovative paths (140).2 Introducing his own book-length
treatment of the topic, The Knowledge of Ignorance, Andrew Martin (1985) assigns
1

Some of these institutional and personal considerations of ignorance, especially as they
affect scientific inquiry, are discussed in Dovring, Folke. Knowledge and Ignorance:
Essays on Light and Shadows. London: Praeger, 1998.
2

The entire series of articles covers a broad range of philosophical issues concerning
ignorance and knowledge that are outside the scope of my argument. The whole set of
articles can be found in Diogenes 43 (1995) : 1-197.
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ignorance the same sort of innovative energy, as a force able to break the circularity of
canonical arguments and texts by “collapsing the putative foundation of the con-text,”
thereby constituting “a kind of knowledge, a way out of the hall of mirrors, or at least a
change of mirrors” (viii).3
While these perspectives reveal a productive view of ignorance, the concept can also
be proposed in a way that blocks inquiry as a dialogue. Rather than being an
epistemological starting point (knowing that I do not know), ignorance can be proposed
as a morally productive absence of knowledge, or a deficit of knowing. This latter sense
is at the heart of Nicholas’, Rawls’, and Driver’s theories, and forms the basis for my
objections.
Nicholas of Cusa’s “Learned Ignorance”
Theologian Nicholas of Cusa (1954) has argued that the limitations of inquiries into
the divine and the unknown require that a “learned ignorance” be obtained by the
searcher. The human intellect has a natural desire to seek the truth, according to Nicholas,
yet it is so far beyond human reason “to know the precision of the combinations in
material things and how exactly the known has to be adapted to the unknown,” that
thinkers such as Socrates, Solomon, and Aristotle have affirmed “that wisdom and the

3

Martin’s (1985) book offers comprehensive coverage on issues of ignorance and
knowledge. He teats everything from the foundations of Western conceptions of
ignorance (in Greek philosophy and Christian theology, for example), through to its
treatment and operation in contemporary literature and science. Martin’s book (formerly
a dissertation on the topic) is excellent general reading on ignorance, although much of it
is outside the scope of my argument. Where his commentary is relevant to my project, I
have quoted him in the text or in footnotes. Martin, Andrew. The Knowledge of
Ignorance: From Genesis to Jules Verne. New York: Cambridge UP, 1985.
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locality of the understanding lie hidden from the eyes of all the living” (8). These
difficulties are the starting points for the acquisition of learned ignorance:
…then in presence of such difficulty we may be compared to owls trying to look at
the sun; but since the natural desire in us for knowledge is not without a purpose, its
immediate object is our own ignorance. If we can fully realize this desire, we will
acquire learned ignorance. Nothing could be more beneficial for even the most
zealous searcher for knowledge than his being in fact most learned in that very
ignorance which is peculiarly his own; and the better a man will have known his
ignorance, the greater his learning will be (1954, 8-9).
By this definition of learned ignorance, Nicholas (1954) re-articulates the Socratic
necessity of beginning any moral search with a consciousness of ignorance and in doing
so, similarly makes ignorance a motivating force for contingent discovery. Also reflective
of Socrates’ moral philosophy, Nicholas derives a “lesson of ignorance” from the
contingency of divine moral knowledge, and turns that lesson itself into moral
knowledge: “the quiddity of things, which is ontological truth, is unattainable in its
entirety; and though it has been the objective of all philosophers, by none has it been
found as it really is. The more profoundly we learn this lesson of ignorance, the closer we
draw to truth itself” (12, emphasis mine).4
Nicholas’ (1954) “lesson of ignorance” and Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge note
the epistemic gap between knowledge of particulars and the uncertainty of universals,
and both thinkers posit this knowledge of ignorance as a starting point for the moral
4

What Nicholas actually seeks in terms of universals is controversial because his writing
on the subject is so unclear. While he certainly constructs a system by which to seek the
(transcendent) unknown, his thoughts on universals oscillate between various
contradictory viewpoints. Jasper Hopkins (1980) writes that his thoughts on universals
are so “distressingly imprecise,” that he makes “no important contribution to either the
articulation or the solution of the philosophical puzzle” (36). For a straightforward
discussion of Nicholas’ varying treatment of universals, see Hopkins, Jasper. A Concise
Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa (2nd edition). Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota P, 1980. 32-38.
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quest. But here the similarities end. Where Socrates takes the recognition of this
epistemic gap as motivation to turn to discourse as the prime mover of a moral quest,
Nicholas makes the opposite move. Where Socrates’ ignorance attempts to mediate
local/Absolute gaps, Nicholas turns mediation down outright. Nicholas’ ignorance is a
justification to shut down discourse, removing all distractions between the subject and
divinity, bringing the individual full circle to a state of perfect ignorance. For Nicholas,
ignorance is a description of the inevitable failure to know perfection from a local
viewpoint, an inevitability only worsened by the distractions of human thought in the
here and now. The attainment of the kind of “learned ignorance” that will help us to
apprehend the unknowable, then, compels us to “eject all that the senses or imagination
or reason with its material accretions can give us…” (22-23). This would have to include
the “ejection” of the very materials of human experience, the examples from which
Socratic essentialist discourse derives its agency.
“Learned ignorance” becomes unattainable unless discourse is abandoned, so that
Nicholas’ moral quest moves in the opposite direction from Socrates’. For Nicholas, the
journey begins with the end of dialogue. As Jasper Hopkins (1980) writes, Nicholas’
contention that “between the finite and the infinite there is no proportionality…leads him
to view the traditional names for God - ‘Creator,’ ‘Justice,’ ‘Goodness,’ etc. - as terms
whose meanings are elicited from human experience,” that, when employed, make us
unable to “reach beyond our ignorance to apprehend the true nature of God” (19).
Departing from the employment of such tainted terms is part of a process by which the
epistemic desires of the “unruly intellect, which may otherwise allow itself to be
deflected from its aim of reunion with God,” are disciplined (Martin 1985, 38). Martin
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argues that Of Learned Ignorance is an “instrument devised by Nicholas for inflicting a
mortification and purification of the mind, quelling its epistemophile impulses” (38).
Discourse is particularly problematic to this purification because, like a dog, it runs all
over the place seeking its master, while God, the master, is “the unmoved mover,” the
terminus and personification of the Word “whose presence would render writing
redundant,” making the shifting, contradictory text “bereft of authority” (Martin, 39).
Nicholas not only finds the activity of discourse problematic, but also the place where
it occurs (the imperfect now), which is irreparably removed from transcendent perfection.
Martin (1985) writes that Nicholas “retains Plato’s opposition between the sensible and
the suprasensible, but deprives the latter of the qualification of intelligibility” (31). This
amounts to the undoing of the epistemic importance Socrates allows examples in his
“What is F?” question. In an attempt to “restore transcendence to the transcendent,”
Nicholas rejects all secular knowledge (including, of course, examples derived from
human experience) as not only imperfect, but “tainted: branded with the stamp of Adam”
(Martin, 31). Nicholas’ perspective implies a rejection of the Socratic discursive journey
from example to essence by this description of secular knowledge, thus the inevitable
failure of the philosopher’s ascent as described in the “lesson of ignorance,” a lesson
derived from the acquisition of learned ignorance: “When we seek to know God or
essences…we are like owls trying to look at the sun, because there is no ladder of
approximations and comparisons connecting the finite world…which we know more or
less, to the infinite world…which we cannot know (Martin, 31).
Nicholas’ simultaneous rejection of discourse as the employment of tainted human
moral terms, and the possibility that those terms might ascend from the particular to the
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Perfect, results most importantly in the removal of moral practice from the community.
The community becomes infused with imperfection, its interactions, debates, and
dialogues providing no potential sources for moral progress and discovery. By removing
the search for moral terms from the community, Nicholas substitutes the Socratic dialogic
quest for an a-communal state of original darkness and perfect ignorance, an epistemic
position from which the individual might glimpse God.
By equating “learned ignorance” with a disciplining of discourse, imagination, even
the human intellect, Nicholas makes the same error that Rorty makes with contingency.
For Rorty, contingency was a justification for removing metaphysical terms from the
community’s vocabulary as the primary catalyst in a procession toward Freedom and
Solidarity. My criticism was that the process endangered its own ends, and that freedom
and solidarity could not be derived by taking away terms of central moral belief from the
community. Nicholas repeats the error, even if his perspective is metaphysically centered.
Closing off discussions based in human experience, from terms derived through
human imagination and intellect, has obvious implications for any theological standpoint.
If discourse is a dog that causes us to chase about various distractions of imagination and
reason, then religion, personal spirituality, or other such journeys come to a halt, as does
the moral growth they are intended to encourage. It would be difficult to reconcile
Nicholas’ distrust of discourse with the centrally discursive activities of religion and
theology, particularly textual interpretations and debates. Also threatened is the
productive and pedagogical impulse of things like New Testament parables, textual
allegory, personal readings, group studies, and private or public conversations.
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Just as important, Nicholas’ closing off of “tainted” secular discourse reflects the
problems of Rorty’s restrictions on vocabulary in that both ideas attack the terms of
communal moral discussion, thus derailing the dialogue of the moral quest. In Rorty’s
creation the quest is hardly worth embarking on because the pathways are contrived, the
arguments are rigged, and the end is preconceived, not by means of vocabulary change
(as Rorty claims, implying a certain productivity), but by way of vocabulary restriction.
In Nicholas’ conception the quest is self-defeating. He offers ignorance as the motivator
for the quest, but in proposing the acquisition of “learned ignorance” he has to take away
the moral terms that the quest is aimed at, plus the means of its practice - human intellect,
imagination, and reason. The quest both begins and ends with ignorance, the common
starting point being the end of discourse. This circularity defines the relationship, for
Nicholas, between the imperfect intellect, discourse, and the realization of perfection.
Martin (1985) writes that for Nicholas, “Truth is a circle with which the intellect, merely
a polygon of an unlimited number of sides, will never be perfectly congruent; its smooth
circumference is resistant to the angular predications of discursive reason” (31). By
taking moral discourse out of the community (and in turn dialogue), Nicholas’ learned
ignorance has little to offer the problem of public morality. While we may question the
epistemic status of examples and contingent terms, that questioning cannot render them
useless, lest we lose the entire basis for moral discovery through dialogue.
John Rawls and Justice Behind the “Veil of Ignorance”
Nicholas’ “learned ignorance” implies movement by the individual toward a position
of original darkness where her moral agency meets its greatest possible fulfillment. John
Rawls’ theory of justice also seeks to place the agent in an “original position” where,
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from behind a “veil of ignorance,” the best decisions on justice can be made. In this
section I will discuss the relationship proposed by Rawls between the veil of ignorance
and the virtue of justice. After a detailed description of the theory, I will demonstrate that
Rawls commits to the same sort of a-communal discourse that I have criticized above, by
privileging a situation in which dialogue between moral agents is shut down.
Rawls basically defines justice as fairness. He conceives of fairness through contract
theory (with a self-described familiarity to Locke, Rousseau, and Kant)5 so that the
principles of justice are those that would be part of an “original agreement” by society:
“They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own
interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms
of their association” (Rawls 1971, 11). Rawls’ contractual definition of justice as
fairness consists of two parts: “(1) an interpretation of the initial situation and of the
problem of choice posed there, and (2) a set of principles which, it is argued, would be
agreed to” (15). The two basic principles of justice proposed by Rawls are The Equal
Liberty Principle and the Principle of Democratic Equality (see Katzner 1980, 42-43).
The first states that “each person is to have the most extensive basic liberty compatible
with a similar liberty for others;” the second states “social and economic inequalities are
to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all” (Rawls 1971, 60-61).

5

For more on Rawls’ “Kantianism” see Blocker, H. Gene and Elizabeth H. Smith (Eds.).
John Rawls’ Theory of Social Justice: An Introduction. Athens: Ohio UP, 1980. 309-345
and Wolff, Robert Paul. Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of A
Theory of Justice. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1977. 106-118.
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What this means is that society is to arrange inequalities of wealth and authority in ways
consistent with these principles of fairness (43).
The vital component of this theory of justice is what Rawls calls the “original
position,” and its most important aspect is the veil of ignorance. Rawls writes that the
original position “is the appropriate initial status quo which insures that the fundamental
agreements reached in it are fair” (17). Katzner (1980) notes that its primary function “is
to define the fair situation” where choices can be made on the principles that will
structure society (53). Katzner further clarifies that Rawls looks to the original position as
a way to arrive at just social rules by beginning with an “initial situation which is
characterized by fairness,” so that rational persons in such circumstances will agree to
just principles (43). The important element of the original position, then, is how moral
agency is to be affected by it.
Equally important is the kind of moral agent that Rawls places in this situation.
Buchanan (1980) notes Rawls’ affiliation with the Kantian idea of the autonomous moral
agent as a “noumenal self,” which for Kant is an agent “whose will is determined by
rational principles rather than by particular desires,” rational principles being those that
serve as principles “for everyone, not merely for this or that agent, depending upon
whether he has some particular desire” (15). One of the vital components of Rawls’
original position is that it provides universal grounds for the moral choices of rational
agents, principles that “must hold for everyone in virtue of their being moral persons.”
Rawls assumes that agents will understand and use these principles in their deliberations
(Rawls 1971, 132). The original position thus enables fair moral choice by putting
rational individuals in a situation where they can employ their natural ability to choose
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just principles; these principles are not emergent from personal desires but rather the
universal standards of rationality.6 On the importance of this idea, Rawls writes,
Assuming, then, that the reasoning in favor of the principles of justice is correct, we
can say that when persons act on these principles they are acting in accordance with
principles that they would choose as rational and independent persons in an original
position of equality. The principles of their actions do not depend upon social or
natural contingencies, nor do they reflect the bias of the particulars of their plan of
life or the aspirations that motivate them. By acting from these principles persons
express their nature as free and equal rational beings subject to the general conditions
of human life. For to express one’s nature as a being of a particular kind is to act on
the principles that would be chosen if this nature were the decisive determining
element (252-253).
The summary idea is that the original position enables the type of moral agency that
will ensure just choices by unlocking the rational nature of autonomous moral agents.
The primary principle that allows for the expression of freedom and equality in the
original position is the veil of ignorance.7 In the above quote, Rawls argues that agents
will not, for the basis of their actions, choose principles from personal biases and desires,
nor rely upon the advantages of their social status and natural ability. The veil of
6

This basis for universality grants Rawls’ idea of the original position much of its
Kantianism. Rawls’ own connection to Kant on this idea is discussed in the “Kantian
Interpretation” section of A Theory of Justice, from which this quote is pulled. Rawls,
John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971. 251-257. Michael Sandel
(1982) argues that the original position is Rawls’ response to Kant, his “alternative to the
route represented by the Critique of Pure Reason.” He writes that by describing an
original condition of fairness with just principles that rational persons would agree to,
Rawls wishes to enable us to view our objective from afar “but not so far as to land us in
the realm of transcendence” (24). Sandel, Michael J. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
New York: Cambridge UP, 1982.
7

This basic description of the original position will suffice for my purpose, which is to
focus on the veil of ignorance. For more details on the components of the original
position, and its contract elements, see the clear description offered by Katzner, Louis I.
“The Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance.” John Rawls’ Theory of Social Justice:
An Introduction. Ed. H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith. Athens: Ohio UP, 1980.
43-53. See also Kukathas, Chandran and Philip Pettit. Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its
Critics. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990. 17-35.
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ignorance is how this seemingly selfless agent is put to work. Rawls (1971) writes of the
purpose of the veil of ignorance, “Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific
contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural
circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order to do this, I assume that the parties
are situated behind a veil of ignorance” (136). This veil keeps individuals from knowing
how “various alternatives will affect their own particular case,” so that they evaluate
principles on the basis of what is good generally (136-137). The basic idea is that one
becomes unconscious of personal advantages, motives, and social conditions, so that
good moral choices become those that would be made by a rational person in the absence
of individual desires. As Wolff (1977) summarizes, the veil of ignorance “is intended to
make calculations of probabilities impossible…” (83). This amounts to the removal of all
personalized criteria for moral judgment. On this, Rawls (1971) writes,
It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain kinds of particular facts. First
of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does
he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence
and strength, and the like. Nor again, does anyone know his conception of the good,
the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his
psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More
than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their
own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level
of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original
position have no information as to which generation they belong. These broader
restrictions on knowledge are appropriate in part because questions of social justice
arise between generations as well as within them, for example, the question of the
appropriate rate of capital saving and of the conservation of natural resources and the
environment of nature (137).
By placing the agent in the original position, behind a veil of ignorance, Rawls
formulates a direct response to the problem of emotivism. The washing of personal
knowledge of advantage, socio-economic position, concept of the good, and
intergenerational conflict, becomes, most importantly, the removal of individual desire as
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the basic motive for moral argument. Rawls substitutes the problems of plurality for an
ideal of positional equality, not only of status, but of epistemology and rhetorical
invention. Argument now extends into a community bound together in common interest
by way of their rationality. It is assumed that people know “general facts about human
society,” such as political affairs, economic principles, “the basis of social organization,”
and the “laws of human psychology,” and indeed they know “whatever general facts
affect the choice of the principles of justice” (Rawls 1971, 137). The important thing is
that this knowledge is general. As long as it is, Rawls imposes no limitations on it
because “conceptions of justice must be adjusted to the characteristics of the systems of
social cooperation which they are to regulate…” (138). While the parties in the original
position are “ignorant of their particular ends, they are all assumed to be motivated by the
desire for certain primary goods” (Sandel 1982, 25).
By offering this distinction between individual knowledge and general knowledge,
Rawls seems to protect moral agency in the same way that Socrates does by preserving
the epistemic value of examples: in Socrates, knowledge of examples allows for others to
participate in dialogue; in Rawls, knowledge of general needs, goods, and social
structures, enables agents to understand the basic framework for their decisions on
justice. But despite this apparent protection, actual discursive practice is still stifled by
the way Rawls positions the agent with self-knowledge.
For Rawls the original position and veil of ignorance is a “hypothetical choice
situation” that relies first on a description that can produce a fair discourse, then a process
of choice by which that discourse can be guided. Buchanan (1980) writes that the
“hypothetical choice situation must be described in such a way that,” given the
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description, it could be expected that rational persons in that situation would choose one
set of principles over another (18). The choice situation is hypothetical in the sense that
actual contracts are “inescapably embedded in the practices and conventions of some
particular society,” while the contract in the original position “is imagined to occur before
the principles of justice arrive on the scene,” so that it is able, as a hypothetical contract,
to “realize the ideal of pure procedural justice” (Sandel 1982, 125).
The resulting process of choice is guided by uncertainty, which in Rawls is an
epistemic absence that positions the agent previous to knowledge of social conditions and
motivations. Given Rawls’ positioning of rational agents under the “informational
restraints” of the veil of ignorance, “the problem of choosing principles of justice in the
original position is…a problem of rational choice under uncertainty” (Buchanan 1980,
21). Individuals, Buchanan writes, are to choose principles that will govern the
distribution of liberty, wealth, authority and other “primary goods” in their society, with
no knowledge as to how their choice will affect them personally: “The parties are to
choose principles which will profoundly influence their life prospects, but they are to do
so in a situation in which the outcome of the alternatives is uncertain” (21).
The main problem is that this uncertainty of outcomes has to be completely
individual, rather than communal. Once others enter the discourse, the outcomes of our
discussions of justice on each other would violate the line drawn against knowledge of
individual fate in the original position. This is so, because knowledge of peoples’
positions as compared to one another (according to talent or social standing) would
become part of the discourse, thereby lifting the veil of ignorance. Put another way, when
people become aware of each other, they also necessarily become aware of their
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comparative positions in terms of talent and fate. The best that Rawls’ theory can do is
offer a guide to policy choices, but not a real investigation of the terms of justice, or any
terms of communal order for that matter, because potential interlocutors have to remain
removed from the epistemic position that would make dialogic agency possible.
For this reason, individual choice in the original position represents (or replaces)
collective choice. Rawls insists that the original position not be thought of “as a general
assembly which includes at one moment everyone who will live at some time,” nor “as an
assembly of everyone who could live at some time. It is not a gathering of all actual or
possible persons.” To imagine an assembly such as this would be to “stretch fantasy too
far.” Rather, the original position must be interpreted so that “one can at any time adopt
its perspective.” It does not matter when one takes up its viewpoint, or who does, but
only that the restrictions mandate that “the same principles are always chosen” (139).
All parties in the original position can be expected to be persuaded by the same
arguments and “to vote the same way, since each is assumed to be equally ignorant, and
equally rational” (Kukathas and Pettit 1990, 21). Rather than being a basis for dialogic
inclusion, ignorance makes one individual choice, made outside of dialogue,
representative of all choices by every potential person. Rawls (1971) argues that we can
view choice in the original position “from the standpoint of one person selected at
random.” If any one individual “after due reflection prefers a conception of justice to
another, then they all do, and a unanimous agreement can be reached” (139). Note that
this unanimous agreement is not reached by way of argument and dialogue, but rather by
the universalizing power of reason, plus the condition of fairness invoked by the veil of
ignorance. In this way ignorance does not exist to promote a discourse, but to make it
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unnecessary. Rawls states this explicitly: “The veil of ignorance makes possible a
unanimous choice of a particular conception of justice. Without these limitations on
knowledge the bargaining problem of the original position would be hopelessly
complicated” (140). The solution to the “bargaining problems” of plurality and individual
desires, then, is to offer principles of rationality, minus personal motives, making the
choice of one the choice of everyone. But by this solution, Rawlsian ignorance shuts
down dialogue and takes the discussion of moral terms out of the community.
By this violation Rawls’ ignorance takes morality out of human, relational practices
in contingent time. As Wolff (1977) criticizes, “human existence is not accidentally
temporal; it is essentially temporal,” and what makes it a matter of justice when a
subgroup chooses for the whole society is “the fact that in principle the entire group
could be included in the choosing.” Moreover, he argues that “The veil of ignorance
creates a choice situation in which the essential characteristics of human existence are set
aside along with accidents of variation. What results…is not a moral point of view, but a
nonhuman point of view from the perspective of which moral questions are not clarified
but warped and distorted” (97). In short the original position is too far removed from the
human lifeworld to be made meaningful to actual people in principle or practice. Michael
Sandel (1982) writes that this objection views the original position as “too abstract” to
yield determinate principles for justice, and that the veil of ignorance “excludes morally
relevant information, information necessary to generate any meaningful results” because
the person in it is “too detached from contingency to account for the requisite
motivations” (27-28, emphasis mine).
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Noting that agents cannot make moral choices in accordance with a social contract
without knowledge of individual motivations, Sandel (1982) adds that no two people
could ever really be so identically situated as to have identical interests. Sandel reiterates
the idea that Rawls’ original position deprives the relevant parties of a true discursive
plurality. While Rawls notes this problem and proposes as a solution the idea that the
decision of one person represents a unanimous decision of all persons, this does nothing
to protect true moral agency, nor otherness, behind the veil of ignorance. Sandel writes:
…once all individuating characteristics are excluded, the parties are not merely
similarly situated (as persons in real life with similar life circumstances and certain
overlapping interests), but identically situated…The notion that not persons but only a
single subject is to be found behind the veil of ignorance would explain why no
bargaining or discussion can take place there. It would also explain why there can be
no contract or agreement in the voluntarist sense. For contracts, like discussions,
require a plurality of persons, and when the veil of ignorance descends, this plurality
dissolves (131-132).8
So, bargaining and discussion go with the removal of otherness, and genuine dialogue
disappears. The resulting condition is nonhuman, especially as it pictures the individual
moral agent. As Kukathas and Pettit (1990) note in their summary of Sandel’s critique,
“In the real world, we cannot detach ourselves from the interests and loyalties which not
only determine our obligations but also establish our identities.” Despite his insistence
that by personal detachment we can derive right principles, Rawls’ theory makes no
sense because “it presupposes a capacity we do not have: the capacity to choose or
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Sandel’s (1982) use of “plurality” here should not be taken as a defense of public moral
“plurality” (in the problematic sense as it is presented by MacIntyre’s and my own
argument). Rather, Sandel is participating in a more general attempt (along with
MacIntyre and other like-minded thinkers) to restore a stability to virtue by emphasizing
actual practices in human community. For more on this see Kukathas, Chandran and
Philip Pettit. Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990. 92118.
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construct a morality without self-knowledge or, indeed, moral experience” (96-97, 154).
To summarize, Rawls incapacitates the moral agent by divorcing her from her own moral
fate and experiences not only as necessary self-knowledge for making moral choices, but
also as motives for seeking the good of the community. In Socrates, the local materials of
argumentative discovery are retained, and ignorance motivates an other-turning for the
sake of mutual elenctic “therapy.” In Rawlsian ignorance both the motivation for
dialogue and the materials that would make it possible are removed. Rawls copies the
problem of Nicholas by offering a conception of ignorance that functions to remove self
and communal knowledge from moral agency, ending argument, bargaining, and
discussion on terms of order.
Modesty and Ignorance: The Problem of Relational Sincerity and Self-Knowledge
In her research Julia Driver has maintained that some virtues require or depend on
ignorance in order to maintain as virtues. Driver’s work has produced a debate on the
idea that sincerity is vital to the relationship between virtue and ignorance. This is an
especially important point in my study, as sincerity has been central to my arguments on
the disavowal of knowledge. While Driver’s ignorance supports some of the claims I
have made, and is friendlier to communal discourse than Nicholas’ or Rawls’, I will
argue that it too lacks the potential to produce genuine dialogue.
The paradigm virtue in the category of what Driver (1989) attempts to establish as the
“virtues of ignorance,” is modesty. Driver is interested in concepts of modesty
“associated with self-deprecation, or an underestimation of one’s worth,” defining the
modest person as one who underestimates her self worth (374). Moreover, modesty relies
on the “epistemic defect of not knowing one’s worth” (374, emphasis mine). Modesty and
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ignorance connect at Driver’s underestimation account of modesty. This account holds
that the modest person underestimates his self worth: “If he speaks, then he understates
the truth, but he does so unknowingly. This entails that the modest person is ignorant, to a
certain degree, with regard to his own self-worth” (376, emphasis mine). Driver’s
account is quite similar to Rawls’ veil of ignorance, since both require that the agent not
know his or her own individual talents and standing. She writes “for a person to be
modest, she must be ignorant as to her own self-worth,” thinking of herself as “less
deserving, or less worthy, than she actually is…Since modesty is generally considered to
be a virtue, it would seem that this virtue rests upon an epistemic defect” (377).9 But
where Rawls posits an emptiness of self-knowledge as an epistemic position from which
to make choices, Driver offers it as a personal characteristic productive of utterances.
Modesty, for Driver, is a partly internal “attitude of ignorance” that leads to “modest
patterns of behavior” (377).
Just as soon as Driver (1989) locates modesty in behavioral outcomes, however, she
notes the problems with equating modest behavior with sincere modesty. After all, one
might simply exhibit modesty insincerely, or by not talking about herself. These would
constitute cases of “false modesty,” the first because it is merely an exhibition, the second
9

In a footnote in this article Driver (1989) writes that in the virtues of ignorance “It is not
the ignorance itself which is valued. Rather, it is the underlying state that is necessarily
connected to the ignorance in a certain type of context” (384). My understanding is that
Driver argues ignorance is to be valued for its virtue outcomes, specifically as it produces
sincere modesty behaviors. In a later article “Modesty and Ignorance,” Driver takes her
argument a step further, claiming that when someone behaves modestly it is the
ignorance itself that we value, especially as a marker for sincerity that would gain a
positive response. Driver, Julia. “Modesty and Ignorance.” Ethics 109 (1999): 829.
While Driver’s theory does picture moral agency and self-knowledge in a problematic
way, her work in connecting ignorance and virtue has been valuable in forming my own
opinions on the subject.
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because it is modesty by “omission” rather than “commission” (377-378). Driver implies
that sincere cases of modesty are those that constitute genuine underestimations of selfworth (378). If we simply equate modesty with modest behavior without accounting for
sincerity, Driver warns that we will include some of the false cases, and miss some of the
real cases. The distinction between real and false cases rests on the self-knowledge
behind the behavior. Modesty that is simply “polite” or “expedient” is not a moral virtue
because it is “too self-conscious an act” (380). Rather, modesty is only a virtue when it
comes from sincere underestimation of one’s worth by way of self-ignorance. For Driver,
sincerity and ignorance are interdependent, just as they were in Socrates’ disavowal of
knowledge. She is right to require sincere ignorance in her conception of modesty, but
her requirement for the role of underestimation in this account casts doubt on the
possibility that modesty is morally productive, or even realistic, as an utterance.
In his response to Driver, Owen Flanagan (1990) emphasizes the point that the
underestimation account is unrealistic. He writes that there is something “deeply
problematic about a characterization of the virtue of modesty in terms of a ‘dogmatic
disposition to underestimation of self-worth’” (425; Driver 1989, 378). On Driver’s view,
notes Flanagan, all modest people possess this disposition. But this is counterintuitive on
the grounds that “The truly modest person cannot be so systematically in the dark about
her worth” (425). Flanagan’s suspicion is that the modest person, by Driver’s description,
would be falsely modest because she would have to practice this sort of underestimation
of self worth rather than coming by it naturally (425). This is an obvious violation of
Driver’s sincere underestimation requirement, especially as this underestimation position
requires her to argue that “Since modesty necessarily involves ignorance, it is also
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necessarily involuntary in nature” (Driver, 381). From this statement, Flanagan attributes
to Driver the view that “only modesty that arises spontaneously, from a person’s
temperament, is true modesty,” since working at being modest would require that person
to “practice self deception” (Flanagan, 426; Driver, 382). This means, for Flanagan, that
the person who is not now modest would have to work at obtaining a vice, “the vice of
not seeing the self accurately” (426). Flanagan’s proposed solution to this paradoxical
situation is a “nonoverestimation account” of modesty, where working at becoming
modest is possible because it does not require obtaining a dogmatic disposition of
underestimation. Instead one “simply needs to learn not to overestimate one’s
accomplishment and worth.” This way, one does not need to be ignorant of one’s own
modesty in order to be modest (426). But, of course, Flanagan’s proposal removes the
requirement that modesty be the product of ignorance, rendering the most important
connection posited by Driver moot.10
As per my argument on Socrates’ sincerity and other-turning, I agree with Driver’s
requirement of sincere ignorance as a source for virtuous action. She maintains that
underestimation, when sincere, results in truly virtuous utterances of modesty. But Driver
(like Nicholas and Rawls), conceives of ignorance as a removal of the agent from self-

10

Driver (1999) responds by maintaining that underestimation has the benefit of
distinguishing between sincere and false instances of modesty, although she proposes
what she considers a “more plausible” account based on “combination modesty.” Under
combination modesty “an agent is modest if he is disposed to underestimate self-worth to
some limited extent, even in spite of the available evidence” (830). The intent is to avoid
personal “overranking,” as this person “exhibits ignorance of self-worth without falling
into the vice of self-deprecation” (831). This becomes yet more confusing, since the
person would have to be separated from enough self-knowledge of talents and social
position to not overrank, yet know enough of this information to not self-deprecate.
Driver’s response does not satisfy the objection that discursive moral agency cannot be
derived from this divorce of self-knowledge, nor that the divorce seems unrealistic.
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knowledge, a divorce that problematizes genuine dialogue. In order to engage in genuine
dialogue, one disavows knowledge not as a removal of information about who she is in
terms of talents and accomplishments, but as a recognition of her uncertainty. The plain
difference is between ignorance as a defect or absence of knowledge, and ignorance
recognized as a type of knowledge. One of the arguments concerning Socrates’ disavowal
of knowledge was that he meant it literally when he said he had no knowledge
whatsoever to speak of. Driver’s sincerity casts ignorance as this very absence. The
problem, as it would have been for Socrates, is the loss of agency for the person with this
deficit. By putting the individual in a position of habitual absence of self-knowledge,
Driver’s agent would be no less able to participate in genuine dialogue than Socrates
would have been under the same limitations.
Conclusion
For Nicholas, Rawls, and Driver alike, ignorance is used as part of a larger positional
argument, where the moral agent is placed in a particular relationship with selfknowledge. From various positions of epistemic defect, moral agents are to make the best
possible choices as produced from what is not known. So, for Nicholas, ethical
communication is talk with the self, as the product of a position of “learned ignorance”
where the agent loses the distractions of local knowledge and discursive chasing. For
Rawls, ethical communication emerges from behind the veil of ignorance, where the
moral choice of one person who has been removed from a position of self knowledge in
terms of personal talents and ends (and thus comparisons against others in community),
becomes a representative discourse for all rational persons who can benefit from the
ordering power of justice. For Driver, the basis of the ethical utterance is underestimation
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of one’s self-worth, talent, and accomplishments as an epistemic defect where one lacks
the knowledge that would inform her as to her personal capabilities (as compared to the
abilities of others) and the worth of her accomplishments within her community. The
problem common to all three positions of ignorance is that none of them places a capable
agent in a realistic discourse community. Nicholas’ conception is flatly non-discursive
and a-communal. Rawls’ veil of ignorance creates a discourse situation in which
deliberation upon terms of order cannot take place. And Driver follows Rawls in the error
of unrealistically removing the agent from self-knowledge as a requirement for producing
moral utterances: where Rawls does so by maintaining that the agent must be unaware of
his motives for choosing principles of justice, Driver does so by insisting on
underestimation as a necessary condition for virtuous modesty. All three accounts remove
the raw epistemic materials for genuine dialogue, whether they be personal or communal.
Conceptions of ignorance that take away the epistemic materials of communal dialogue
take the cultivation and investigation of virtue terms out of the settings and activities of
rhetorical practice. For this reason the ignorance of Nicholas, Rawls, and Driver
undermines the very motivation and practicality of genuine dialogue.
I have drawn definitional boundaries around contingency (immanent versus
uncertain) and now, ignorance (dialogic versus a-communal). The next chapter returns to
Socratic ignorance and contingency as uncertainty to reveal how these advocated senses
of my main terms make genuine dialogue an enactment of virtue. We can get a sense of
how we have finally arrived at enactment by revisiting virtue as craft. The craft analogy
provides identifiable standards of accomplishment for moral discourse. The standards by
which a craft can be said to be pursued well or badly depends on its point or purpose and
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the difficulties its practitioners encounter (Wallace 1988, 223). I have identified the
purposes of genuine dialogue as a search for Absolutes, the inclusion of other arguments
and arguers, and the maintenance of open-endedness; its challenge has been identified as
mediation. Inasmuch as participants in genuine dialogue accomplish these standards by
their mutual activity, and meet this challenge, they are doing virtue, as the craft analogy
goes. Just as one may ask what ethics would promote excellence in flute-playing or
carpentry, so I have asked what ethics promote these “excellences” of genuine dialogue.
Those concepts of contingency and ignorance that were demonstrated as ethics promoting
the standards of genuine dialogue have been advocated against their counterparts. We are
now in a position where I can demonstrate how ignorance promotes the doing of genuine
dialogue as an enactment of (or craft of) virtue, by the example of Socratic piety. As I
have been implying an enacted perspective throughout by my emphasis on practice,
Socratic piety will summarize my foregoing comments on contingency and ignorance.
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CHAPTER 8
PIETY, IGNORANCE, AND THE ENACTMENT OF VIRTUE: THE EXAMPLE
OF PLATO’S EUTHYPHRO AND APOLOGY
In an attempt to demonstrate the moral operations and outcomes of contingency and
ignorance in actual discourse, I offer the examples of the Euthyphro and Apology in this
chapter. My aim is to provide a textual example of how virtue - in this case piety becomes enacted in dialogue, and how this enactment is contributed to by contingency
and ignorance. I will build my case first by deriving a definition of Socratic piety from
the Euthyphro. Next, I will demonstrate how Socrates’ elenchos is a discursive enactment
of his own sense of piety. Finally, I will illustrate the relationship between this practiced
piety and ignorance by citing passages in the Apology where Socrates disavows
knowledge in connection with his activity of philosophy. From these passages I will offer
broader implications for moral dialogue and ignorance based on what is revealed by
Socratic practice. The discourse I provide in this chapter is pious on the model of Socratic
ignorance, a motivation for dialogic other-turning intended to build a deeper level of
coherence and unification for moral, communal problems. For Socrates, piety puts all
arguments to the test and envisions the people of the city as potential interlocutors on
matters both local and divine, if only by recognition of their ignorance they are willing to
commit to each other in dialogue.
The virtue of piety can be defined from a variety of perspectives.1 In rhetoric,
Kenneth Burke (1954) has defined piety as a “system-builder, a desire to round things

1

Historical and philosophical changes in the meaning of piety are outside the scope of
my argument. For a thorough treatment of what piety meant for the Greeks, see Nilsson,
Martin Persson. Greek Piety. Trans. Herbert Jennings Rose. Oxford: Clarendon, 1948.
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out, to fit experiences together into a unified whole…the sense of what properly goes
with what (74). As a “schema of orientation,” Burke writes, “it involves the putting
together of experiences” in a way that “may be right or wrong,” guiding or misguiding
(76). Rosteck and Leff (1989) extend the description, writing that for Burke, pieties
“function as stable frames of reference which direct human perception and determine our
judgments about what is proper in a given circumstance” (329). For Burke “pieties arise
out of the impulse for order.” When interests conflict, they “struggle to organize matter at
the expense of rival perspectives” through rhetorical practice (330). For Rosteck and
Leff, Burke’s secularized piety is ethically directed at “propriety,” reconsidered as a
“principle of local integration…that coordinates what is said with how it is said within
some particular context” (329). The limitation of this sense of piety is that it is not
directed at being, but rather a sort of perspectival appropriateness and coherence. Burke’s
piety is enactment and order with an overemphasis on the local. Weaver (1948) keeps
piety in the realm of divinity by defining it as “a discipline of the will through respect”
that “admits the right to exist of things larger than the ego, of things different than the
ego” (172), but his discussion of the virtue at the end of Ideas Have Consequences does
not offer any clear comments on rhetorical practice. In this chapter I look for a sense of
piety that is both enacted and Absolute, a virtue that is practicable according to the
standards of genuine dialogue.
My analysis will be restricted to a Socratic definition of piety for two reasons: 1) I
will be claiming that Socrates’ dialogic practice is pious according to his contingent sense

For a more general historical review of piety, see Garrison, James D. Pietas From Vergil
to Dryden. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1992.
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of the eidos of that term; this demands gaining a sense of what values surround piety for
Socrates, and how he might maintain contingency and ignorance as a preservation of
those values in contributing and exposing his own view to the testing function of his
elenchos; 2) Socrates’ sense of piety reveals his dialogic ethics, and so, is consistent with
the aim of my study, as well as the characteristically Socratic conceptions of contingency
and ignorance that I have advocated.
Defining Socratic Piety
In defining Socratic piety, I rely on Gregory Vlastos (1991) and Mark McPherran
(2000). For both thinkers, Socrates’ activity of philosophizing is aligned with (and
motivated by) his sense of piety. The first step to understanding this is grasping Socrates’
notion that the gods and their aims are wholly good.2 For Vlastos, the primary textual
evidence for attributing this view to Socrates comes in Book II of the Republic:
And is not God of course good in reality and always to be spoken of a such?…
But further, no good thing is harmful is it?…
Can what is not harmful harm?…
Can that which does not harm do any evil?…
But that which does no evil would not be the cause of any evil either?…
Once more, is the good beneficent?…
Is it the cause, then, of welfare?…
Then the good is not the cause of all things, but of things that are well it is the
cause - of things that are ill it is blameless…
Neither, then, could God…since he is good, be, as the multitude say, the cause of
all things, but for mankind he is the cause of few things, but of many things not the
2

This is one of several religious considerations that can be raised in this discussion, many
of which are outside the scope of my study. Socrates’ religion is a controversial topic,
and will be discussed in this section only insofar as is needed to understand the way
Socratic piety motivates Socratic dialogue. For more detailed discussions on Socrates’
religious views, see Brickhouse, Thomas C. and Nicholas D. Smith. The Philosophy of
Socrates. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000. 231-265. Also see McPherran, Mark L. “Piety,
Justice, and the Unity of Virtue.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2000) : 299328 and Vlastos, Gregory. Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
UP, 1991. 157-178.
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cause. For good things are far fewer with us than evil, and for the good we must
assume no other cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for in other
things and not in God (379b-d).
The last of these inferences is the most important, as Socrates makes God the cause of
only good, and never evil things, in human matters. Vlastos (1991) explains what
Socrates is up to as a rationalization of the gods in order to make them moral. He has to
do this, according to Vlastos, because he is situated between two apparently opposing
positions. One the one hand, he promises to follow reasoned moral argument wherever it
leads, being persuaded only by those propositions arrived at by reason (157). “On the
other hand, he is also “committed to obeying commands reaching him through
supernatural channels,” as evidenced by several references in the Apology to the demand
from the god to do philosophy (157). Vlastos points particularly to 33c, where Socrates
says the death penalty cannot scare him from continuing to philosophize because “This
duty I have accepted, as I said, in obedience to God’s commands given in oracles and
dreams and in every other way that any other divine dispensation has ever impressed a
duty upon man.” Negotiating these simultaneous commitments, Vlastos argues, does not
demand Socrates abandon his reasonable method of moral inquiry for metaphysics, but
he can neither “insulate his religious faith from the formidable energies of his critical
intellect.” His response is to require that his gods meet “not metaphysical but ethical
standards…His gods can be both supernatural and rational so long as they are rationally
moral.” So, Socrates derives a moral theology, “investigating the concept of god no
further than is needed to bring it into line with his ethical views” (162). This leads
Vlastos to argue that for Socrates, every virtue, including piety, had an essence of its
own, regardless of what any god or human thought of it, making it normative for gods
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and humans alike.3 This determines “what virtue is in their case as strictly as it does in
ours…if knowledge of good and evil entails moral goodness in a man, it would entail the
same in a god” (165).4 This is because both are bound to be rationally moral, according to
the guidelines of Socrates’ moral philosophy.
By binding both god and human alike to the normative power of moral reason,
Socrates can be simultaneously attentive to reason and divine command as arbiters in the
moral domain. Thus, the apparent paradox of being guided by these two voices is
resolved. They “cannot conflict,” writes Vlastos, because “only by the use of his own
critical reason can Socrates determine the true meaning of any of these signs” (171). The
important result is that Socrates relies upon his discursive method of moral reasoning
(elenchos) to investigate the meaning of both reasoned argument and divine command.
This is precisely the journey he embarks upon in the Apology after the Oracle says he is
the wisest of all men. The requirement to investigate divine inspiration in order to
evaluate it as true knowledge also shows up, for example, in his arguments on poetry in
the Ion (see especially 533d-535a, 537c-539e, 540a-541a, and 542a).5

3

This is shown by Socrates’ argument that the holy is not holy because it is approved of
by the gods, but that the gods approve of it because it is holy (Euthyphro 10a-11b).
4

Vlastos (1991) uses this argument, in part, to explain why Socrates’ gods were in such
violation of the gods of the city. If gods were to be held to the “norms of Socratic virtue
which require every moral agent, human or divine, to act only to cause good to others,
never evil…the city’s gods would have become unrecognizable” (166). By way of
“ethical transformation” the old gods, who through divine activity torment and destroy
the innocent and guilty alike (for example, Hera’s persecution of Heracles in retaliation
for Zeus’ infidelity) would be destroyed for the creation of new ones. Of course this is
one of the charges (being a maker of gods) against which Socrates must defend himself in
the Apology (165-166).
5

In that dialogue, Socrates allows that Ion and other poets are “god-possessed,” inspired
by a divine voice, but he objects to the idea that Ion has true knowledge through divine
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It is important to note that this wish to reasonably investigate the inspired discourse of
diviners, oracles, poets, and so on does not reflect a pessimism toward the purpose of the
gods, but rather a desire to submit to the elenchos interpretations of what these divine
signs mean. This is what motivates Socrates to do “street philosophy;” attempting to read
divine signs as a quest for moral truth becomes his duty to the gods. According to Vlastos
(1991), when the god says that Socrates is the wisest of all men, he is not lying, for lying
is an evil and Socrates’ theology (god is “invariantly good”) does not allow for this.
Rather, Socrates has been given the job of spreading the god’s good will for the city (and
Socrates himself) that they should put the perfection of their souls above all else. The god
would do this himself, through dreams and oracles, but unless the people “brought the
right beliefs to the interpretation of those signs, they would not be able to read them
correctly.” And they would not even be able to start on this process if they weren’t
“engaged in the quest for moral truth” (173). Socrates’ responsibility, then, from which
we can derive a definition of Socratic piety, is to impose upon the city the method of
moral reasoning, elenchos, by way of “street-philosophy,” in order to motivate a moral

inspiration because what he receives is mindless. As Vlastos (1991) puts it, Socrates sees
diviners, seers, oracles, and poets having the same problem: “All of them in his view are
know-nothings, or rather, worse: unaware of their sorry epistemic state, they set
themselves up as repositories of wisdom emanating from a divine, all-wise source. What
they say may be true; but even when it is true, they are in no position to discern what
there is in it that is true” (170). Vlastos contends that Socrates would not hold the view
that there are two orders of knowledge, one rational and inferior (reached by elenctic
argument), one extra-rational and superior (reached by divine inspiration). If he held this
view, he would take the divine commands given him as true moral knowledge “apart
from reason and superior to it, yielding the certainty which is conspicuously lacking from
his elenctic searches” (167). This view seems supported by textual evidence, especially
Socrates’ motivation to disprove the oracle, and his distrust of the divine inspiration of
poets as constitutive of true knowledge.
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quest toward improvement of the soul. This is the “other-turning” of ignorance that I
have identified previously.
By the evidence in the Apology, Socrates believes this duty has been uniquely
imposed upon him because he is the wisest of all men, but we must remember that he is
“wisest” because he has knowledge of his own moral ignorance. When we re-introduce
the idea of ignorance here, we see it motivating the moral quest: the words of diviners
and oracles may be true, but they do not constitute certainty and must be investigated
through elenctic argument. Putting the specifics of Socrates’ theology aside, the
important point is the uncertainty imposed upon both humanly reasonable
(argumentative) and divine (inspired) moral discourses. It is the will of the god to have
the city care first for virtue and the state of their souls, but if the word on this is spread
through divine signs, the threat is that the people of the city will lose sight of the meaning
of these signs by taking them as certain moral knowledge straight away; there will be
little, if any, reasoned interpretation or dialogue. Vlastos’ statement that the people would
not bring the “right beliefs” to the interpretation of divine signs can readily, I think, be
used to say “they would not bring a proper attitude of ignorance” to the interpretation.
And his following statement that they “could not have come by those right beliefs unless
they had already engaged in the quest for moral truth” (173) strongly implies that the
moral quest, guided by elenctic uncertainty, puts one in the proper frame of mind for such
interpretations. So, the god cannot simply offer divinations and trust that these will direct
the city toward self improvement and virtue. Instead, Socrates is employed for this job,
because of his ignorance.
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At this point a definition of Socratic piety can be given.6 Vlastos (1991) writes that
“piety” in Socrates’ life means “doing on the god’s behalf, in assistance to him, work the
god wants done and would be doing himself if he only could” (175), or, “Piety is doing
god’s work to benefit human beings” (176). McPherran (2000) offers a very similar
definition: “Piety is that part of justice that is a service…of humans to gods, assisting the
gods in their primary task to produce their most beautiful product…” (303). This
definition previews, and is supported by, Socrates’ comments at Apology 30a, where he
promises he will test those who say they care more for virtue than for money or
reputation, for “This, I do assure you, is what my God commands, and it is my belief that
no greater good has ever befallen you in this city than my service to my God. For I spend
all my time going about trying to persuade you, young and old, to make your first and
chief concern not for your bodies nor your possessions, but for the highest welfare of
your souls.” This passage provides a clear connection between Vlastos’ and McPherran’s
6

These definitions are tied to key arguments in the Euthyphro. Euthyphro offers that part
of piety consists of service to the gods (12e). Socrates pushes Euthyphro on what he
means by “service” (13a) and gets him to agree that it entails “care…given for the good
and welfare of the object that is served” (13b). But Socrates warns against where this
argument is going: “Then holiness, which is the service of the gods, must likewise aim to
benefit the gods and make them better? Are you prepared to say that when you do a holy
thing you make some deity better?” (13c). Socrates offers a similar challenge to
Euthyphro’s contention that piety is an art of commerce between humans and gods (14de) by asking what advantage the gods could possibly gain by receiving anything from
humans (15a). McPherran (2000) points out that the question Euthyphro has failed to
answer is, “what is that ‘most beautiful product’…in whose production the gods might
employ our assistance?” (302). Euthyphro’s unsatisfactory answer at 14b “If anyone
knows how to say and do things pleasing to the gods in prayer and sacrifice, that is
holiness…” causes Socrates to tell him he has simply “slipped away” at the point where
he could have revealed what piety is (14c). McPherran (2000, 302) and Vlastos (1991,
175) take this as a significant point for the definition of piety they end up offering:
service of human beings to the gods in their primary work - producing virtue and
improving souls. Euthyphro does not catch on to this hint, Vlastos argues, because “the
notion that the gods have work to do, work in which human beings could assist them, is
foreign to Greek religion” (175).
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definitions of Socrates’ piety and the discursive activity of his moral philosophy: his
elenchos is a method of moral dialogue for the purpose of instilling virtue in souls, in
assistance to God. A longer quote from McPherran makes the connection between piety
and elenchos yet more explicit:
Socrates would have reasoned, since the gods are wholly good, their main project and
product must be wholly good. But since the only or most important good is virtue…it
is likely that the only or most important component of the gods’ chief product is
virtue; and hence, our primary service to the gods - the one we are best situated and
suited to perform - is to help produce virtue via the protection and improvement of
the…human mind/soul. Because elenctic examination of oneself and others is for
Socrates the key activity which helps to achieve this goal via the improvement of
moral-belief-consistency and the deflation of human presumptions to divine
wisdom…elenctic philosophizing is, then, a preeminently pious activity. The life of
philosophy for Socrates is thus a prime case of pious, anti-hubristic, “street
preaching” activity; activity whose aims include the rational re-establishment and
revisioning of the traditionally-warranted metaphysical/epistemic gap that separates
mortal human from gods (303).
When McPherran claims that Socrates’ elenchos is itself a pious activity, he makes
explicit not only the connection between virtue and dialogue, but also assigns the
elenchos in particular the potential to be an enacted piety. In addition, McPherran assigns
the value of uncertainty (pious, anti-hubristic) to its practice, and points to the city
audience (street preaching) for whom this discourse is intended. For Socrates, piety
consists of working on the gods’ behalf to remove false certainty, by recognition of
ignorance, for the inculcation of virtue in souls. Socrates’ elenchos is the instrument of
choice because it aids others in recognizing their common ignorance and the contingency
of their arguments, which must be tested and retested to count as significant moral
knowledge. Socrates’ elenchos, then, is an enactment of piety: by practicing the elenchos
Socrates practices piety, according to the aims, standards, goods, and outcomes specific
to pious accomplishment.
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The uncertainty of elenctic argument is a relational good because Socrates and his
interlocutors can only embark on a contingent search for moral terms if Socrates’ own
recognition of ignorance is matched in attitude by his argumentative “other,” who, not
recognizing her ignorance and the inconsistency of her beliefs, might be made by
argument to see these flaws and open herself to genuine dialogue. In the next section I
offer an investigation of what Socrates’ enacted piety looks like in his speeches in the
Apology.
Piety as Enacted in the Apology
By the time he speaks in the Apology it is fairly clear that Socrates feels secure in
what he believes piety consists of, and that he is practicing it by doing the work of the
gods that they cannot do themselves, for the sake of the city. That this work is done by
way of elenctic philosophy, and that the elenchos is therefore an enactment of piety, has
been claimed above. Socrates’ discussion of piety in the Euthyphro is at once an
investigation of what piety is for the sake of securing that term elenctically in preparation
for his defense in the Apology, and an actual practice of the virtue itself. This uniformity
between discursive practice - dialogically raising the question of piety, and engaging an
other in argument, refutation, and testing - and enactment - “doing” piety by the
maintenance of ignorance and contingency in the discourse - reveals that the extensive
search for the eidoi of moral terms can be a practice of the very virtues sought by
practitioners.
This also reveals something important about the praxis of Socrates’ dialogue form.
The notion of piety that he is operating with is secure enough that he proceeds, with
confidence, to say in the Apology that he is doing piety for the positive benefit of the
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people he encounters. Of course his notion of piety remains in the category of
uncertainty, as it has been justified by elenchos, but this does not mean that Socrates
cannot put this contingent sense of what piety is to practical use in a speech defending
himself against its opposite. Socrates’ provisional judgments are intended to influence
decision-making by members of the polis. The outcomes of Socrates’ dialogues, no
matter how partial and contingent they may be, move his interlocutors forward on their
moral quest in a way that makes them capable of practical action.
At Apology 23a-b, Socrates explicitly describes the purpose of his pious mission as
the inculcation of ignorance: “That is why I still go about seeking and searching in
obedience to the divine command, if I think that anyone is wise, whether citizen or
stranger, and when I think that any person is not wise, I try to help the cause of God by
providing that he is not.” Socrates is enabled to practice piety because he recognizes his
own ignorance. Just as important, Socrates describes ignorance as a discursive condition
for other potential agents who would engage in dialogues on moral matters (including
those he might investigate and learn from), moving the focus from his individual agency
to the agency of ignorance itself: the god has not meant that only he (Socrates) is nothing
compared to wisdom, but that this is the condition of the entire city (Apology 23a-b). The
“wisest” of all people are those who recognize that they are nothing in respect to wisdom,
and this connects to the practice of “seeking and searching in obedience to the divine
command” and helping “the cause of God” by providing that those who think they are
wise, are really not. Here, enacted piety is pictured as the furthering of ignorance in
others, which will enable them as participants in genuine dialogue with one another.
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In this way ignorance could contribute to the expansion of a community of agents as
participants in dialogue on the essential moral terms that order their lives. This expansion
consists in Socratic practice of the removal of false and unreasonable beliefs, as well as
the hubris of thinking that human wisdom on moral matters constitutes a certainty as to
their being. Reconciling with the epistemic gap between the local and the perfect,
ignorance targets certainty as a barrier to genuine dialogue. In enacting piety, Socrates
especially targets those who consider themselves the most wise, or, most certain.
Reporting the results of his investigation of the oracle’s claim that he was the wisest of all
men, Socrates says “It seemed to me, as I pursued my investigation at the God’s
command, that the people with the greatest reputations were almost entirely deficient,
while others who were supposed to be their inferiors were much better qualified in
practical intelligence” (Apology 22a). Here, Socrates pictures the expert as the one who
has the least potential to engage in genuine dialogue, and assigns the greater
“intelligence” to those who recognize what they don’t know. As an example of the kind
of person Socrates sees as being in the worst condition for dialogue, consider Euthyphro,
who sees himself as an expert on piety, and must be since he is so confident in his
conception of that virtue that he is ready to prosecute his own father on its basis
(Euthyphro 4e-5a).
Rather than attempting to place moral knowledge in the category of certainty,
practices like the “What is F?” question, the argument from definition, and Socrates’
elenchos (which we now see as an enactment of piety) seek to secure contingent
conceptions of the Good, Justice, Courage, and so on, within a practice of dialogue that
makes these conceptions available for practical matters in the present, but also for
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retesting and revision given the results of future dialogues. Recognizing this we
understand that to say a term is contingent, or to say it is categorized in the uncertain
through ignorance, is not to say it is devoid of any moral epistemic content; nor does it
discount the idea that the moral knowledge constituted by that term can be made useful
for present decisions. Socrates, for example, is confident enough in his ever-contingent
sense of what piety is, that he is willing to practice philosophy as an enactment of that
virtue, maintain the value of these philosophical pursuits in the speeches of the Apology,
and ultimately, accept execution because he in unwilling to stop enacting the pious.
Socrates’ promise at the end of the Euthyphro to never stop searching for what the pious
is extends past the time of his trial in the Apology, and, in fact, past his execution. When
we take the promise to continue dialogic questioning at the end of the Euthyphro and
trace it through the Apology, we see that the future trajectory of investigations into the
eidos of piety, or any virtue, is potentially endless, extending into the future as long as
Socrates can do philosophy. Indeed, at the end of the Apology, Socrates envisions the
continuation of elenctic searches after his death:
If on the arrival in the other world, beyond the reach of our so-called justice, one will
find there the true judges who are said to preside in those courts, Minos and
Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus and all those other half-divinities who
were upright in their earthly life, would that be an unrewarding journey? Put it in this
way. How much would one of you give to meet Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and
Homer? I am willing to die ten times over if this account is true. It would be a
specially interesting experience for me to join them there…And above all I should
like to spend my time there, as here, in examining and searching people’s minds, to
find out who is really wise among them, and who only thinks that he is. What would
one not give, gentlemen, to be able to question the leader of that great host against
Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or the thousands of other men and women whom one
could mention, to talk and mix and argue with whom would be unimaginable
happiness? (41a-c, emphasis mine).
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Here, Socrates plans to keep the promise of continued elenchi made in the Euthyphro
even after he has passed from this world to the next. I have italicized the sentence where
he explicitly describes his intentions to continue examining others in the afterlife as
elenctic. Of the great names listed in this part of the speech, great judges who “apart from
the other happiness in which their world surpasses ours…are now immortal for the rest of
time,” all are potential candidates to participate in examinations of moral wisdom, and
Socrates will talk to them by the same method with which he approached interlocutors in
his present life. By describing his potential dialogic action in the afterlife, Socrates does
not complete the moral narrative of his life, but rather points it to its uncertain future as
the telos of activity in the human ethical sphere.
In this chapter I made the case that Socratic piety was an enactment of virtue
according to the standards of genuine dialogue. The enactment of piety through Socrates’
street philosophy accomplished the ends of genuine dialogue by inculcating ignorance in
his interlocutors, inviting them into a collective, community-building discourse. The
themes of other-turning, inclusion, and open-endedness were all illustrated through the
example of Socratic piety. In my final chapter, I continue another theme started here,
praxis. Framing a set of implications for future research, I discuss the practicality of the
discourse I have proposed in this study and some contexts where relevant issues might be
examined. Matters of praxis also extend into a broader conversation on ideal rhetoric and
what has been implied for its practicability by contingency and ignorance.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In closing the study, I wish to offer a set of future directions for similar research on
genuine dialogue, contingency, and ignorance, with an emphasis on possible
contemporary contexts for investigation, and issues of praxis. I will end with a series of
general conclusions from the study, explaining how these conclusions restore some
received notions of moral rhetoric while challenging others, and how my arguments fit
into the general body of knowledge on the problems I have addressed. It will be most
helpful to begin with a summary of where I have been.
As a response to contemporary problems of moral pluralism, I have offered an
essentialist notion of moral discourse that recognizes the epistemic limitations of human
practices without lapsing into relativism. In my proposal I have advocated the
introduction of notions of contingency as uncertainty and ignorance as a form of moral
knowledge to promote a genuine practice of dialogue. My primary goal has been to
demonstrate how contingency and ignorance make genuine dialogue an enactment of
virtue, defining virtue as a “craft” or techne. Through the examples of definitional
argument, the “What is F?” question, and Socrates’ elenchos, I have argued that
contingency as uncertainty, and ignorance as moral knowledge, are ethics that help to
further the values and ends of genuine dialogue: other-inclusiveness, open-endedness,
and essentialist searching. I have criticized notions of immanent contingency and acommunal ignorance that endanger these same values and ends. Enacted virtue was
exampled by the activity of Socratic piety in the Euthyphro and Apology in the previous
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chapter. In that chapter, I also raised the issue of praxis, which I examine more closely
below.
Future Research and the Issue of Praxis
The recovery of a classical sense of ignorance has been proposed as a potential repair
for the contemporary accent on relativity in moral rhetoric. For this reason I have focused
on classical arguments as well as texts. But the proposed form of dialogue that emerges
from an attitude toward contingency is not merely limited to the Euthyphro and Apology,
nor to Socratic articulations. The problem I proposed as my target was “emotivism,” an
ill of contemporary civic activity and debate. I have built a case to address the dual
demands of that problem: 1) discuss theoretical principles that deal with the central
problem of moral epistemology that plagues disputes on terms of order in civic
community; and 2) describe a civic discourse practice that mediates between
considerations of the local and the Absolute. The first demand concerns what is really
knowable in the moral realm, and what kind of communication practices might be
motivated by the unknown. The second demands a description of what this mediated
practice looks like, what its actual aims are, and how moral agents might accomplish
these aims given their human limitations. I have addressed the first with a thoroughgoing
treatment of contingency and ignorance. Comments directed at the second have focused
on dialogue practices that stress uncertainty without sacrificing the search for Absolute
terms, a mediation that raises the central question of praxis.
The question naturally arises “if these dialogues are uncertain and extensive into an
unknown future, where do agents stop in order to propose policies?” To this point the
response has been that genuine dialogues, along the lines of Socrates’ elenchos, result in
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“dialogically secured” positions on moral terms that can be acted upon now. But these
terms are always left exposed to re-calculation and revision in future dialogues. They are
contingent, but this does not deny that they can be powerfully invoked for moral direction
and order in human practices. I have tried to make this point evident by the example of
Socratic piety, a contingent virtue that orders Socrates’ entire philosophical activity and
directs him toward practical civic action. Future research should continue to focus on
how contingent terms of order can be made useful for present needs of choice and policy
in civic settings. Here I will propose two possible contexts for additional research: one
metaphysical - social-economic policy in the Catholic Church - and another secular -the
pedagogy of medical ignorance. In future investigations it will be important to go looking
for ignorant/contingent dialogues in both metaphysical and secular settings for the sake of
examining the broader applications of genuine dialogue. These examinations may also be
useful for highlighting similarities and contrasts of dialogic practice according to the
ethic that orders particular communities, institutions, and individuals. The two contexts I
offer here reveal the possibility that Socratic values of dialogue may appear in both
metaphysical and secular settings. Appearing here as example contexts, they are not
intended to be fully developed analyses.
My discussion of Catholic social teaching and medical ignorance is intended to offer
a contingent response to some basic questions on praxis: is the discourse practical, or, can
people learn it and do it?; and, does the discourse build relevant communities around an
order of beliefs and values? My description of both contexts below suggests that the set
of practices I have proposed is already being approximated by major institutions
(medical, religious), through the practices of people unified by value systems and
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practical goals. If people in these institutions are “doing” ignorance, it suggests that
success in social reformation and practical accomplishment through ignorance is
possible.
Catholic Social Teaching
One of the ways Catholic social teaching has become part of the public dialogue on
civic issues has been through the issuance of papal social encyclicals, generally
addressing issues of “human freedom and its embodiment in culture, economics, and
politics” (Weigel 1992a, 1). Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (1891), written as a
response to the increased movement of working-class Catholics away from the Church in
the midst of growing attitudes toward individualism, as well Marxist and socialist
temptations (Pawlikowski 1985, 1-4), began an extensive conversation on where the
Church stood on specific economic and social issues, including workers’ rights, class
struggle, and private property rights. The centenary of Rerum Novarum was notably
marked in May 1991 by Pope John Paul II in the encyclical Centesimus Annus, a letter
that reviews Rerum Novarum, where Church social policy has gone since that encyclical,
and where it is going in the future. Catholic social-economic policy serves as an example
context where the Socratic ethics of dialogue I have described are prominent. By
evidence of general precepts of Catholic debate and dialogue, as well as specific
statements within Centesimus Annus, the Catholic conversation on economic policy is a
promising context for future investigations of contingency and praxis.
Scholarly commentary on Catholic social debate emphasizes an overarching theme of
dialogue. “Continuing conversation” and “controversy” are described as part of Catholic
(and generally Christian) social teaching (Neuhaus 1991, xiii), and in conversations such
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as those opened by the encyclicals “disagreement does not imply disrespect” since all
such debates are “open-ended” and “may lead in surprising directions” (Weigel 1992b,
xi). The Catholic attitude toward history that ensures this commitment to conversation is
marked by an emphasis on uncertain futurity and a partial understanding of divine action
in the social realm (Royal 1992, 175). Royal writes that the Christian future is “an open
field” since human political progress relies upon the frailties of human effort and
knowledge, a “truism” that denies the ideological vision of social perfection for the
reality of our contingent end (170-171). Moreover, this attitude toward contingency and
ignorance maintains a dialogic ethic in Catholic social teaching and political action.
In Centesimus Annus1 John Paul II notes human imperfection and the contingency of
Christian truth as bases for engaging others in dialogue, rather than the construction of
dogmatic social schema:
Christian truth does not claim the right to impose on others [one] concept of what is
true and good. Since it is not an ideology, the Christian faith does not imprison
changing socio-political realities in a rigid schema. Human life is realized in history
in conditions that are diverse and imperfect. Further, reaffirming the transcendent
dignity of the person, the Church’s method is always that of respect for freedom.
While paying heed to every fragment of truth he encounters [elsewhere], the Christian
will not fail to affirm in dialogue with others all that his faith and the correct use of
reason have enabled him to understand (46).
A good part of this statement is a direct denial of the ideological effort to perfect
human history by the imposition of rigid rules for speech and action, one of the values of
genuine dialogue that I have stressed throughout. But other affirmations appear here as
well, primarily, the recognition that the moral agent must operate in a place of
1

Throughout this chapter I cite the Centesimus Annus from its reprinting in Weigel,
George (Ed). A New Worldly Order: John Paul II and Human Freedom. Washington,
D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1992. 29-57. The numbers appearing in
parentheses after each direct quote note the passage numbers in the original encyclical.

177

imperfection, using imperfect materials (for Socrates this was the compromise between
example and eidos) for the discovery of moral arguments. This emphasis on imperfection
motivates not the false repairs of a “rigid schema,” but rather an openness to the
contingency of conversation in diverse and imperfect social settings. The turn is away
from the impulse of the ideologue, and toward that characteristically Socratic discourse
that pays heed to socially encountered truths, and affirms in dialogue with others, those
understandings that the faculties of faith and reason have provided.
Catholic social teaching comments on present challenges in accordance to ordering
(transcendent) moral terms. At the beginning of Centesimus Annus John Paul II lists some
of the “fundamental principles” of Christian “social and political organization” furthered
in past encyclicals - “friendship,” “social charity,” “love” - as various articulations of the
virtue upon which his own commentary is based, “solidarity” (10). Much of Catholic
social thought and debate also centers around what “justice” means given the precepts of
the Christian faith and their relevance for present social issues and political organization.2
Potentially, the Catholic version of the “What is F?” question may look very much like its
Socratic manifestation. This makes the Church’s search for what “friendship,”
“solidarity,” and “justice” are in present human society a prospective place for
investigating contemporary manifestations of Socratic form. Important questions of
policy may also be addressed here, as gaps between the perfection of these ideas, and the
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In Rerum Novarum, for example, Pope Leo XIII rejects the socialist emphasis on class
struggle, shared property, and the parental function of the state as unjust violations of
natural order (12-28). Here I am citing the passage numbers from the original encyclical
as reprinted in Byers, D.M. (Ed). Justice in the Marketplace: Collected Statements of the
Vatican and the U.S. Catholic Bishops on Economic Policy, 1891-1984. Washington,
D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1985.
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imperfection of human knowledge and society, challenge the Church’s ability (and
desire) to offer specific social mandates.
On the issue of praxis, some critics argue that the Church’s social teachings are too
general to be politically and economically useful (Royal 1992, 172). In Centesimus Annus
John Paul II writes that part of Catholic social teaching is resisting the “theocratic
temptation” of passing “definitive judgments on complex social issues,” as such
impositions are outside the domain of the Church’s teaching function (3). The Church
does comment on specific issues, but hesitates to do so, preferring to speak from
generalities. But Royal argues this policy does not constitute a drawback from society;
nor does it mean that Catholic social teaching does not have “significant, real world
consequences” (172). By “pointing out false views of man and history” the Church has
served a “boundary-setting function” with actual historical, social, and political
implications. For example, Pope Leo XIII’s initial objection to socialism, then only a
social philosophy and not yet a fully official system of government, turned out to be an
accurate warning given the sufferings of Polish, Russian, and Czechoslovakian workers,
and the eventual fall of communist governments (Royal, 172; John Paul II, 12).
Future investigations of Catholic social teaching may reveal that institutions
practicing dialogue with an attitude toward contingency and ignorance can make
historically influential comments on proper social/political order, as well as propose
specific policies on the issues of the day. John Paul II writes that the Church “formulates
a genuine doctrine, a corpus that enables her to analyze social realities, to make
judgments about them, and to indicate directions for the just resolution of problems” (5).
To say that dialogues such as those proposed by the Church have uncertain ends is not to
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say that the contingent principles they posit and test cannot be practical materials for the
formulation of a directive social doctrine. What needs to be asked in future research is,
“how are both general commentaries on social problems, and specific guidelines for
action, articulated within a dialogue form that maintains an ethic of ignorance and
contingency consistent with the social teaching values of the Church?” The additional
question then becomes, “what tangible historical evidence can be provided that links the
outcomes of these dialogues with social/political change?” Several of the answers may be
found in a more thorough analysis of Catholic social encyclicals for their stated dialogic
values, plus a tracking of historical changes associated with their public reception.
Medical Ignorance in Pedagogy and Practice
The stated dialogic values of medical ignorance are accessibly Socratic. The ethics of
medical ignorance that I will cover here concern training, and their Socratic heritage
makes this context an excellent direction for future research. My comments will center on
the University of Arizona College of Medicine’s curriculum on medical ignorance; with a
brief treatment I will illustrate the potential for further research on particulars of the
school’s program, course content, comments from professors and students, guest lectures,
and pedagogical outcomes.
In an article appearing in the Western Journal of Medicine, Witte, Witte, and Way
(1990) write that the University of Arizona College of Medicine’s curriculum on
ignorance has the following aim: “To promote a spirit of inquiry, rather than the mere
memorization of syndromes and treatments…” (17). Students “are taught that which is
not known,” a category of medical knowledge that includes “things which we believe we
know, but in actuality do not” (17, emphasis mine). This emphasis on false belief
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constituting “knowledge” recalls the target of Socratic elenchos; in the same way that
Socrates’ disavowal makes moral ignorance a form of knowledge, so too does this basic
statement provide medical ignorance a positive categorization. The ethic of ignorant
inquiry is also strikingly similar, expressed in the claim that “Indeed, the belief that one
understands a subject is usually, if not always, an indication that one simply has not dug
far enough into the area” (17). Finally, the therapeutic function of the discourse is
characteristically Socratic. The removal of false beliefs in medical certainty is realized by
way of recognizing the limitations of medical scientific knowledge, and this is done for
the inculcation of ignorance in order to train better practicing doctors. Witte, et al. (1990)
write “With hard work, dedication, and a great deal of reading and careful thought, the
finest students at the University of Arizona are managing to graduate more ignorant than
when they enrolled” (17). The purpose of this rigorous inculcation of ignorance is
“learning how to question, rather than how to answer, whether about the basic biology of
an illness…the diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of specific diseases…or related
socioeconomic, legal, and ethical issues…” as a reversal of most medical curricula (18).
Future examinations might focus on the particular courses and their stated values, as
well as the more specific desired outcomes for students as related to the ignorant journey
described above. At the University of Arizona, students learn an ethic of continuous
questioning in dialogue with other students, professors, and guest lecturers, who together
“explore the cutting edge of the unknown” (Witte et al., 18). Begun in 1985, the
curriculum helps students “develop the needed attitudes to recognize and deal with
ignorance” understanding “the things we know we don’t know, the things we don’t know
we don’t know, and the things we think we know but don’t” (18). Important to this
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process is a recognition of the historical contingency of medical “facts” and “knowledge”
that proceed in a nonlinear fashion through past and future successes and follies (18).
Reflecting the basic ethic of ignorance that promotes continuous questioning, students are
graded “not by short-answer tests, but primarily by the progression of their questions”
(18). All of this training on questioning is connected to medical praxis. Students record
their questions in weekly “ignorance logs” as they perform analyses, have discussions,
conduct research, and “practice making clinical decisions where lives may hang in the
balance” (18-19). How ignorance training leads to better practical capability in diagnosis
and treatment would be a primary question to pursue in future research.
In this article Witte, et al. (1990) describe the role of medical ignorance concerning
AIDS and lymphatic diseases, illustrating the issues of treating illnesses with unknown
aspects, as well as the historical uncertainties of discovery and analysis that plague
medical findings. Other contexts can be similarly explored for procedures and outcomes
according to an ignorant dialogic ethic. What is important to note is that ignorance in this
context has clear practical applications; the training is intended to make better doctors,
and their treatment of patients is likely to be an enactment of the virtues gained from their
ignorance work.3 An investigation of what those virtues are - fairness, patience, or
humility, for example - how they are defined and negotiated by practitioners and
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An essay appearing in The Lancet, for example, advocates continuous questioning as a
way to better administer medicine to patients, implying an ethic of ignorance by the
recommendation that an attitude of omnipotence be replaced by a recognition of
impotence. Pickering, William G. “Does Medical Treatment Mean Patient Benefit?
(Benefits of Therapy Need to be Continually Evaluated).” The Lancet 347 (1996) : 379380.
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professors, and what their practical outcomes are in doctor/patient relations, would be
likely areas of focus.
A related area for future inquiries could be medical research, where the values of
ignorance, especially as they are based on scientific unknowns, may affect the way
researchers work, form policies, and publicly describe the outcomes of their research.4
Here, the Absolute aims of genuine dialogue could potentially be examined by focusing
on religious conflicts in medical research, for example, in stem cell and human cloning
debates. The matter of public reporting, of course, would also be a problem of rhetorical
interest.
Finally, it is important to identify medical ignorance as further evidence that
contingency does not deny praxis. The University of Arizona is attempting to train “more
ignorant” doctors as capable practitioners of medicine; discovering how this is
accomplished, and what it means to be a “capable, ignorant doctor” may provide a rich
description of what actual practice looks like when contextualized within a continuous
medical dialogue on ignorance.
Contingent, Ignorant Conclusions
My study has centered around, and given thorough treatment to, two main terms:
contingency and ignorance. It would only be appropriate to cast my conclusions in their
language. I have applied contingency to a description of moral rhetoric as a search for the
ordering terms of community - justice, piety, courage, fairness, equality, and so on.
Genuine dialogue has been described as an attempt to discover the eidoi of these terms
4

In a New Statesmen article, for example, an ethic of ignorance is proposed as a repair
for various problems of medical research. Le Fanu, James. “Why Doctors Should Admit
Their Ignorance (Pseudo Explanations by Physicians Betray Their Scientific Ignorance).”
New Statesman 128 (1999) : 28-29.
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for the stabilization of public moral argument. Genuine dialogue mediates the epistemic
gap between imperfect human knowledge and perfect (divine, essential) knowledge by
forming a practice that compromises neither, a practice aimed at positing, investigating,
challenging, and re-testing, moral theses over time into an open-ended future. A
characteristic form of disagreement with this statement holds that idealist practices are
forms of manipulation in contingent clothing: Socrates knows the answers to his
questions before he asks, making his interlocutors into marks and reducing Socrates to a
(basely) ironic trickster character. This interpretation ignores important textual evidence
to the contrary (as I have argued), and transforms the values of genuine dialogue openness, inclusiveness, uncertainty - into a set of baited traps and dishonest stances.
Moreover, it closes off scholars of moral rhetoric from a dialogue tradition that makes it
possible to mediate between the contemporary theoretical accent on individualizedtruths-made-in-historical-context, and the idealist voice that this accent has made sound
naive, or worse yet, manipulative.
To recognize the contingent ethic of essentialist moral dialogue is to preserve its
actual dialogic integrity as a response to charges of impossibility and manipulation. The
defense has worked on several levels in my project. First, I have demonstrated that
contingency as uncertainty is an enabling principle of genuine dialogue, making its
practice extensive into uncertain ends/futures, and therefore, reconcilable with the
practical imperfections of local human experience, conventional language, and historical
moment. The actual ends of genuine dialogue, being uncertain, are not problematized by
these limitations but rather become a realistic description of potential argumentative
outcomes. Second, I have turned the charge of manipulation against immanent versions
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of ethical contingency. When “contingency” is made a motivation to eject the vocabulary
of entire traditions of moral dialogue, as Rorty proposes in his “contingency of
language,” the result is not that the dialogues left over will proceed toward uncertain
ends. Rather, those dialogues remaining are manufactured against the very arguments that
threaten whatever political or historical project they are meant to further. Ideological
efforts represent a truer form of contingency-based manipulation since they shape
discourse according to the aims of a preconceived program for human ethical “progress.”
Ignorance has been defined in two senses: as a form of moral knowledge, and as a
rhetorical means. The particular value of Socratic ignorance is that it categorizes moral
knowledge as uncertainty and makes its discovery and testing the project of contingent
dialogue. Socrates’ ethic of dialogic ignorance was intended for the whole city, and its
basic target was certainty in several variations; I expanded Socrates’ criticism of certainty
to utopian and progressivist discursive programs. I have implied Socrates’ individual
ethic as metaphysical, but the condition of ignorance could be therapeutically imposed
upon any interlocutor, inviting persons of diverse opinions and values into dialogues on a
wide range of topics. The therapeutic aim of the elenchos was to make Socrates’
condition of (ignorance-based) wisdom the condition of his dialogic “others,” and this
could apply equally, I think, for the staunch pragmatic sophists Polus and Callicles, as it
could for Socrates’ student Plato. The potential value of ignorance given our
contemporary theoretical and public condition is that it equally infects theorists and
practitioners on both sides of the metaphysical divide. For this reason ignorance can open
dialogues and include participants in contexts with varying value systems, with the lone
requirement that everyone knows what they don’t know.
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Another key idea in the study that becomes relevant here is that of a relational good.
According to Farrell (1991), relational goods “require another person in order to be
practiced and thereby cultivated,” making rhetoric a “coherent, creative activity admitting
to certain standards of accomplishment” (187). As a good relational to genuine dialogue,
ignorance requires the inclusion of people who disagree, submitting challenges from
diverse perspectives. The counterexample of ideological discourse demonstrates one
possible form that results when dialogues are built on manufactured certainties designed
to silence particular voices. The role of the expert in the contemporary public sphere has
caused similar problems, especially by the articulation of guru knowledge through
technical jargon. Ignorance has the potential to rescue the privileges of debate away from
technocrats, intellectuals, medical scientists, and analysts by imposing contingency on
their conclusions, and calling into question the certainty of their specialized rationalities.
Socrates’ method provides a model, as it was directed with the greatest force against
those who considered themselves “experts” on moral wisdom, for example, the
politicians, and Euthyphro.
As a recognition and inclusion of the “other” in contingent civic contexts, ignorance
also contributes to conceptions of phronesis. Recall that Johnstone (1980) assigns
phronesis, through Aristotle, the task of mediating between considerations of concrete
situation and universal. Johnstone writes “The objective of practical wisdom…is the
apprehension of moral truth, of truth in the probable and contingent realm of action” (3).
Socratic ignorance fits this function of phronesis precisely, first by dividing “moral truth”
off into the category of uncertainty, then by promoting a practice fitting for the
“contingent realm of action,” a description we can apply to genuine dialogue. Further
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research could investigate fuller forms of integration between ignorance and phronesis.
The question could be asked “is ignorance a form of practical wisdom?” The early
answer is a tentative “yes.” By his disavowal of knowledge, Socrates “apprehends” the
moral truth that he is nothing compared to wisdom, and his resulting practice of
philosophy occurs in a morally contingent realm of civic action, a description that
corresponds with Johnstone’s definition. Describing the relationship between phronesis
and ignorance may be another way to get at the mediation between the ideal and local
accomplished in genuine dialogue.
Finally, the outcome of genuine dialogue, virtue, is an important matter for future
research. Defining virtue as craft I have focused on the “doing” of moral dialogue, a
creative process formed from the considerations, materials, and limitations specific to it.
Just as medicine and law admit of certain standards of practice for the production of their
desired ends, so does genuine dialogue have standards for its procedures - inclusion and
open-endedness accomplished through contingency and ignorance - as well as outcomes
in moral choice and policy. Craft virtue is connected with the above ideas of phronesis
and relational goods, since these make the creative “doing” of genuine dialogue possible.
The purpose of the “craft” of Socratic dialogue, and the difficulties it faces, are unified
under ignorance: those who don’t know must be made to know that they don’t know, so
they can engage one another for the sake of growing in virtue. Seeing virtue as craft helps
us as rhetorical theorists to focus on the purposes, standards of accomplishment, and
difficulties that define ethical practices, including the practice of rhetoric itself. Through
the craft perspective, we can usefully ask what various participants in dialogue can do
relationally in order to further the values and ends of their community. Further research
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should take a closer look at what it means to accomplish a “craft” of virtue from a
rhetorical perspective. The metaphor is useful to rhetoric not only because of its emphasis
on practice, but also because it binds together considerations of form, content, context,
purpose, and limitations, all considerations that rhetorical theory is uniquely capable of
examining.
Implications
In ending the study I return to the problem in order to frame a set of implications. The
problem was framed around “emotivism,” the contemporary attitude that “all moral
judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling,
insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character,” so that “moral judgments, being
expressions of attitude or feeling, are neither true nor false; and agreement in moral
judgment is not to be secured by any rational method,” (MacIntyre 1984, 12).
MacIntyre’s definition can be expanded into a general statement on the denial that
contemporary moral pluralism launches against truth-seeking discourses in the public
realm. Genuine dialogue has been my attempt to recover essentialist discourse as a repair
for the fragmentation of competitive, pluralistic arguments on public, ordering terms. My
proposal has been for practical mediation between the local and the Absolute, with the
warning that overemphasis in either direction can lead to trouble.
An overemphasis on locality yields various forms of moral relativism (for example,
emotivism, or moral plurality), as well as more specific manifestations such as ideology
and immanentist discourse programs. Conversely, an overemphasis on the Absolute can
yield discursive proposals impractical to human moral endeavor, as exampled by
Nicholas’ wholesale departure from discourse. Among its several possible meanings,
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“mediation” involves matters of emphasis and overemphasis. These matters provide
useful guidelines for how the local and perfect are negotiated in ethical rhetoric, and how
these emphases regulate moral dialogue in particular - making it possible or impossible,
revealing whether it is in service to the larger polity, or small and exclusive communities,
and creating a standard for how “dialogic” it really is. In another sense “mediation” could
denote a sense of comfort with imperfection. The metaphysician and ideologue alike
propose various dialogue forms in order to address the common target of imperfection,
but those proposals, and especially their aims, reflect different states of comfort. The
ideologue’s attempt to “clean up” language is reflective of a discomfort with imperfection
- social, political, and linguistic - and the formation of language programs can become the
chosen therapy. The metaphysician is equally troubled by social and political maladies,
but her action in the social realm is not aimed at perfection, but rather, as a form of
service within a contingent frame of present and future time. Attitudes toward
imperfection become relevant for those parts of social action that are discursive (public
moral argument), especially as standards for dialogue. Comfort with imperfection
underlies several elements of genuine dialogue - Socrates’ willingness to argue from
examples, the categorization of moral wisdom as uncertainty, and, of course, Socrates’
disavowal of knowledge. The implication is that varying levels of comfort or discomfort
with imperfection motivate differing forms of moral dialogue, and the motives for
dialogue proposals can be tracked along these lines of mediation.
A primary motive for offering a “mediated” solution has been to revive classical and
metaphysical forms of ignorance in order to make them possibilities in contemporary
rhetorical practice. In this way my study may contribute to the debate between ideal and
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pragmatic rhetoric begun in Ancient Greece that continues today. Gorgias’ tenets of
communication stand as enduring objections to the type of discourse I have proposed in
this study. They are: nothing actually exists; if anything actually did exist, it would be
incomprehensible to human beings; if it were comprehensible, it could not be
communicated to others (Enos 1993, 81-82). The first statement is a denial not of
physical reality, but of the existence of essences. Enos writes “Gorgias so strongly
opposed the belief in essences” that “Platonic notions of ontological ‘essences’ (for
example, the ideal rhetoric) were absurdities…” (81). I have demonstrated how this
denial can become a basis for ejecting metaphysical vocabularies, and so, a blockade to
dialogue generally. I have argued that the importance of including consideration for
essences in moral dialogue is that such consideration motivates an ethic of contingency
and ignorance that acts to preserve the integrity of genuine dialogue as inclusive and
open-ended.
Gorgias’ second statement refers to the limitations of human sensory perception. It
confronts ideal notions of rhetoric based on the misconception that these notions demand
“perfect knowledge” in order to be practiced. For Gorgias, Enos writes, Plato’s idealized
rhetoric was a fantasy because the existence of Perfect things have no referents in the
physical world attainable by human sensory perception: “In short, total knowledge of any
subject (including rhetoric) would be impossible and what would appear to be knowledge
would be thoughts about observations that could only be partially understood through
interpretations of our finite senses and cognitive preconceptions” (Enos, 82). This
argument is based on the misconception that idealist practices demand “perfect
knowledge” of their subjects in order to meet their own standards of accomplishment, an
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argument that is denied by the ethic of uncertainty central to Socrates’ “What is F?”
question, elenchos, and disavowal of knowledge.
The third tenet holds that, even if the Perfect were experienced, language could not
articulate it, since speech can only communicate “references to experience” (Enos, 82).
Enos attributes to Gorgias the belief that “even if it were possible to acquire an
understanding of an ideal rhetoric, it could never be communicated to others, since it
could have no referent to anything which could be perceived” (83). This is the problem
mediated by Socrates when he asks the “What is F?” question. Inevitably, answers to
what piety is, or what courage is, have to be based on examples and human experiences,
imperfected by individualized perceptions and articulations of sensory reality. We have
seen, however, that Socrates reconciles with this by accepting examples and even using
them himself, as the material for responding to, accepting, and rejecting, the arguments of
his interlocutors. This acceptance comes with the recognition that examples are the only
materials available to them as human beings, and the outcomes of their arguments toward
essential definitions will be contingent as a result.
My study has not implied proof that an ideal rhetoric is possible; nor has it disproved
the denials of critics. But by pointing out some of the misconceptions underlying stances
critical of idealist proposals, I have implied the possibility for a more dialogic ethic in
this overwhelming debate. Based on concepts of contingency and ignorance, I have
argued that the purposes of idealist practices such as the argument from definition, the
“What is F?” question, and Socratic elenchos have been largely misunderstood by critics,
whether they be Thrasymachus or Richard Enos. In supporting this stance I have
responded to claims of Socrates’ insincerity in disavowing knowledge, Socrates’
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insistence that one has to know the eidos of a thing in order to have moral knowledge
(claims that attribute the Priority of Definitional Knowledge (PD) to Socrates, and hold
that he denies the epistemological value of examples outright), and the general perception
that arguments from definition actually aim of positing final, rather than contingent,
definitions. A greater understanding of the dialogic ethic of idealist practices may come
through a better conversation in the field on ignorance. Part of this conversation might
consist of discovering points of similarity between the social concerns and proposals of
theorists on both sides of this enduring debate, especially as they are found in dialogue.
In short, genuine dialogue may be a decent form to impose upon debates internal to the
discipline on matters of being and immanence.
Finally, whether this contingent and ignorant dialogic ethic becomes part of scholarly,
or public, debate, important issues of symbolic violence can be addressed by it. In the
same way that the ideologue does violence to metaphysical vocabularies, the scientist
does violence to arguments from mystery and religion, the engineering professor does
violence to arguments in the philosophy department, and the materialist does violence to
spiritualist objections, all based on certainties about fact, measurement, or visions of
progress. If, as James Herrick (1992) has argued, contemporary rhetoric has become
directed not at seeking consensus, community, or humanness, but rather “victory,
ideological hegemony, or…’having the last word’” (1992, 133-134), then violence is its
only logical outcome. Practices that do seek “consensus,” “community,” or “humanness”
are not insured against violence by their nature, but the addition of an ethic of
contingency and ignorance could go a long way toward the inclusion of arguments,
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vocabularies, and diverse “others.” By this ethic the dialogic revisioning of one term of
order for another may become an act of collective sacrifice rather than murder.
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